icon662.gif9789861855073富爸爸之有錢人的大陰謀.jpg

富爸爸【有錢人的大陰謀~八種全新的金錢法則】 

你知道嗎?
你也可以在出版社高寶的網站上看到更多的資訊~包含電子試閱版唷!
fig010.gif
我想要獲得更多不為人知的有錢人祕密

吃飯可以比別人慢,
但保護自己的錢可千萬別落人後喔!

 

 

 

Fred預計在今年招開一堂只為MTS舊學員和部落格格友的全台獨家【有錢人不說的秘密】,除了告訴你Fred在美國的期間究竟親耳聽到甚麼驚人的消息!更會展示好不容易入手的照片和血淋淋的實況影片!

這一切只要一攤開在陽光下,你根本無法想像世界可能發生何等驚人的動盪!!這些令人不可思議的陰謀,都已經秘密的進行中了!還不知道發生甚麼事的人,或是等不及想知道的人~誠摯的建議你在Fred開課前,趕緊去看看這本9/8出版的富爸爸【有錢人的大陰謀~八種全新的金錢法則】!因為只有看過這本書的人,才聽的懂Fred在講的究竟是甚麼!

 

這個文章空間,開放給所有想知道有錢人陰謀的人、想知道如何在這陰謀下順利平安渡過,甚至發現商機找到賺錢機會的人,來留下你的觀點、想法、意見...等~ Fred的【有錢人不說的秘密】將會視格友們的討論熱烈度,來決定公開多少的資料和不為人知的祕密~

 

歡迎你針對這個主題暢所欲言吧!(嚴禁打廣告、口水戰)

 


FrederickWang 發表在 痞客邦 PIXNET 留言(140) 人氣()


留言列表 (140)

發表留言
  • 窮忙族 勤勞貧困階級 工作貧窮者 新貧階級 working-poor
  • 我還沒翻過「有錢人的大陰謀」這本書,但是我聽說書裡好像有提到學校教育故意不教理財教育,
    也故意不教大家要怎麼成為右邊象限的觀念,都是教大家要怎麼好好當個E象限的窮忙族,
    當然學校教育結束後那些窮忙族就是去找份工作替大企業家努力工作幫大企業家來賺大錢,
    窮忙族自己只能賺到那沒啥用的小錢而已,
    當然大企業家就更有錢,窮忙族就越來越窮,
    貧富差距越來越大,對企業家就更有利,
    企業家還可以用句「今天不努力工作,明天努力找工作」
    等類似的話來威脅窮忙族,窮忙族怕工資收入就此沒有了,
    只有更努力的工作,但是工作時間更長薪水只會越來越少,
    加上政府又是力挺企業家而不甩窮忙族,
    窮忙族只有乖乖的被企業家給剝削了!

    調漲資本工資? 大老闆先反對
    http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/100826/11/2bsn3.html

    學貸+低薪 35歲前工作只能還債
    http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/100825/135/2brsw.html

    平常無聊會搜尋窮忙族等相關文章,真的發現到窮忙族的新聞常常出現,
    搜尋燒炭自殺的新聞發現到多數燒炭自殺的也都是窮忙族居多,
    光是這兩個最近的新聞,就可以看出那些大企業家的嘴臉跟窮忙族的無奈,
    大企業家為了再賺更多,當然就更要剝削那些窮忙族,
    所以我很羨慕出生在大企業家的家庭,從小接觸有錢人的思想跟最好的教育,
    將來繼承企業後也可以好好的來剝削窮忙族,讓這些窮忙族替自己賺更多錢,
    窮忙族呢?就給點小錢打發掉就好了,
    還可以用「今天不努力工作,明天努力找工作」等類似話來威脅跟剝削他們,
    不過窮忙族就可悲了,不但有不少負債的東西要還,房貸助學貸款等之類的東西,
    而且工作時間長薪水又少,每天平均要工作超過11個小時,
    長時間去做那些沒用的工作不但提升不了財務的基本常識,
    而且又浪費時間,身體健康不管是生理還是心理的也全都被搞壞,
    還要花不少醫藥費再身體健康上,更是雪上加霜,
    窮忙族想充實自己的財務基本常識?沒有用的啦,
    每天超時工作,工作完後都累個半死,哪還有什麼時間跟體力去充實自己?
    最後窮忙族就會這樣惡性循環越來越悽慘,人生充滿了極度的絕望,
    因為再怎麼努力也沒有半點用處,有的就會去買木炭不買肉的去燒炭自殺!
    更慘的是兄弟因為都是窮忙族,為了窮忙族的問題哥哥去殺弟弟再自殺!

    失業毀天倫... 兄殺弟再燒炭
    http://news.cts.com.tw/cts/society/201008/201008060534275.html
  • 求人不如求己
  • 學校教出來的最多是S
    但是若沒有FQ, S象限賺的到$而存不住$


    明星私立小學前十名的家長會 就含蓋立法委員( > 2/3) 百大企業董事和CEO
    私校小學背經典 双語(全日制 上午下午各一種語文 很公平)
    小學中文讀(背)老子易經詩經論孟 英文讀Times(成人版)和莎士比亞


    如果要自力救濟 可以在家自己要求自己的小孩

    徐薇(英文老師)說 她一家姐妹弟三人 她爸爸[逼迫]她們小學就自讀讀國中英文 國中時讀高中英文 高中時被魔鬼老師強迫每天背英文社論一篇 所以她才能聯考英文全國第一 她妹妹高考第一


    求人不如求己
    有快樂的童年  就有不快樂的成年

  • 劉林添
  • 防災求生物品清單

    防災用品╱50項防災求生物品清單
    以下就是我列出來的清單,前提是在停水斷電時,這些物資足夠在家窩上7天,到了必須外出逃難時,還能挑出重點分裝進防水登山後背包裡:
    1.肉類、豆類或玉米罐頭 2.壓縮餅乾或營養口糧 3.泡麵或杯麵
    4.礦泉水(至少20公升) 5.少許的鹽(避免肌肉出現痙攣)
    6.果仁或不容易壓壞的巧克力棒 7.塑膠便當盒(到收容所時可微波食物)
    8.鋼杯(可代替碗,也可代鍋具烹煮) 9.湯匙、叉子
    10.紙杯、紙盤(停水時可暫時擋著用) 11.小塑膠袋(保存吃不完的食物)
    12.大塑膠袋或垃圾袋(集水、擋雨、防潮、求救)
    13.保險套(必要時可用來承裝大量水) 14.簡易炊具
    15.舊報紙(包紮、當燃料、墊屁股…) 16.手動發電手電筒
    17.反光鏡(反射日光,引救援者注意) 18.收音機
    19.電池和太陽能充電器 20.滅火器(防地震引發煤氣爆炸)
    21.衛生紙、溼紙巾 22.毛巾和抹布 23.顏色鮮艷的雨衣或雨傘(易被看見)
    24.輕便的睡袋和毛毯 25.工作手套 26.五米長尼龍繩
    27.寬版膠帶(包紮或是做記號用)
    28.盥洗用具(含女性衛生用品,若想不佔位置的話,棉條最適當) 29.免洗內褲
    30.針線(必要時還可以用來暫時縫合傷口)和安全別針
    31.急救藥箱(OK繃、常用藥、處方藥、抗生素、防蚊液、淨水片…)
    32.口罩、工業用透明眼罩 33.舊眼鏡(近視者備用)
    34.打火機、防水火柴、打火棒 35.蠟燭
    36.指南針 37.鍊鋸 38.多功能瑞士小刀 39.哨子(求救用) 40.紙、筆
    41.身分證明文件、存摺(置防水袋中) 42.鈔票、電話卡、銅板(打公共電話)
    43.當地地圖 44.電池充飽且耗電量少的舊款手機
    45.長袖運動服、運動鞋和棉襪 46.可防墜落物的帽子
    47.筆電(還有餘裕的話最好能帶著,並且申請一個webmail)
    48.相機(記錄災情,求償或申請減稅) 49.一本書(防無聊、正向思考者尤佳) 50.寵物防災包
    50樣看起來很多吧!
    其實35-44項可以全部裝進一個便當盒大小的容器裡,而且46、47項還可以直接穿在身上,所以實際上佔不了多少空間。
    如果還是嫌多,只要想想家裡的雜物和救命物資哪樣重要,很快就能挪出空間來擺放了。
    我在國外網站上有看到可保存20-30年的脫水食物.加水就可以食用.不知道有沒有人知道台灣有沒有在賣.提供一下.
  • 求人不如求己
  • 緊急避難

    清水和脫水食物至少要能撐30天(100天更好) 器材大概差不多 別忘了處方藥
    有一種強力濾水器(隨身型) 廣告號稱連水溝水都能過濾成清水 為家人一人買一個算保險
    脫水食物登山或軍品社大概有 聽說慈濟正在開發 只是不知道是否外賣
    世界展望會正在為重點山地鄉屯積戰備糧和急救藥 也可能有
  • Yoko
  • 有錢人想的和你不樣的行前說明會我有去參加,也報名了今年的新加坡MMI
    那天聽Fred有稍微提到這次新開的課程內容
    覺得相當震驚,真不知道這個動盪不安的時代究竟會演變成怎樣?
    難不成會比過去的經濟大蕭條更加令人恐慌嗎?
    好難想像,但是更想知道該如何提前準備
    保護好自己和家人!!
    期待這個課程可以早日開課~!!!
  • 阿大
  • 一定會去買來看的好書
  • 852
  • 正式的中文版終於要出了
    有錢人的大陰謀之前有拿到(搶先翻譯版)
    正版我一定會買來拜讀
    最近再看以前買的一本好書
    1998年商周出版的(金錢簡史)
    分享一段名人說過的話

    紙幣的困擾,在於它報償了可以操縱金錢的少數人,卻愚弄了勤勞而儲蓄的一代
    亞當.史密斯

  • yichie
  • 讓孩子去學校受教育要有很大的勇氣

    改變自己成為有錢人的思維
    培養孩子擁有有錢人的思維
  • 儒林外史
  • 為何諾貝爾經濟學獎大多發獎給數學家 美國主流大學也把經濟思想史和經濟史改列選修
    讓經濟系學生連Adam Smith, Karl Marks, 李斯特(德)都不知道也可以畢業
    讓經濟系教授整天研究數學方程式 就不會關心真正的市井小民的真經濟
    統計資料只有和去年比的年增長率(流量) 沒有歷年累積的存量資料

    這和中國古代科舉的功能差不多
    國王萬歲萬歲萬萬歲


    雜誌提到六十年來台北房地產價格漲為四十倍 上過王老師的課的人就會算出六十年來真實價格總合增長率為12%而已 (平均每年才增長 0.19%而已)
    40倍 / (1250 / 35) = 1.12倍
    2010 七月 gold price = 1250 USD/troy-ounce
    1945-1970 gold price = 35 USD/troy-ounce



    清崎說 [主流沒有說謊 只是並未說出全部的事實]

  • nervlee
  • 在70-80年代.那時代的父母都承E,該死的雇員習性硬逼著孩子要讀書,沒第一名便會遭毒打,以現在的觀感這種父母早就被殺了
  • silver-knights
  • 蔬菜(之前有po文跟大家分享過)

    家樂福及B&Q都有賣蔬菜種籽很便宜30~45天即可收成!別吃脫水蔬菜那只能短暫維持生命希望大家受用(趁現在多買些種籽肥料)
  • 求人不如求己
  • 緊急避難(30天)時沒水沒電沒瓦斯沒電話 有什麼就吃什麼 還得防備別人搶 回到原始叢林 大男人要用武力保護全家老小女人
    可考慮豆芽(長的特快) 吃一點點脫水蔬菜只是撐幾天而已 等海嘯過後就旭日東升
    到時後連清水都得自己過濾
    維生素 礦物質要如何補充 ? 請教大家
    水肥如何清運也是大問題


    回想一下祖父曾祖父輩奮鬥的過程 就知道老人的智慧很有用 祖父輩只有重病患者與懷孕婦人可以吃雞蛋 日落而息 用木柴燒大竈
  • dragon Yang
  • 我們是否活在如同電影椘門的世界之中,世界上的一切是真實還是有心人所塑造的假象,我們是否有足夠的能力與勇氣去洞察、判斷、自醒,我想可以藉由這次最新的著作訊息來審視與參考,我們是不是應該要從"Matrix母體"中甦醒,激發更多機會與能力來面對未來更嚴苛的挑戰。
  • Rich egyptian chi
  • 等了好久好久好久的書 終於出來了

    fred 老師 上次聽你演講 說到這個不能說的秘密

    真的是太震驚了 到時候一定會去上的
  • nervlee
  • 全球股跌 恐慌指數大漲 金價飆
    中國時報 / 張舒婷/台北報導 2010/08/26

    美國房市不佳,引發股市下修,全球股市從美股修正至亞股,昨天台股也重挫,代表恐慌程度的VIX指數單更是大漲7%,唯獨一向被視為避險資產的黃金「一枝獨秀」,再度突破1230美元,但油價從8月以來已下跌逾1成,與5月初波段高點(92.25美元)相比,跌幅更達22%。

    歐美股市紛紛重挫,道瓊跌破所有均線後未見止跌,一直表現強勁的亞股也面臨獲利了結賣壓,昨天除了升息1碼的泰國、前天重挫後來翻紅的菲律賓,以及指數位居高點的印尼上漲外,其餘亞股全面下挫,台灣、越南跌幅最深。

    保德信投信投資長余睿明表示,台股走勢受國際投資氣氛左右,美國企業財報季進入尾聲,金融市場暫時難以擺脫震盪走勢,台股近期較亞洲其他國家股市相對強勢,因此一旦回檔整理,震盪幅度也會加大。觀察年線及半年線,9月初可望黃金交叉,下跌至此時應有短線支撐。

    群益亞太中小基金經理人蘇士勛指出,亞股在漲多後受到國際股市拉回,由於亞股是今年資金淨流入最多的區域,資金撤出的壓力也相對大,尤其短期美元指數有止跌回升的現象,近來與美元指數走勢相左的亞股恐將受波及。

    股市走跌,推升金價走高,匯豐黃金及礦業股票型基金經理人過孟袁分析,6月時金價創下每英兩1266.5美元歷史新高,主要反應全球金融市場動盪、貨幣貶值,近期資金再度流入黃金避險。

    過孟袁認為,短期來看,隨著復甦前景蒙上陰影等負面消息出籠,帶動金價走揚,但上攻力道不夠健全,可能早成心理面對高價位的障礙,預估金價進入1230美元到1240美元後,將會引發一波獲利回吐賣壓,近期金價恐呈現高檔震盪。

    蘇士勛則強調,長線來看,亞洲龍頭的中國股市底部逐漸形成,日後續挫機會相對低,加上其他新興亞股經濟體質良好,印度、泰國、馬來西亞、台灣、韓國全面加入升息行列,顯示經濟復甦強勁,後市仍值得看好。

    前段陳述恐慌指數標高,後段則又推薦股票,真是無言
  • .
  • 賣瓜的說瓜甜
  • 自由人
  • 我們都知道錢會不斷已複利的方式貶值,這也是為什麼以前的百萬富翁現在還買不起台北的一間廁所(大陸以前的萬元戶現在算窮人也是這個道理)

    36年前我剛出生時前兩年,我爸在民生社區買了間三十坪的公寓,當時花26萬買的房子現在值1350萬(可惜在24年前已被法拍200萬賣掉了)漲了50倍以上
    39年前黃金一盎司35美元而現在1238美元,也漲了35倍以上!

    錢不能光看數字的變化就已為增加了,相信大家都知道,所以才要以實質資產來對照紙幣的價值,只有實質資產不能憑空生出!
    以我上述所說的房子來說,台幣相對那間房在38年內已貶了98%
    而美元也好不到哪去,美元相兌黃金在39年間也貶了約97%
    請問30-40年後紙鈔對實質資產還會貶多少呢?我看只會貶的比過去更多,不過大多數人在3-5年內感覺不太出,就像以前多頭時代時的複利一樣,前面覺得錢增加的很慢,要經過長時間的複利加乘後才知道厲害,但這次的複利貶值會比過去更厲害些,千萬別被國王們用溫水煮蛙的方式煮熟了還不知不覺!
    不過我不認為房子還會像過去一樣會再漲幾十倍(再漲一倍可能就會暴動了,兩倍就革命了)而貴金屬我認為能很好的保護我的資產,使我能參與下次的財富重分配!希望各位也都保護好自己財富!
  • 自由人
  • 真抱歉!我也不知怎麼變那麼多重複的迴響,每次在此部落格發表都要送出好幾次才會貼上!
  • 謝謝你的迴響~
    有時後痞客邦的系統不穩定就會變成這樣的狀況
    我們已經把重覆的部分都拿掉了
    請安心繼續發言~^^

    MTS群岳國際部落格經營團隊

    FrederickWang 於 2010/08/30 16:52 回覆

  • 窮忙族 勤勞貧困階級 工作貧窮者 新貧階級 working-poor
  • 我建議自由人發文時可以先把文章打好後複製一份到記事本裡以防萬一,
    然後在部落格發文時不管發成功還是失敗,再另外開個相同網頁檢查一下是不是真的發成功了!
    或是可以換個其他的瀏覽器試試看會不會改善原本的情況,例如火狐、GOOGLE等!
  • 窮忙族 勤勞貧困階級 工作貧窮者 新貧階級 working-poor
  • http://news.chinatimes.com/forum/0,5252,110514x112010082800394,00.html
    又找到一篇關於窮忙族的文章,裡面有提到
    「生活在社會最底層的窮人,日子一直苦哈哈,即使是一般薪水階級,十年來的薪資成長扣除通膨之後,實際是負成長,成了窮忙族。」
    唉,看到這句話就覺得那些E象限的窮忙族還真是可憐,那麼辛苦那麼拼命的努力工作(努力替B象限的大企業家工作),
    身體健康跟自由都沒了,薪水還是負成長,真的是再怎麼努力(再E象限)也沒有任何回報,
    根本就是大企業家的奴隸,沒利用價值就會被當成垃圾一樣的丟棄!
    無能政府還說「台灣貧富差距還不算太差。」
    想也知道政府只注重大企業家,不會去管窮忙族的死活,
    只注重失業率的數字,不管窮忙族的問題,
    窮忙族想翻身,難上加難啊!
    而且還有某個窮忙族想選議員呢,問題是選的上嗎?
    就算選上了窮忙族問題會改善嗎?我相信是不會的,
    我反而相信到時候窮忙族的社會問題會更多,
    而且賣木炭的人生意可能會更好一點!
    因為窮忙族問題越嚴重讓想燒炭自殺的人也變多了!
  • 如有雷同  純屬巧合
  • 如果排碳列入管制(溫室效應) 則沒有核心技術的又要為掌握工業文明核心技術的白白打工(進貢)幾十年

    苦幹實幹 嚴加查辦
    大混小混 一帆風順

    一頭牛被剝三次皮
     
  • nervlee
  • 不能po文,系統有問題
  • T.williams
  • 請問FRED,大家都說垃圾美元將會歸於零。除非再度回歸金銀本位才能確保人民的購買力,但國王還是掌握著絕大的權勢,當海嘯來臨財富重分配後會有新的交易媒介還是碳貨幣或是世界貨幣即將篡位呢?
  • .
  • 給24樓

    宋鴻兵的貨幣戰爭(二)的最後兩章有預測
  • 與大家分享~
  • 富媽媽與小孩的金錢難題

    一大早在奇摩的話題看到~與大家分享或許有人已看過,就當複習囉~
    歐洲女首富、法國萊雅集團(L'Oreal)繼承人莉莉安‧貝登寇(Liliane Bettencourt)因為大手筆餽贈友人價值上億歐元的現金與禮物,被女兒告上法院。儘管貝登寇夫人一再表示,她擁有自由支配財產的權利,卻依舊無法獲得女兒諒解。事實上,近年來在台灣,也逐漸出現不少兒子向父母索取金錢未果,進而產生暴力行為的社會事件。甚至有不少就業輔導員表示,許多已成年的小孩仗著父母經濟實力雄厚,既不出去工作,也不在家裡幫忙,抱著一副準備賴著讓父母養,或等待接管日後財產的心態,變成終日無所事事的尼特族。難道,這是造成「富不過三代」的最大原因!?

    不過在股神華倫巴菲特的字典裡,卻從來沒有出現過「富不過三代」這個名詞,因為他不曾考慮過要把財產留給自己的小孩。在他的兒子,彼得巴菲特所出版的書中曾提到,彼得巴菲特在19歲那年從華倫巴菲特手中得到一筆「足夠追逐自己的夢想,卻不夠安享清福過一生」的金錢,因此後來他決定使用這筆錢,成立個人音樂工作室,憑藉自己的音樂專長,靠接案子謀生。多年以後,彼得巴菲特不僅榮獲美國電視艾美獎的肯定,更成為好萊塢知名的音樂人、作曲家和製作人。他雖然比其他年輕人幸運,擁有來自老爸的支持,卻也因為他的老爸決心將日後財產捐出去,讓他沒有後路可退,只能靠自己努力前進。


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    金錢期待不對稱 就會產生衝突


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    很多人以為「富不過三代」是子孫不爭氣所造成的結果,但是看在曾經連續13度榮獲堪稱保險業奧斯卡獎,擁有保險天后美名的李佳蓉眼中,卻認為父母的金錢教養方式才是最大的癥結所在。

    她指出,以歐洲女首富的財產糾紛事件為例,其實就反映出父母與小孩之間,彼此之間存在著金錢期待完全不對稱的問題。換句話說,許多父母嘴巴裡雖然會嚷嚷著要省錢、希望孩子早點學會獨立自主的話,但是卻又產生拼命買奢侈品給小孩,或是在字裡行間有意無意透露出「反正以後我的錢都是你的」,種種表裡不一的言行舉止。如此一來,小孩就會下意識地產生期待,理所當然認為父母的錢就是我的,我也有權支配。因此她提醒所有父母,就算你什麼都沒說,但是只要你一產生矛盾心情,或是在言語間有任何閃爍模糊地帶,小孩依舊感受得出來。

    為了避免同樣的情況發生,她很早就下定決心,要以鐵的紀律般的家庭財務管理原則,培養兩個兒子正確的金錢觀念,如同她的新書書名《你的價值,自己創造》,她要她的小孩找到一輩子都受用的價值觀。因為有些價值,花再多的錢都買不到。但是很多父母卻沒有意識到,栽培與給予,完全是兩碼子事。

    花錢要有理 省錢不能沒道理


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    「父母的堅定很重要,因此當你訂定原則之後,絕對不能有一分鐘的動搖。」李佳蓉表示,她的規矩其實並不多,該給小孩的食衣住行育樂……等基本開銷也從不匱乏。但是,從小孩開始認字懂事時,她就訓練他們養成記帳的習慣,上了國中之後,申請零用錢或額外開銷則必須說明用途、寫簽呈。比如說,她給兒子一千元的預算購買體育課所需要的球鞋,但是兒子卻想買當時最流行的喬丹鞋,足足超過預算的兩倍。這時候,兒子必須主動說服她,為何要花兩倍預算買下這雙鞋。

    「我不接受趕流行,或是同學有我也要有的說法,我希望他可以認真去思考想要和需要的差別性,同時,慢慢讓他們瞭解,花錢必須花得有道理。」她說,後來兒子成功以這雙鞋具有保護雙腳的優良設計質感,獲得她的同意。僅管她知道,這明明是店內最貴的一雙鞋,她也付得心甘情願。她強調,父母不能因為怕浪費,省錢省過頭,省到連基本的用途都忘了,結果反而會造成小孩的自卑感。

    為了增廣小孩的見聞,她曾安排豪華旅遊行程,帶小孩搭頭等艙,前往香港半島酒店居住,見識最貴的飯店、享受頂級下午茶……等經驗。而在過程裡,她總是不厭其煩地跟小孩分享細節,如半島酒店為何如此有名、米其林餐廳的美食為何備受讚譽。不過,如此奢華享受僅此一回,往後的旅遊又回歸到平民路線。

    「我的目標是培養小孩成為全方位的生活家,因此,他必須要有見識,全方面地去體驗不同生活的樣貌,感受不同價值的差異性。所以我只讓他們體驗一次,這樣他才能學會自己去判斷,長大之後,他要追尋的是哪一種生活方式,他會自己在心裡編織夢想的藍圖。」李佳蓉說,賦予孩子追尋夢想的動力,也是一種財富。


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    對每一分錢負責,就會對自己負責


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    從不改變立場的李佳蓉,在執行懲罰時,也絕不寬容。她明言規定,每一筆零用錢的剩餘款項都必須繳回,否則將以雙倍懲罰。舉例來說,她曾經給大兒子五百元去買20元的零食,但是大兒子卻忘了把找回的480元全數奉還。隔天,她就向大兒子追討960元。

    她是個一言九鼎的母親,這麼多年以來,她的小孩也不敢心存僥倖。記得還有一回大兒子弄丟了她的手機,回家後哭得極其傷心,因為她兒子知道,必須將辛苦打工賺來的錢,拿去買兩支手機歸還給媽媽。「看他哭得那麼傷心,我也很難過。但是我不能心軟,我得讓他學會完全負責任,即使是一塊錢。因為人生只要一耍賴,就完了。」李佳蓉感慨地說,父母親一定會比小孩早死,因此父母要早點想清楚,自己不可能成為小孩子一輩子的依靠。就算留給小孩子再多的錢,他也不見得會珍惜,甚至會很快就花光。萬一當錢都沒了,你的小孩要靠什麼讓自己站起來?給小孩子負責任的能力,才是受用一輩子的本事。

    有趣的是,當她的兩個兒子愈來愈大時,反而認真去找打工賺錢的機會,因為他們認為,與其跟媽媽申請零用錢,要說明各種花費用途,實在太麻煩了,尤其是交了女朋友之後。因此,身為李佳蓉的大兒子,林世德從考上大學那一天起,就憑一己之力賺取生活費,在25歲那年買下人生的第一棟房子,在30歲時成為年薪百萬的保險業務員,更自行負擔籌備婚禮、度蜜月等所有費用,但他驕傲地說,「我靠自己贏得所有人對我的尊敬。」他不僅沒有怨言,反而跟母親培養出好朋友般的關係,他並坦承,自己從沒想過未來能得到多少財產,因為他知道母親早已下定決心捐贈財產給慈善團體。

    不要剝奪孩子白手起家的機會


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    「我遇過客戶的兒子,明明都35歲了,卻整天賴在家裡不出門,因為他只要工作得很工作,父母就會心疼,要他辭職回家,準備當接班人,結果搞到整個人完全失去鬥志。還有人主動幫小孩買房子買保險,卻又忍不住掛在嘴上邀功,彷彿害怕小孩不知道自己的苦心,造成孩子不願多做努力,變得意志消沉。」李佳蓉語重心長地表示,這些父母都不知道,你們正在剝奪孩子白手起家的機會。

    她回想起大兒子在25歲那年買房子的痛苦與掙扎,自己也曾經差點就忍不住要出手幫忙了,但她隨即轉念一想,白手起家的機會可能一生就那麼一次,也許當下充滿挫折,但是只要能熬過去,他所獲得的自信與成就感,卻是多少錢都換不到的。因此她選擇相信兒子,鼓勵他堅持下去。

    李佳蓉所抱持的觀念是,「錢不能取代父母,父母也不要妄想可以用錢陪伴小孩一輩子。許多父母會用錢去討好孩子,其實是怕小孩以後會恨他、不愛他、不願意孝順他。說穿了,到頭來還是為了自己。」李佳蓉相信,小孩是生命的延續,因此她教育小孩的目的,是為了替這個世界培養一個優秀的人才,而不是為自己,更不期望小孩來照顧她的晚年。而且,如果每一代都願意為自己負責,一代就會比一代強。當你的小孩願意為這個社會付出貢獻時,他就會心甘情願對你好。這樣的愛,才是無價。

    本文章轉載自「《ELLE》國際中文版雜誌八月號」
  • 先苦後甘
  • 巴菲特的父親是參議員 但他小學就得去賣汽水
    雷根小時候去打工 以賠償他在小學闖的小禍 因為他父母拒絕買單


    這種教育把父母勤奮的精神傳給子女 
    開始很累 以後輕鬆 先苦後甘
  • 與大家分享~
  • 這就是現在父母要學習的一個課題,這樣小孩子以後才不會變成茶來伸手飯來張口~
    而能從小就開始學習打造自己的財務方舟,自己釣魚吃而不是等著別人給魚吃~
  • 分享
  • 孩子是天生地養的 一枝草一點露

    歐美的父母 通常把孩子當成尚未成年的合夥人 而不是客戶
    歐美的父母只是暫時受委託的臨時監護人 不是主人

    宇宙的創造者(天父)才是孩子真正的主 創造天地的主會對孩子負責 

    歐美的父母通常不為孩子留很多財產 因為父母自己也只是財產的管理人而不是主人 創造天地的主才是財產真正的主



  • nervlee
  • 如果歐美父母的管教方式是如樓上所所的這樣完美無暇,台灣的教改就是完全來自美國,更證明了台灣拿到的那套教改就是美帝的思想武器,透過李遠則這特務來實行
  • 29樓
  • 回答30樓

    29樓說的是歐美的[家教] 不是學校教育  家教不等於學校教育
    29樓說的是歐美父母對親子間權利義務的態度 父母只打算管養子女到成年(18歲) 成年後放牛吃草  父母也不期望子女回養父母 

    事實上歐美已有一群人把小孩留在家庭自己教 拒絕上國王辦的學校  這群人可能是已經有所覺悟 
    台灣也有些人(包含校長,依照天下雜誌報導)把孩子留在家裡自己教 

    30樓是行家 也是覺悟的人

    美國的學校系統和歐陸(主要是法德)差別很大  美國不等於歐州  美國稱歐陸(法德)為老歐洲 
  • DIY
  • 清崎的書 就是在提醒父母要自己教導培養子女正確的財商 不要依賴國王的學校和媒體


    國王的學校 不管改不改 都只是國王的工具而已 五十步笑百步
  • 窮忙族 勤勞貧困階級 工作貧窮者 新貧階級 working-poor
  • 終於等到有錢人的大陰謀可以訂購的時候了,我已經到博客來預訂了,
    希望可以預訂成功!
  • nervlee
  • 我買了,300元,明天應該可以去超商取件
  • 劉林添
  • 今天去金石堂看一下有錢人的大陰謀.380元.本想網路上買300元.但知識是無價的.先買先看.真正的好書不看可惜.大家趕快去買來看.
  • 廈庭
  • 銀價期貨價格站上20美元關卡了。
  • 知識就是力量
  • 書店說總部有書,分支小門市則還要等一週.
    知識的傳播也有時間差.
  • 小康家庭
  • 從金石堂網路書站訂的書9/9一大早就到了,而且在全家拿打79折300元,還沒運費比x客來便宜,我覺得要快就是要網路訂上次在x客來訂貴重金鼠!比上市前更早拿到書!書的內容很好,尤其是cash flow的觀念!很多人都沒做到!一心只想賺差價!
  • nervlee
  • 今天一早就去7-11拿書,迫不及待的想看,但是要上班沒辦法,中午不要吃飯來K書好了
  • English半文盲
  • 讀中文版比較精確 不會誤解
    謝謝王老師
  • 窮忙族 勤勞貧困階級 工作貧窮者 新貧階級 working-poor
  • 我星期三中午前去博客來預訂,星期四還沒有,結果到了今天星期五終於拿到了,
    我還以為星期四就可以拿到了!
    不過沒差,書還是拿到手了!
  • T.williams
  • 請問FRED 新課程何時會開課呢?
  • Mr. Huang
  • 之前太想看了所以就先買了原文版的來看,有一些自己的心得可以分享給大家(想參考的人寄mail給我)。中文版一上市還沒有拿到手,經過專業的翻譯一定可以更了解富爸爸要告訴我們的資訊。
  • nervlee
  • 未來發生德國式的通貨膨脹機率遠遠大於美國式的通貨緊縮, 因為有連準會這種卡特爾機構, 控制著全世界的金流 , 未來身為中華民族, 以民族的尊嚴, 必切斷與美元的關係 ,大家都不用美元 ,就像我們不會去用辛巴威錢幣一樣, 結果超級通膨就會來臨
  • 第三波
  • <第三波>這本書在幾十年前就指出,工業革命(第二波)後才興起的制式學校有工廠的型式 : 大量生產,裝配線式. 制式學校真正的隱形目標是訓練學生 : 單方面服從命令 守紀律 守時 重覆作單調的事 團體行動 從眾而不要特別.   
    作者預言 : 第三波資訊文明興起後,工業革命所對應的工廠式學校將跟不上資訊時代.


  • news
  • 澶淵之盟的貨幣戰爭

    2010年06月17日 商界評論

    後世史家總覺得,金與遼的迅速腐化、衰亡,是由於金、遼兩朝統治者心理漢族化。
    殊不知,經濟上被掏空,才是遼和金日益虛弱的根本原因。

    文/王吉舟 頤和財經總裁



    提起“貨幣戰爭”,大家可能會覺得這是個很酷很玄很00後的新名詞。其實,那是因為我們沒有好好讀歷史。
    上帝曾說:太陽之下,沒有新事,人類犯過的錯必將再犯,除非信我。
    僅從這一點來看,上帝太牛了。不信?好,我們就來說說宋朝發動的貨幣戰爭。

    趙匡胤怎麼當上的皇帝,這個大家都清楚,叫“陳橋兵變,黃袍加身”。說白了,就是總經理把董事長廢了,自己當了董事長。自大唐公司倒閉後,天下大亂,新公司層出不窮,新公司沒有品牌效應,世人實在記不清公司名,就把那個時代叫五代十國,各個新公司的總經理都很努力地做業務,都夢想著有朝一日自己的公司能一家獨大,這樣一來,就能自己當董事長了。

    競爭的結果大家都看到了,這個便宜最後讓部門經理趙匡胤給佔了。趙匡胤弄了個黃袍往身上一披,廢了大周公司董事長,成立了大宋公司;其實,大周公司董事長也不冤,他爸當年也是這麼做掉大漢公司董事長的;大漢公司董事長也不冤,他爸……

    毫無疑問,擺在大宋公司董事長面前的頭等大事,就是別讓自己的小弟們再把自己廢掉。但是,怎麼面對北方的山寨公司呢?以前的幾個公司都沒想出來法子,滅了北方山寨公司吧,內部難免不出亂子,說不定又來一個部門經理把現任董事長給滅了;不滅吧,北方山寨公司老是來搗亂怎麼辦?

    這個死結,是困擾五代十國時期漢族的最大難題,一直沒答案。於是,大宋公司新任董事長趙匡胤好好研究了一下當時的形勢:漢族人細皮嫩肉的惜命,即使做大業務,三五十年之內,也滅不了北方的山寨公司,最多打個平手,能不被滅就不錯了,此其一;其二,大宋公司之前的幾家漢族大企業(譬如大唐公司、大隋公司、大漢公司),其實都不是被北方山寨企業滅的,都是被自己人搞跨的,自己人一是外戚,一是宦官,一是武將。這三種人,可比北方的山寨公司危險得多。

    於是,大宋公司董事長決定:反正短期內滅不了山寨公司,就乾脆不滅了。雙方假打真議和,最終目的是通過打邊境戰爭,簽署邊境和平協議,求同存異,共同發展。這就是宋遼打打停停的邊境戰爭和最終取得的豐碩成果《澶淵之盟》。

    如果你是一個生活在1000年前的金國公民,你會遇到這樣的情況:養了幾年的羊終於肥了,你出門賣自己家的羊,收購羊的商人是宋朝來的大客戶,他給你的錢是大觀通寶,而你並沒有覺得這有什麼問題。你去集市買幾尺布料給孩子做衣服,你買的布料是臨安產的,對了,事實上,整個集市上沒有什麼像樣的東西不是進口的。你付給老闆一把大觀通寶,老闆收下,找給你一把崇寧通寶,你們倆都沒有覺得這有什麼問題。

    這樣的日子每天都在重複,你每年都在辛苦地養羊,但是,生活一點也沒有變得富裕。你實在想不清楚,究竟是什麼導致自己的貧窮,事實上,你可能從來就沒有去想過這個問題,老百姓為什麼窮,就像太陽為什麼升起,不值得想。

    偶爾誰去了一趟臨安,那可是值得他誇耀一輩子的大事,臨安的繁榮,南朝的富庶,是大家從小就听到的傳說,聽說那邊“農夫躡絲履,走卒類士服”,咱這邊縣上的干部家才有絲履,平時還捨不得穿。

    可惜,臨安就像天堂,大部分人這輩子沒有機會去見識。

    年尾,官差來收稅了,你家納的還是大觀通寶,官差沒有說什麼,他也不覺得這有什麼問題。

    言歸正傳:

    如果你覺得貨幣戰爭是個很酷的新名詞,那1000年前的這一幕肯定已然震驚了你一下。

    要講宋朝的貨幣戰爭,不得不從《澶淵之盟》說起。

    說起《澶淵之盟》,我們又想起不平等條約和楊家將了,大家都知道老楊家“七子去六子還”死的那個慘烈,燒火丫頭都上了,最後皇帝老兒還是貪生怕死簽了議和條約,跟漢族人提《澶淵之盟》,那感覺就跟提《南京條約》差不多。

    《澶淵之盟》的內容大體上有這麼兩條:

    一、遼宋為兄弟之國,以後,誰家的皇帝年紀大,誰家皇帝就是哥哥。

    二、宋每年向遼供歲幣銀十萬兩,絹二十萬匹。雙方開展自由貿易。

    第一條,今天看,這不但不是不平等,甚至是完全符合《聯合國憲章》宗旨的。

    第二條,漢族罵條約不平等,主要是因為這第二條,但是,我們嘴上罵歸罵,心裡要清楚牌局。十萬兩白銀是個什麼概念,大宋的歲入,是一億兩,打宋遼戰爭,每年軍費是五千萬兩。

    關鍵在於第二條的第二款,兩國開始自由貿易。

    這“歲幣+自由貿易”可太厲害了。

    大遼除了賣羊賣馬能有什麼貿易基礎?他幾乎沒有任何產品可以輸出給宋,而宋的每一種商品都是遼需要的。開始遼還賣一些馬,後來發現大宋的騎兵越來越多,就不敢再賣馬了,蕭太后下令誰出口馬,殺誰全家,(北宋原版的清明上河圖顯示北宋首都汴京街上沒有馬,北宋連大富翁都不能騎馬,因為馬是最重要的戰略物資,最優先支援戰場)
    結果,邊境貿易從一開始就變成一邊倒的對宋貿易巨額逆差。大遼收的歲幣,到年底全被大宋賺得乾乾淨淨,每年還倒賠。

    從經濟學的角度看,歲幣更像今天中央支援邊疆建設的財政補貼。

    大遼不懂經濟,後來就乾脆不發行貨幣了,反正發行出來,也沒老百姓認,即使大遼皇帝本人也覺得只有大宋的錢才是真正的錢。
    遼的絲綢和紡織業完全崩潰, 因為南方進貢(歲幣)的絲好穿又源源不絕.

    要了大遼老命的貨幣戰爭,就這麼悄無聲息地開始了。

    結果是,一百年雙方無戰事,大遼的財富通過貨幣戰爭,源源不斷輸入大宋。大宋的先進文化傳播滲透進了大遼的每一個毛孔。

    金滅遼,大宋跟金打了一下,發現也打不過金,就跑到南方繼續與金玩貨幣戰爭,大金不知是計,接受了“歲幣+自由貿易”的遊戲規則,也放棄了貨幣發行權,全國繼續使用大宋的貨幣,結果一百年後,大金也虛得不行了。

    今天的古代錢幣收藏界,很難找到遼和金的銅錢,反倒是宋的銅錢既質量好,又款式多,數量多得比清代的還便宜,就是這場曠日持久三百年的貨幣戰爭的遺跡。

    蒙古滅金後南侵,大宋的群臣拒絕議和,非要PK蒙古,結果,漢族的歷史從此走入黑暗。

    研究元史,其實蒙古人最初是想跟大宋繼續“歲幣+貿易”遊戲的,只不過價碼要得比金高了,價碼再高,它也是要用大宋鑄的幣,可惜啊! 

    大宋皇帝通過鑄幣,實際掌握了北方的財政權。北方的原材料與勞動剩餘價值,通過自由貿易和使用南方的鑄幣,源源不斷地輸入南方,換回南方的商品,這種壯觀的南北貨幣戰爭,持續了整個遼、金與宋對峙的三百年曆史。

    1000年前這段有趣的貨幣戰爭歷史鮮為人知,十分值得後世玩味。後世史家總覺得,金與遼的迅速腐化、衰亡,是由於金、遼兩朝統治者心理漢族化造成的。
    殊不知,經濟上被掏空,才是遼和金帝國日益虛弱的根本原因。
  • JOE
  • 最近讀了一本書叫《畢德堡俱樂部》,也就是我們俗稱的彼爾德伯格,裡面講到該集團的期望與目標,有興趣的可以看看........世界持續朝該方向發展的趨勢
  • silver-knights
  • 回應JOE

    畢德堡俱樂部看完之後很震撼喔!而今全球正朝著一個方向前進,那就是國王們計畫中的NEW WORLD ORDER!
  • silver-nights
  • 回應MAX

    不知道該高興還是沉默~~~
    美好的希望永遠都在!
    台灣,在我們生長的這片土地上,這群勤奮樸實的人們,努力工作節省一輩子,經歷了戰亂,民族融合, 再到民主化的洗禮,最後擁有了一點點財富,但最終........我不信國王們可以奪去我們的一切!加油!各位格友,增加財商IQ是你唯一的武器!反NEW WORLD ORDER!
  • max
  • 回應silver-nights :
    就算國王還未奪去我們的一切,可是幾乎已經控制了我們,從思想到生活上,
    除了加強自己的財商之外,最重要的還是從教育上著手,就跟國王們一樣
    他們從基本教育的思想上控制了大眾,就像富爸爸清崎說的,
    要完全脫離國王們的控制,其實很難,因為這是需要全體人類起身革命的
    要不然對受了國王們教育洗腦的大眾來說,這不過只是個陰謀論罷了!
    但是,我還是期待這一天的到來 ~ 人類的重生
  • BEN
  • 真相總是太殘酷,甚至於母體自己公開真相,人們也是不相信

    駭客任務有句台詞很有趣
    當某位男士吃玉米麥片時問:母體怎麼知道玉米的味道是什麼?(也許真實世界的麥片吃起來才是虛擬世界玉米的味道)

    我們怎麼知道所聽所聞有幾分真實呢?
    若不培養獨立思考,只是人云亦云
    哪天就算揭穿了有錢人陰謀,大家沉浸在勝利的歡呼時
    殊不知真正的陰謀在後頭呢...

    再提醒一次"我們怎麼知道所聽所聞有幾分真實呢?"
  • 路人甲
  • 羅斯福總統(FDR)上任後打富除弊博得掌聲,教科書也把新政列為典範.
    讀過貨幣戰爭才發現是國王的左手和右手在打.
  • GEAB
  • Spring 2011

    Spring 2011: Welcome to the United States of Austerity / Towards a very serious breakdown of the world economic and financial system


    - Public announcement GEAB N°47 (September 16, 2010) -





    As anticipated by LEAP/E2020 last February in the GEAB No. 42, the second half of 2010 is really characterized by a sudden worsening of the crisis marked by the end of the illusion of recovery maintained by Western leaders (1) and the thousands of billions swallowed up by the banks and the economic « stimulation » plans of no lasting effect. The coming months will reveal a simple, yet especially painful reality: the Western economy, and in particular that of the United States (2), never really came out of recession (3). The startling statistics recorded since summer 2009 have only been the short-lived consequences of a massive injection of liquidity into a system which had essentially become insolvent just like the US consumer (4). At the heart of the global systemic crisis since its inception, the United States is, in the coming months, going to demonstrate that it is, once again, in the process of leading the economy and global finances into the « heart of darkness » (5) because it can’t get out of this « Very Great US Depression (6) ». Thus, coming out of the political upheavals of the US elections next November, with growth once again negative, the world will have to face the « Very Serious Breakdown » of the global economic and financial system founded over 60 years ago on the absolute necessity of the US economy never being in a lasting recession. Now the first half of 2011 will dictate that the US economy take an unprecedented dose of austerity plunging the planet into new financial, monetary, economic and social chaos (7).







    Comparative progress of the CMI (red) and US GDP (green) growth indices (2005 – 2010) - Source: Dshort, 08/26/2010
    In this GEAB issue, our team therefore anticipates for the coming months, different aspects of this new development of the crisis, especially the nature of imposed austerity process which will affect the United States, the development of the accursed « inflation / deflation » argument, the actual progress of real US GDP, the strategy of central banks and the direct consequences for Asia and Euroland. As we do every month, we set out our strategic and operational recommendations. And, specially, this GEAB issue offers an excerpt from the new book by Franck Biancheri « The Global Crisis: The Path to the World After - France, Europe and World in the Decade 2010-2020 » : the French version will be published on 7 October next by Editions Anticipolis and the English one later in December.

    In this issue we have chosen to present an extract of the anticipation concerning the forthcoming austerity which will be imposed on the United States beginning Spring 2011: « Welcome to the United States of Austerity ».





    « United States – the double whammy: no equity, no jobs » - Correlation of falling property prices and unemployment trends state by state (2006-2009) - Source: FMI / OIT / OsloConference, 07/2010
    The coming quarters will be particularly dangerous for the world economic and financial system. The Chairman of the Fed Ben Bernanke passed on the message as diplomatically as possible at the recent meeting of world central bankers at Jackson Hole, Wyoming: even though the policy to revive the US economy has failed, either the rest of the world continues to fund US deficits at a loss and hopes that at some point the bet will pay off, avoiding a collapse of the global system, or the United States will monetize its debt and turn all the Dollars and US Treasury Bonds held by the rest of the planet into funny money. Like any power at bay, the United States and is now forced to introduce the threat of pressure to get what it wants. Barely a year ago the rest of the World’s leaders and financial officials had volunteered to « refloat the USA ship ». However, today things have drastically changed since the noble assurance from Washington (the Fed’s, like that of the Obama administration’s) proved to be only pure arrogance based on the pretense of having understood the nature of the crisis and on the illusion of possessing the means of controlling it. However, US growth evaporates quarter after quarter (8) and turns negative again from the end of 2010. Unemployment hasn’t stopped growing and between the stability shown in official figures and the exit, in six months, of more than two million Americans from the workplace (LEAP/E2020 believes that the real unemployment figure is now at least 20% (9)); the U.S. housing market remains depressed at historically low levels and will resume its fall from the fourth quarter 2010; last but not least, as one can easily imagine in these circumstances, the US consumer is and will be absent on a permanent basis since his insolvency continues and even gets worse (10) for the one American in five without work. Behind these statistical factors hide three realities that will radically change the US and global political, economic and social landscape in future quarters as and when they dawn on the public consciousness.



    Broad-based anger will cripple Washington from November 2010
    First of all, there is a very depressing widespread reality, a real trip « to the heart of darkness », which is that tens of millions of Americans (nearly sixty million now depend on food stamps) who no longer have a job, no longer have a house, no longer have any savings, are wondering how they will survive in the years to come (11). The young (12), retirees, African-Americans, workers, service employees (13),… they constitute this mass of angry citizens who will speak violently next November and plunge Washington into a tragic political impasse. Supporters of the « Tea Party (14) » and « new secessionist (15) » movements... want to « break the Washington Machine » (and by extension that of Wall Street) without having feasible proposals to solve the country’s myriad problems (16). The November 2010 elections will be the first opportunity for this « suffering America » to express itself on the crisis and its consequences. And, won back by the Republicans or even the extremists, these voters will help to further cripple the Obama administration and Congress (which will probably swing to the Republicans), only pushing the country into a tragic gridlock just when all the signals turn red again. This expression of widespread anger will in addition, from December onwards, collide with the release of the Deficit Commission report set up by President Obama, which will automatically place the issue of deficits at the heart of public debate at the beginning of 2011 (17).

    For example, we are already seeing a very specific expression of this widespread anger against Wall Street in that Americans have deserted the stock market (18). Each month, an increasing number of « small investors » leave Wall Street and the financial markets (19), today leaving more than 70% of transactions in the hands of major institutions and other « high frequency traders ». If one keeps in mind the traditional image that the stock exchange is today’s temple of modern capitalism, then we are witnessing a phenomenon of loss of faith comparable to people’s disaffection with official demonstrations experienced by the communist system before its fall.



    The Federal Reserve now knows that it is powerless
    Finally, there is a financial and monetary effect that is particularly tragic since the players are aware of their unenviable situation: the U.S. Federal Reserve now knows that it is powerless. Despite the extraordinary efforts (zero interest rates, quantitative easing, huge support to the real estate mortgage market, massive support to banks, tripling its balance sheet, ...) that it carried out from September 2008, the U.S. economy will not restart. Fed leaders are finding they are only a part in the system, even if it is a vital part and, therefore, can do nothing against a problem that affects the very nature of the system, in this case, the US financial system, designed as the solvent heart of the global financial system since 1945. But the US consumer has become insolvent (20), the consumer who, during the last thirty years, has gradually become the central economic player of this financial heart (with more than 70% of U.S. growth dependant on household spending). It is this insolvency of US households (21) that has broken the Fed’s efforts.

    Accustomed to the virtualism and thus to the possibility of manipulating the processes and dynamics of events, US central bankers believed that they could « mislead » households, once again giving them the illusion of wealth and thus pushing them to revive consumption and behind it the whole United States’ economic and financial machine. Until summer 2010, they did not believe in the systemic nature of the crisis or they did not understand that what was causing the problems was out of reach of the tools of a central bank, as powerful as it may be. Only in recent weeks have they discovered two pieces of evidence: their policies have failed and they have neither arms nor ammunition.

    Hence the very depressed tone of the discussions at the central banks meeting in Jackson Hole, whence the lack of consensus on future action, whence the endless debates about the nature of the risks to be faced in the coming months (e.g. inflation or deflation, knowing that the system’s internal tools used to measure the economic consequences of these trends are no longer even relevant, as we analyse in this issue (22)), whence increasingly violent clashes between proponents of renewed growth via debt and followers of deficit reduction... and whence Ben Bernanke’s speech full of veiled threats to his central banker colleagues: in ambiguous terms, he passed the following message: « We will try everything and anything to avoid an economic and financial collapse and you will continue to finance this « everything and anything », otherwise we let inflation loose and thus devalue the Dollar whilst US Treasury Bonds will no longer be worth much » (23). When a central banker expresses himself like a common cash extortionist, there is danger in the house (24).

    The response of the world’s major central banks will be unveiled in the next two quarters. Already the ECB has made it clear it thought that a new policy of stimulation through an increase in US deficits would be suicidal for the United States. Already China, whilst saying it would do nothing to rush things, spends its time selling US assets to buy Japanese ones (reflected in the historic level of the Yen / Dollar rate of exchange). As regards Japan, it is now forced to align itself simultaneously with Washington and Beijing ... which will probably cancel out all its financial and monetary policies. In future quarters the Fed, like the federal government, will find that when the United States is no longer synonymous with juicy profits and / or shared power, its ability to convince its partners declines quickly and heavily, especially when the latter question the relevance of the chosen policies (25).





    Index of mortgage applications (1990-2010) (4 week moving average) - Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association / Bloomberg / New York Times, 08/2010
    The consequence of these three realities that are gradually making their presence felt in US and global consciousness will, therefore, for the LEAP/E2020 team, come to pass in Spring 2011 by the United States entering an era of austerity unprecedented since the country became the heart of the global economic and financial system. Fhederal political blockages in the context of an electorate sick and tired of Washington and Wall Street, heavy reliance on federal funding of the entire US economy and the Fed's impotence against a backdrop of growing international reluctance to finance US deficits will combine to push the country into austerity. An austerity that has, moreover, already begun to affect at least 20% of the population head-on, and wich directly affects at least one in two Americans worried about joining the ranks of the homeless, those without work and other long-term unemployed. For these tens of millions of Americans austerity is here and it's called lasting impoverishment. What is going to come into play between now and Spring 2011 is, therefore, the shift into official speeches, budgetary policies and international awareness to the idea that the United States is no longer « the land of plenty », but « the land of few ». And beyond the domestic political choices, it is also the discovery of a new limitation for the country: the United States cannot afford a new stimulus (26). Rather than a multidecade collapse like the Japanese situation, many decision makers will be tempted by shock therapy ... this same therapy that, with the IMF, the United States recommended to Latin American, Asian and Eastern European countries.

    This is normally a good reason for the rating agencies, always so quick to see the straw in the eye of most countries in the world, to threaten the United States with a strong downside rerating if they not implement a comprehensive austerity plan as quickly as possible. But anyway, for LEAP/E2020, due to the internal and external conditions in the country described above, it is really in spring 2011 that the United States has an appointment with austerity, an appointment that the rest of the world will impose if it is paralyzed politically.

    Until then, it is likely that the Fed will try a new series of « unconventional » measures ( a technical term meaning « desperate attempts ») to try and prevent arriving there because, at this stage, one thing is certain concerning the consequences of the United States entering a large-scale programme of austerity: that will be financial and monetary chaos in the markets accustomed for decades to the exact opposite, that’s to say, US waste; and an internal economic and social shock unparalleled since the 1930s (27).
  • silver-knights
  • Last X'mas~

    今年或許不是最後的聖誕節但是明年一定會想起今年聖誕節的美好!
    颱風將至,請各位格友做好準備!
    (颱風來了~你會做防颱準備,那金融風暴也要來了你會做準備嗎!!!會?不會?)
  • news
  • 壽險利差損 今明年恐將浮現

    2010-09-22 工商時報

    「低利率環境造成的利差損,今、明兩年將開始浮現!」曾是台
    大保險教授、保發中心董事長的宏泰人壽董事長周國端,昨日表
    示台灣利率下滑已接近10年,壽險公司當初買到的高利率債券陸
    續到期,今、明年開始,壽險公司利差損問題將開始展現在帳上
    ,若沒有監理協助或升息,未來壽險公司將有沉重增資壓力。

    周國端建議,保險業應有兩套會計報表,一套是給監理官,即所
    謂監理財報,不必依市價計算投資標的,同時計算RBC也應該用
    監理財報;另外一套則是上市櫃保險公司的一般會計報表,是給
    投資大眾看,符合國際會計準則,如此一來,壽險公司的投資決
    策才不會因為RBC、依市價評估等因素,從長期投資改為短期操
    作。

    整體壽險業在2008年大虧1267億元,當年度也增資上千億元,去
    年壽險業獲利48億元,但仍是增資數百億元,周國端認為,「今
    年會比去年悲慘」,主要是台股已在相對高點,台幣匯率也能在
    年底波動,上半年壽險業已虧近300億元,今年壽險大股東可能
    又要拿出數百億元增資。

    同時,國內利率從民國90年開始,由5%以上急速下降到一度不到
    1%,壽險公司前幾年因為還有高利率債券支撐,利差損未在帳上
    顯現,但這些10年期高利率債近期將陸續到期,周國端說,若利
    率未明顯上升,壽險公司這兩年帳上的利差損將開始顯現。
  • 感謝news分享這麼重要的訊息:
    Fred在此重新呼籲:
    任何想要靠舊思維來安排自己未來計畫的人請注意了!
    以往50年來的投資或保險觀念、習慣、與智慧,
    都面臨了前所未見的新考驗!
    這是因為全球的金錢已經被玷污了,
    不可不慎!

    FrederickWang 於 2010/09/27 20:27 回覆

  • news
  • IMF Article Predicts New World Order

    Wednesday, October 06, 2010 – by Staff Report

    The Daily Bell

    D. Strauss-Kahn

    Germany Opposed To Unconditional IMF Safety Nets ... Germany is opposed to the setting up of 'global financial safety nets' under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund, a Deutsche Bundesbank official said Tuesday. The official told journalists that the mechanisms proposed by the G-20 group of nations, would create moral hazard by obliging countries to provide unlimited liquidity without conditions in times of financial stress. The comments come as the German delegation prepares to fly to Washington DC for the autumn meetings of the IMF and World Bank ... The IMF's willingness to provide loans under the PCL to countries which, in its own words, "may not meet the FCL's high qualification limits" appears to have raised hackles at the Bundesbank, which has consistently opposed any dilution of the IMF's principles of only lending against strict commitments to sustainable fiscal and monetary policy. The initiative to expand such "safety nets" is part of the G-20's efforts to make the international financial system more stable. It has been promoted by South Korea and has received some limited support from France and U.K. – WSJournal.com

    Dominant Social Theme: The world needs a central bank and the IMF is ready to be one.

    Free-Market Analysis: As we have written plenty of times before, it's startling to see how fast the Anglo-American power elite is willing to move now toward a more specific and comprehensive global governance. When we read this article, even just the beginning, it was obvious to us what was going on. And then we came to this sentence: "It means a de facto obligation to provide unlimited liquidity in euros...but the IMF is not a central bank for the world." Exactly. Is there a sub dominant social theme in the article. Perhaps so: "Pushback will continue but the IMF's expanded role is inevitable.

    Indeed, the IMF is being cast in some places as an inevitable precursor to a world central bank. It need only graduate from SDRs to bancors and then expand its monetary authority. Of course we've covered this evolution in the past, but we didn't take it very seriously. The world moves slowly and is a complex place. But as we've seen (and commented on) over the past year, the Anglo-American elite seems to have shed any inhibitions about moving slowly or deliberately toward global governance goals.

    It is in a race of some sort, though who or what it is running from or towards is not clear. But in picking up the pace in a kind of mad dash toward some unseen finish line, it is abandoning at least a century of deliberate, promotional construction designed to bring Western citizens in line with its goals. We've written we have no explanation. Let's say for argument's sake there are 6,000 in the ranks of the Anglo American familial elite. That still leaves six billion people that one needs to "bring along" presumably. But convincing people seems about the last thing on the mind of elite these days so far as we can tell. In aggregate, it gallops madly forward, careening out of control, oblivious to obstacles, increasingly leaving a trail of ruin behind.

    The bluntest and most alarming presentation we've read recently regarding the IMF comes from Germany's powerful Spiegel magazine. This is ironic, given that the Germans, as we can see from our initial article excerpt above, are the lone power standing up to the IMF's efforts to remake itself (with fairly blinding speed) into a global central bank. But it is this article we will spend the rest of our time analyzing. It deserves all of our attention – and yours, though trying to describe this article leaves one almost without words. It is so fulsome, so slavishly admiring, so ... craven in its intention to please the powers-that-be that it is a truly remarkable example of a certain kind of journalism. It is available in its entirety (translated) online and we would urge anyone to read it. Here is how it begins:

    Three years ago, the International Monetary Fund was irrelevant, an object of derision for all opponents of globalization. Under director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (above left) and as a result of the global economic crisis, the IMF has since become more influential -- governing like a global financial authority. It is also putting Europe under pressure to reform.

    The building that houses the headquarters of the global economy is a heavily guarded, 12-story beige structure in downtown Washington with a large glass atrium and water bubbling in fountains. The flags of the 187 member states are lined up in tight formation.

    Visitors walking into the office building find the cafeteria on the right, where many meetings are held. There, experts in their shirtsleeves, their jackets draped over the backs of chairs, drink lattes out of paper cups and talk countries into crises or upturns. A little farther down the hallway is the Terrace, the IMF building's upscale restaurant where the director receives official guests.

    On a Tuesday afternoon in late September, as the first leaves are falling from trees outside, the director, wearing a blue suit and a blue tie, is sitting on a blue couch high up in his office at the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), outlining his idea of a new world. Some of it already exists, in the form of a new world order established in September 2008 to replace the one that was collapsing at the time. The result wasn't half bad -- but it is robust?

    There is nothing halfhearted in this voluminous portrait of Dominique Strauss-Kahn and the reinvention of the IMF. In the first four paragraphs descriptions like "global financial authority" and "new world order" and "new world" are strewn about with all the subtlety of an IMF bailout itself. The very next paragraphs read as follows:

    'The Money Is The Medicine' ... These are important times for humanity. The crisis has forced everyone to see many things from a new perspective. Now the IMF is preparing for its annual meeting on Oct. 8. Can it live up to expectations, and can it police the new global economic order and keep global banks in check? "You have to imagine the IMF as a doctor," says Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the 61-year-old director of the International Monetary Fund. "The money is the medicine. But the countries -- the patients -- have to change their habits if they want to recover. It doesn't work any other way." He smiles benevolently as he says these things, his eyes disappearing behind small cushions of wrinkled skin.

    Money is not medicine of course. The IMF, with its history of reducing middle classes around the world to ruin, is nothing like a doctor. After reading it, if one still believes in such a thing as freedom in the world, one wants to take a long bath. There is a brutal deliberateness about the language (assuming the translation is accurate), which must be calculated. From the next paragraphs:

    The IMF, says Strauss-Kahn, warned the world about the collapse and about the American real estate bubble and its consequences, but "politicians don't want to hear bad news." And when the crisis arrived in the fall of 2008, as predicted, it took the old world -- Europe, which always takes six months to make a decision -- too long to react. That was the time when the world was laying the foundation for a new order.

    The New World Order ... There are two telephones to Strauss-Kahn's left and two to his right. The room has high ceilings, beige carpet and white curtains. An old clock and books about Mexican painting stand on the bookshelf. The IMF's director is sometimes referred to as DSK, which makes Strauss-Kahn sound like a three-letter brand like IMF or USA, and yet he speaks English with a soft French accent. DSK leans back in his chair, weighing his words, glancing at the audio recorder and smiling. The new world order? Well, let's talk about it, he says.

    There is no hesitancy here. If there was ever a literary coming-out party for elite intentions to create a one-world financial structure, it would seem to us to be this article. One hardly needs to read between the lines. Skimming from paragraph to paragraph is like being stabbed between the eyes. ...

    Countries like China and India are becoming important, countries with rising markets that have long been stable and are clearly powerful. Whenever he is in China or other parts of Asia, says Strauss-Kahn, the leaders there tell him that they have written off Europe for now. "They say they want a strong Europe, but there is always one part of the world that is lagging behind. They say that in the past it was them, and now it is Europe. It's a shame, but the world can live without Europe."

    The new world could be a frightening place. The IMF director says: "The Europeans still believe they are the center of the world, but in reality this is not clear any longer. Currently, the question is whether Europe will remain a participant in a game with many players -- that is not necessarily a given."

    The Rise of the G-20 ... The United Nations will probably become less important; the organization is far too slow-moving and sluggish. And, if one understands DSK correctly on this point, the importance of the United States -- that egomaniacal country which is incapable of action -- will also decline. Of course, Strauss-Kahn would never speak in such terms, but he does point out that it was the United States that reacted to the 2008 crisis, not with a long-term view, but bank by bank. "They tried to solve Bear Stearns first, and then Fannie and Freddie, and really believed that each hurdle was the last one," he says.

    What will become important, however, is the G-20, that coalition of the strongest economies, the center of power in a new world. The G-20 gave the IMF $850 billion (€620 billion) and the mission to solve the crisis. What followed, says, Strauss-Kahn, was "the biggest global coordination ever."

    Does this mean that the IMF became the first post-crisis world government? ... Strauss-Kahn stretches when he hears the question, and pauses for 20 seconds before responding. He is an elegant man, a white-haired Parisian with three deep furrows in his brow, who smiles slyly and flirtatiously. He is a ladies' man, not particularly tall and even a little stooped.

    Solving Global Problems ... Sitting in his cool office, a room that smells of fresh flowers, he says: "No, no, the government has to consist of elected people, and that's more like the G-20. But the reality is the G20 – or any other grouping – doesn't operate like a government. Their willingness to work together was very strong during the crisis, but frankly I think it's fair to say that it's decreasing. The more leaders and finance ministers believe that the crisis is over – even if they are mistaken – the more they are concerned about their own problems and less so about coordination and consensus."

    In Strauss-Kahn's view, the IMF should become an administrative unit of sorts for the G-20, an agency that "tries to find solutions for global and national problems," and comes up with plans and create values. "In the end we aim at much more than just the right financial and economic policies. The ultimate goal, of course, is world peace through economic stability." This is the way Strauss-Kahn views his organization, and the astonishing thing is that hardly anyone, with the exception of a lone professor in Boston, disagrees with him anymore.

    All right. We'll stop. What have we learned from the beginning of this truly remarkable article? (We hesitate to call it an article, for it's more of an encomium a kind of ritualized praise-offering of the sort troubadours used to prepare for royalty.)

    First ... Europe is too slow and fragmented currently to compete in a world of dashing powers like India and China. Second ... same thing with the United Nations, according to Strauss-Kahn (and the IMF is an arm of the UN). The United States itself, divided between its republican past and its authoritarian future has also given offense and is characterized as "egomaniacal." Third ... the legislative body of choice, this article seems to indicate, is going to be the G20, and the IMF will seek validation and credibility from it (along with funds) before proceeding on its mission which is to become the G20s "administrative unit."

    Reading this article, it is possible to visualize the Anglo-American elite as straining ponderously to take flight. It is attempting to shed in one convulsive effort, the painstaking paraphernalia with which it has encumbered itself in the past. The days of patiently building world government through the EU or the UN are OVER. The decision has been made. The G20 is now the vehicle of choice and the IMF will interpret its G20 mandate as it wishes to under the auspices of the kindly Strauss-Kahn who wants nothing more than to build "peace through economic stability."

    It is truly remarkable. Reading it (and it is a very long article) is like watching a beautifully crafted knife being withdrawn from its sheath with agonizing slowness and deliberateness. When you are finished, the knife is revealed to you in its all its gleaming fullness. It lies there in front of you, winking with malevolence. A little more:

    Sitting in his office, surrounded by the scent of flowers, Strauss-Kahn prefers to talk about Europe's sad future. "The European institutions," he says, "were absolutely necessary and very useful for many reasons, but only in quiet times. ... The crisis exposed very clearly the way the EU is working. There is, in my view, too much concern about domestic safeguarding and domestic problems rather than concern about the EU itself.

    The result of that is that the recovery in Europe is lagging behind while the recovery in Asia, South America, the US and Africa is rather strong. I'm afraid that if the European countries don't take the bull by the horns, they will be the part of the world with sluggish recovery. After building the Union and creating the euro, the European Union now needs to take a third step, which is more economic policy coordination and more fiscal policy integration, and so more centralization. But the system moves very slowly."

    He reaches toward the table, but there isn't any water there. Everyone at the IMF drinks too little water and too much coffee. ... Then he says: "You can't have a monetary union without a reasonably coordinated fiscal policy. And you cannot make it work when neighbors make deals: If you're nice to me, I'll be nice to you -- just as France and Germany did when they exceeded the 3 percent deficit limit. Europe needs rules, surveillance and sanctions. Sanctions should not be the suspension of voting rights. Who cares about voting rights? They have to be financial sanctions -- payable not during a crisis, of course, but a few years later."

    In the end, DSK raves about China, Asia, dynamism and speed.

    We bet Strauss-Kahn raves about China. There's a country for you, only about half a century out from starving 50 million of its citizens deliberately. For Strauss-Kahn of course the efficiency of authoritarianism is far preferable to the tattered republicanism of the "egomaniacal" United States. But the real threats in this article are reserved for Europe, which he says over and over in various ways must become more "integrated" and "centralized" so that the system does not move so "slowly."

    Here's how the authors describe how the article came about: "SPIEGEL's journey of discovery into the world of the IMF lasted 10 weeks. It began in Washington, and then led to Hungary, Greece, Oslo, Brussels, Boston, New York City and back to Washington, where the Fund is headquartered, on the corner of H Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. In the beginning, the IMF didn't even bother to refuse interview requests. The organization doesn't simply open itself up to visitors; it has been criticized too much in the past. Then, Strauss-Kahn decided to open the doors, and from that point on there were no more barriers or taboos. The only rule was that most interviews were to be conducted off the record, and quotes had to be submitted for authorization."

    In normal Western journalism, as we are aware of it, no one submits quotes for "authorization" let alone a media complex as authoritative as Spiegel. You fact check quotes (it's done all the time) but you don't read them back verbatim. And you certainly don't "submit them." That's just another part of the oddity of this article from our perspective. All we can think of is that, having decided to go through with it, the IMF, Strauss-Kahn and his shadowy elite handlers decided to make a full blown statement of intent.

    Conclusion: Whether the article is a kind of emphatic trial balloon or a full-on proclamation of where the world is now headed – and at breakneck speed – time will tell. But what an article it is! And from our point of view a most disturbing one.

  • .
  • 王老師 :
    崎(訓讀saki)和岐(音讀ki或 gi)在日文發音不同,只要寫出英文名稱就很清楚.
    若還真有搞不清楚的人,那我實在實在有一點被他們打敗... ...
  • The Economist
  • Old-age tension
    Increasing the retirement age is inevitable and better than the alternatives
    Oct 14th 2010

    FRENCH workers have begun another round of strikes in protest against President Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposals to extend the minimum retirement age to 62. The protesters probably haven’t stopped to examine how demographic trends are set to devastate government finances in the developed world.

    The bad news was spelt out in “Global Ageing 2010: An Irreversible Truth”, a report released by Standard & Poor’s, a ratings agency, on October 7th. As the baby-boomers (people born between 1946 and 1964) retire over the next two decades, the burden on the state will rise sharply.

    This demographic problem has been coming for some time. But the boomers have not provided enough for their old age. And the credit crunch has made the sums look even worse.

    It is not just pensions. Spending on health care and long-term care (ie, nursing homes) will have to rise too. If policies do not change, six European countries— Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Ukraine—will be devoting more than 30% of GDP to age-related spending by 2050. The median advanced country will be spending 27% of GDP on age-related items by then; state spending will absorb around 70% of some countries’ GDP.

    As a result, at least in part, of this age-related spending, the median advanced economy will be running a deficit of 24.5% of GDP by 2050; 12 countries, including both America and Britain, will have deficits of more than 30%. Debt-to-GDP ratios in the G7 will have ballooned to more than 400%.

    Merely to state these numbers is to grasp why policies will have to change. Countries cannot deal with this problem by raising taxes, since any tax increase on that scale will crush economic growth. Nor is it likely that governments could slash other forms of spending by enough to counteract the effects of ageing.

    It would seem that countries will have to choose between two forms of default. They can break their promises to their creditors or they can break their promises to future pensioners. Some countries will do the former, either by an outright failure to repay their debts or via the more subtle approach of inflation and currency depreciation. But most will attempt to do the latter, despite the protests and the electoral power of the elderly.

    Raising the retirement age is the most obvious reform. It is a fair adjustment given the increased longevity of the population: European life expectancy has increased by almost ten years since 1950. A later retirement age also increases the size of the potential workforce, and thus the number of taxpayers. Some argue that it is unfair on manual labourers, whose life expectancy tends to be shorter, but this bias has always existed.

    And manual workers would surely suffer more if governments went off in the other obvious direction—cutting benefits. Britain has quite a stingy basic state pension because of a Thatcher-era decision (reversed by the new coalition) to link payments to prices rather than earnings. Fiddling with inflation-linking is a stealthy way of cutting benefits but would hit the poorest hardest, since they have no alternative source of income.

    Is there a deus ex machina, a device that will rescue the rich world from its plight? One option might be to generate a second “baby boom” so that by the time 2050 rolls around, there are more workers to support the pensioners. This is by no means impossible. In France the fertility rate is already around two children per female, not far short of the “replacement rate” which keeps population numbers steady. But it is unlikely. In Europe as a whole the birth rate fell from 2.65 in 1950-55 to 1.42 in 1995-2000. Although the birth rate has edged up since then to 1.5, it would take a huge social change to push it as high as is needed.

    Another option is immigration. Opening the borders would increase the labour force, creating more taxpayers and more potential carers (in hospitals and nursing homes) to look after the elderly. Immigrants also tend to have more children, one reason why the British birth rate has rebounded over the past decade.

    However, for this solution to work at the European level immigration would have to come from outside the continent, probably from Africa. European far-right parties have already surged in electoral popularity. Imagine what would happen to their support if countries tried to increase the flow of immigrant workers.

    Raising the retirement age may not be popular, but it will be more popular than the alternatives. Get used to it: we are heading towards a pension age of 70.
  • BEN
  • 誰控制了我們?又誰控制了他們?

    感謝富爸爸集團出版有錢人大陰謀
    及王老師開放這個美麗的部落格園地
    有遠見的老師們感謝您讓我有機會發現了一些以前從未注意到的事情
    有些事情可能太不合乎一般設想、邏輯,或有人乾脆認為那是胡說八道
    我不知道那是不是宇宙真理
    我只知道~若心靈尚不夠開放,不夠能接納各種可能將很容易失去接觸最真實純潔智慧或能量的機會
    只因為祂超出我們能理解範圍...
    已前的我 若聽到占卜,易經算命,星座性向等言論
    必定腦中有小聲音說~怎麼如此不切實際...
    在體悟到了自己的渺小後 明白宇宙是如此的浩瀚
    因為我相信自己是如此的渺小,所以願意相信了各種事情存在的可能
    於是開啟了無限的想像........
  • 求知者
  • 我一直很不解本書第303頁到304頁這段到底在說些什麼!!圖裡的資產項40000是怎麼來的呢!?而且每個月300要多久才還得完120000~萬一遇到銀行生息怎麼辦!?麻煩能幫小弟解惑一下嗎?
  • .
  • Race to the Bottom
    Posted on: Tuesday, October 12, 2010


    If you follow the dollar, this has been a very interesting week of news. One very interesting article I came across in The Wall Street Journal, entitled "Fed Officials Mull Inflation as a Fix", related how the Fed is considering reversing three decades worth of monetary policy to adjust their informal inflation target.

    The reason they're considering this is because the economy is so fragile and the recovery is not happening like they want it to. They hope that by raising their inflation rate target that it will put downward pressure on "real" interest rates—nominal interest rates minus inflation—"encouraging consumer and businesses to save less and to spend or invest more."

    Savers are losers

    I've been saying for a long time that savers are losers. Here is further proof of that. It's financial insanity to think that you can save dollars and win financially when the Fed is willing to reverse three decades worth of monetary policy in order to get people to spend more and save less.

    The fact that the Fed is willing to even consider inflation as a fix for our financial woes shows that they have given up on the dollar and are willing to sacrifice it on the altar of economic growth.

    And the world is taking note.

    Dollar Days Are Gone

    Just last week, the dollar dropped to a 15-year low against the yen. The Wall Street Journal reported that pro-yen bets against the dollar skyrocketed by 72 percent.

    The reason for these bets? "Speculation swirled that the Federal Reserve may soon act to stimulate a sagging economy." Translation: Investors believe the Fed will sacrifice the dollar for growth, and they're betting against it.

    You may be wondering why the Fed would want to weaken the dollar and how a weak dollar would fuel growth. One answer is that by weakening the dollar, our exports become cheaper, leading to export-lead growth. The problem is that every nation is looking to have export-lead growth, and they're also willing to weaken their currencies to achieve it. Most notably, China is notoriously keeping the yuan artificially depressed in an effort to stay ahead in the export wars. As a result, the US is pressing China harder to let their currency appreciate and trying to rally international support through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The result is a currency race to the bottom.

    What's the Point?

    You may be wondering, what's the point of all this dire news about the dollar? The point is that the dollar is very dangerous. Everywhere I turn, it seems people are talking about savings. Saving money is touted as a prudent economic move. The financial talking heads are cheering about the fact that people are being "smart with their money again."

    But I'm here to tell you that saving dollars is not being smart. It's financially ignorant. It ignores the fact that the Fed will do everything in their power to make the dollar weaker, to raise inflation to stimulate growth, and to push you and me into debt.

    Good Debt, Bad Debt

    As I've written before, debt is the new reality of money. Our money is debt. The only way our economy grows is if you and me spend and spend some more. It's the interest on our loans that the ultra-rich are after.

    And as I've written before, there is good debt and bad debt. The dividing line between winners and losers in the new economy will not be savings. It will be understanding the difference between good debt and bad debt.

    Very simply, good debt is debt that puts money in your pocket. Bad debt is money that takes money out.

    So, going into debt to purchase a rental property that provides cash flow that covers the debt payment and the operating expenses is good debt. Your tenant pays the debt down, you get the asset, you get cash flowing into your pocket each month, and you get all the appreciation (if there is any)—all while putting up only 70 to 80 percent of the asset's purchase price thanks to leverage.

    Bad debt would be taking out a home equity loan to fund a vacation for your family or to purchase a car. Those are liabilities because they provide no cash flow. They only take money out of your pocket—and they do so for a long time in the form of interest payments.

    Today, there is much opportunity. While depreciation is happening, you have the opportunity to acquire great assets as rock bottom pricing. This will not last forever. The Fed will find a way to create inflation, and when that inflation hits, savers will lose and debtors will win.

    I encourage you to continue your financial education and to learn about the difference between good debt and bad debt. Then, put that knowledge in action before it's too late.

  • LEAP
  • n 43

    The five steps of the global geopolitical dislocation phase: T4 2009 – T4 2013


    - Excerpt GEAB N°43 (March 16, 2010) -



    [...] In this context, LEAP/E2020 believes that the phase of global geopolitical dislocation will take place in to five successive steps, that is to say:

    0. Beginning of the phase of global geopolitical dislocation
    1. Step 1: Monetary disputes and financial shocks
    2. Step 2: Trade disputes
    3. Step 3: State crises
    4. Step 4: Socio-political crises
    5. Step 5: Strategic crises



    Step 1: Monetary disputes and financial shocks – Q1 2010 / Q4 2012

    China’s new yuan-denominated loans (02/2009 - 02/2010) (bar chart: in Yuan billions / yellow line: % change over the previous month) - Sources: China Daily / Central Bank of China
    « Currency wars » caused by competitive devaluations, aggressive intervention in the currency markets, fabrication of news and information to push speculative flows in a particular direction,…

    The recent speculative attack on the Euro, carried out by hedge funds and the investment banks of Wall Street and the City of London under the pretext of Greek debt, is nothing more than a first step in a series of monetary disputes which will increase in the coming years. The Sino-American struggle over Yuan-Dollar parity will be the « centrepiece » of this international monetary face-off. The British Pound will be its victim between now and summer 2010, after the general election which will probably leave the United Kingdom in a Greek-style situation: post-electoral forcible recognition that the state of public finances is, in reality, infinitely worse than announced at the beginning of the crisis. Switzerland already operates a policy of competitive devaluation vis-à-vis the Euro, managed by the Swiss Central Bank. These « monetary wars » will take place on the playing field of capital flows, leading a growing number of countries, especially emerging ones, to follow Brazil’s example and impose exchange controls on capital entering the country in order to avoid speculative exchange rate fluctuations in its currency (1).

    The IMF, already weakened in 2009 by the creation of a sort of AMF (Asian Monetary Fund), becomes increasingly marginalised, with now a clear statement from Eurozone countries that it is « forbidden » in Euroland (2). Washington’s traditional tool of influence, the IMF, appears to be increasingly limited to countries within Washington’s direct geopolitical orbit and the poorest countries; another sign of the unravelling of the threads of the world geopolitical fabric of these last few decades.

    The growing suspicion on the exact motives of Wall Street investment banks (of which Goldman Sachs’ (3) highly suspect role in the Greek crisis is a perfect example) has equally caused Wall Street to be excluded from an increasing number of monetary, financial and budget deals. Thus, in 2009, there was only one US investment bank left amongst the first ten which managed European country debt issuance (and in last position); whilst US banks comprised half the list in previous years (4).

    Finally, all these monetary disputes will destabilise the US Treasury Bond market and all US denominated assets because they reflect increasing doubt, especially of governments, in Europe, Asia (5) and Latin America, vis-à-vis the American currency and its players, public and private (6).

    Our team estimates that, at the end of 2012, with elections taking place in the United States, in Europe and China (7), a last window of opportunity will open to learn the lessons from these monetary disputes and try, with new leaders, to recast an international monetary system. However there is no evidence to the contrary that it won’t be a case of missed opportunity like spring 2009. 2013 will, therefore, be a year of transition for this topic: for better or worse.

    At the same time, the world’s banks and finance houses which, in the main, are still insolvent (due to the continued devaluation of the assets on their balance sheets) even if they have been provided with temporary liquidity by central banks, will continue to produce very nasty surprises. The rapid progress in the number of bank failures in the United States (10% of banks are currently in difficulties according to the FDIC (8)) will be accompanied by further payment defaults worldwide (9), especially by financial players who took on more debt than they could afford in 2006/2007, at the height of the financial bubble, and which fall due for repayment around 2011/2012.


    Step 2: Trade disputes – Q3 2010 / Q4 2013
    « Trade wars » fed by increasingly indiscriminate customs duties, by growing retaliatory customs measures (with more and more formal recourse to the WTC), by political decisions limiting or forbidding capital transfers or economic activities, an increase in the politics of public purchase with « national or regional priorities », de facto exclusion from major markets of certain players, economic or financial ones, on the basis of their nationality,…

    We won’t comment further on the last aspect, dealt with previously, which sees certain financial operators being, de facto, progressively excluded from a number of markets (as is the case in the Eurozone with American investment banks). Sino-US commercial relationships are, once again, at the heart of this sort of dispute. The question of Yuan-Dollar parity is one of its constituent parts. The United States, with a President from a Democratic party which is in great difficulty ahead of the November 2010 elections, will increase the pressure on Beijing, including indiscriminate customs duties, if there isn’t a significant revaluation of the Yuan. In both cases, Beijing is certain to display increasing aggressivity in defending its market share and signaling its discontent. Public opinion counts in China too.

    After the collapse of the environmental route linked to the issue of global warming, Europeans will play the « environmental card » to justify more restrictive customs policies vis-à-vis Asia and the United States in particular. Even if the whole world has its eyes fixed on the Beijing-Washington axis, it is the size of the transatlantic part of world trade which will give the best indication of the state of affairs in the « trade wars ». The recent dispute over US Air Force in-flight refueling tankers just goes to show European leaders (even British) that Washington had absolutely no intention of playing the game of open markets: so, the idea forms that in reality it is a « no win » game. These two zones are not lacking in examples over which trade friction can take place: the next three years will lead to a fall in the value and volume of transatlantic trade.


    Step 3: Country crises – Q4 2009 / Q3 2010

    Incremental purchases of Gilts (UK treasury bonds) by the Bank of England - Sources: McCormick – Guardian, 02/2010
    Collapse or serious weakening of countries’ capacity to borrow in the face of serious public deficits, non-payment by state public authorities (or at the next level down, such as US states or autonomous regions),…

    Events are not moving ahead as quickly as our team anticipated last year for the United Kingdom and the United States, but the powder trail of Ireland, Dubai, Greece,… clearly leads towards the two barrels of London and Washington (10).

    The Greek crisis will allow the Eurozone to prepare its tools to moderate the eventual risks arising from other Euroland sovereign debt crises. By looking at the list of the eight countries whose situation is worse than that of Greece (11) in this GEAB issue, one can consider that the Eurozone countries will thus benefit from the Greek precedent (and the tools put in place by Euroland – budget supervision and a variety of aid) in order to be, a priori, sheltered from a severe shock. Those countries which cannot count on anyone for help, except the IMF, are: the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan.


    As the crisis seems to be growing along a dangerously rising upward curve (first the smallest countries – « the smallest bombs » - exploded), the United Kingdom (12), then Japan (very shortly afterwards (13)) and eventually the United States (14), represents the likely sequence. However, as we saw in September 2008 the crisis has times when it accelerates strongly. One cannot, therefore, ignore the fact that the United Kingdom might very rapidly lead the two other countries down the road of general distrust.

    Our last comment on this subject: those who accept Beijing’s statements that it will continue to buy US Treasury Bonds, contrary to what really happened in 2009 (see GEAB N° 42), should give some thought to the fact that one judges a state like an individual, on its deeds not its words.



    Step 4: Socio-political crises - Q1 2010 / Q4 2013

    French youth unemployment in France (1975 – 2009) - Sources: AFP / Journal du Net, 02/2010
    A rising number of strikes and increasingly violent social strife, increasing power of political parties with extremist and/or xenophobic policies, reduction in size of the middle classes in favour of the disadvantaged classes, strong rise in violent crime and theft, increasing number of incidents on the border of criminality and political attacks (15), rise in domestic terrorism, threats of secession by federal states or autonomous regions, use of the army to maintain order,…

    It is sad to write, but a daily reading of the press in every Western country shows how these events are unfolding. In Europe, the next Dutch parliamentary elections will provide a further example if a large number of votes are cast for Geerd Wilders’ party (he could finish in second place). In the United States the growing strength of the « Tea Parties (16) » movement and the mass impact of the suicide attack in Austin and the political statement by the person responsible, Joe Stack, show the middle classes’ increasing extremism (on the ground of increasing unemployment (17)), and the re-emergence of domestic and anti-federal terrorism (18). At the same time, the disadvantaged classes are much more badly affected by the crisis than the well-off (19). In the United States, estimates of unemployment amongst the disadvantaged classes are as high as 50% (even higher than in the Great Depression of the 1930’s) compared to slightly less than 10% for the upper classes. In Europe, with a large number of unemployed coming to the end of their unemployment benefits, 2010 will show an identical state of affairs, even if it is tempered by the social support network in place, particularly as regards healthcare. But politically it is the « degradation » of the middle classes (including retirees) and the marginalising of youth in the jobs market which is the most dangerous event for the democratic structure of the Western nations, since it is their ranks which make or break majorities. In China, it is the appearance of leaving the crisis (20) behind which will set off a violent « rebound » at the heart of the population.


    Step 5: Strategic crises – Q1 2011 / Q4 2013
    A rapid rise in the level of diplomatic confrontation (a period of verbal exchanges on limiting and breaking off diplomatic relations); a change in the temperature of disputes, rising from « cold » to « hot »; appearance of new areas of conflict; increasing number of international conferences or summits deferred indefinitely or cancelled; a growing number of displays of military strength within the framework of trade; monetary and other disputes; regular resurfacing at the highest level of all sorts of disputes; increasing extremism of the media and public opinion over these different conflicts, …

    The recurrence of the Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese conflict, Iraq coming off the rails, and NATO’s rout in Afghanistan make up the strategic knots which will « unravel » quickly from next year, setting increasingly powerful protagonists against each other with the United States at the root of it: Israel and Iran, Iran and Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan,… At the same time, tensions will rise over Taiwan, Georgia, Columbia and Venezuela, testing the new boundaries of declining US power. Our team considers that the failure of the Copenhagen summit and the near-disappearance of the G20 from international news indicate a process of a big fall in the number of high-level international meetings: cancelled international summits, continual deferments (like the WTC Doha trade round) where never-ending negotiations will increase and constitute a reliable measure of this step. On the other hand, there will be an increasing number of regional summits suggesting the formation or strengthening of blocks; and a rise in the level of the latent conflict between China and the United States (21). LEAP/E2020 believes it is unlikely there will be major military conflicts (involving two or more major powers) between now and 2013, but this step will see a rise in the number of low-level conflicts, and will especially see military and strategic considerations come to the forefront at the time of other crises: a worrying sign for the rest of the decade. As regards this step, we believe here too that 2012/2013 should offer a political opportunity for the new world political leaders to retake control of this dangerous slide.




    ---------
    Notes:

    (1) Sources: Bloomberg, 02/25/2010; Figaro, 02/19/2010

    (2) The creation of an EMF (European Monetary Fund), likely two years hence in an institutional format, is in effect a reality taking shape due to the Greek crisis: subjects which were, until now, taboo, such as « how to help a country with serious budgetary difficulties which is a member of the Eurozone? », are now on the agenda of all top-level European meetings. As is the custom, Europeans will find their own solutions as the crisis develops. It is a process that Anglo-Saxon observers, even in good faith, can never take into account (Paul Krugman, in his piece « The making of a Euromess » published in the New York Times on 02/14/2010, is a typical example - assuming, of course, that he is of good faith): Europeans are involved in a political process which naturally gives rise to the frequent emergence of problems for which there are no pre-set solutions. But, given that the European process of integration is a constant questioning on the future of Europe, there is always somewhere a study, idea, or proposal that corresponds to the current problem. European way of doing things, in spite of (or thanks to) a multiplicity of treaties and institutions, gives, in fact, a lot of room for manœuvre to decision makers, what follows is a matter of political will which never appears so strongly and rapidly except at a time of crisis. Paradoxically, Europeans are much better at managing crises which affect them directly, than the Americans or Japanese, who have « fixed » political systems, with formal rules, used by a large number of socio-economic and political players, who want to arrange events of all sorts in a certain order. This distinction is the opposite in the case of crises which affect Europeans indirectly because, in these circumstances, political will does not always appear and, thus, results in Europe taking no action. But, essentially, the global systemic crisis affects everyone directly, constituting the type of challenge particularly suited to the European decision-making process. LEAP/E2020 is aware that its analysis set out here goes against majority opinion; but that is one of the GEAB’s roles in questioning « evidences » which are in fact « prejudices ».

    (3) Goldman Sachs is now in European authorities’ sights (and probably those of other continents as well). The 10 questions suggested by Simon Johnson for an audit of GS’s role in the Greek crisis is a good example of what this Wall Street firm can expect to happen to it in the next few months. Source: BaselineScenario, 02/14/2010

    (4) Source: Guardian, 03/08/2010

    (5) Even South Korea, despite being Washington’s faithful ally, has begun to think « post-Dollar ». Source: AsiaNewsYahoo, 02/28/2010

    (6) The European attack on CDSs is very negative for Wall Street and City players. Source: Le Temps, 03/10/32010

    (7) Presidential elections in the United States and in France (German parliamentary elections follow several months later), election of Chinese leaders during the XVIIIth congress of the Chinese communist party. Source: NRC, 03/05/2010

    (8) Source: MarketWatch, 02/23/2010

    (9) Using Kuwait’s financial institutions as an example (even though an oil producer), many of which are, de facto, insolvent. Source: Financial Times, 21/02/2010

    (10) This powder consists of a complex mix of Dollars, Pounds, out-of-control public deficits, New York and London investment banks, hedge funds and exotic financial products.

    (11) In the next GEAB issue, we will refine this list to include an analysis of a sample of major US states. It is highly likely, therefore, that the list of eight states will only include one or two Eurozone states with, probably, two or three US states in addition to the United States itself. Californian debt had become riskier than Kazakhstan’s: Will Borat follow the Terminator as Governor of California? Sources: Huffington Post, 03/01/2010, Los Angeles Times, 02/26/2010

    (12) Even the pro-British Ambrose Evans-Pritchard warns Telegraph readers on 11/03/2010 against United Kingdom sovereign risk and the next Pound sterling débâcle. Whilst Moody’s a likely downwards re-rating of UK banks. Source: Wall Street Journal, 09/03/2010

    (13) Because the trend which allowed Japan to finance its huge public deficits without any problem for years is in the process of reversing. Source: Telegraph, 08/03/2010

    (14) CNN dares to call the United States the « United States of Iceland » whilst the risk of payment stoppages is increasing at all levels in American agencies and authorities. Sources: CNN Money, 11/03/2010; Yahoo Finance, 19/02/2010; Market Watch 18/02/2010; CNN Money, 10/03/2010

    (15) The recent bombing of JP Morgan Chase's offices in Athens is a precursor to others, especially in the United States. Source: Wall Street Journal, 02/18/2010

    (16) Those proficient at running and participating in « Tea Parties » are readying themselves as candidates for the next Congressional elections in November 2010, an invasion of a popular movement in the well-oiled US two-party system. Source: TPMDC, 01/06/2010

    (17) Sources: MSNBC, 02/16/2010; CNBC, 02/21/10

    (18) See the chapter on the extent of real political and social unrest in the section on recommendations.

    (19) In France, just as elsewhere, the number of poor is exploding. Source: Libération, 02/25/2010

    (20) Sources: Global Times, 02/24/2010; Bloomberg, 02/24/2010

    (21) A conflict for which the Spiegel 102/16/2010 believes China has a plan and the United States doesn’t.
  • 王伯達
  • 書摘

    大泡沫

    王伯達(2010年)

    2009年,台灣的M1B年增率是近30年來第二次突破30%,而第一次
    突破30%就是在1990年的萬點泡沫之時,那麼,現在這些氾濫的
    貨幣是否也同樣造成了台灣的資產泡沫呢?(P.59)

    當1990年台灣股市站上歷史高點12,682點時,整體上市公司家數
    還不到兩百家,而當時台灣股市的總市值也不過7.60兆新臺幣左
    右。到了2009年底,台灣上市公司家數已經有741家,股票總市
    值更是突破了20兆新臺幣,若以市值的觀念來看,台灣股市老早
    就已經超越過去萬點的水準。(P.60)

    巴菲特曾經在2001年的某一期《財星》雜誌中提到,他是透過一
    個國家的股票市值對國民生產總值(GNP)的比率,來判斷一個
    國家的指數高低。「如果這個比率落在70%~80%之間,就是進場
    買股的好時機;反之,如果這個指標超過150%,甚至於接近200%
    ,這時候進場就如同在玩火,正如同2000年的網路泡沫一樣。」
    巴菲特在該篇文章中提到。(P.61)

    台灣股市自1990~2010年的20年間,巴菲特指標的平均高點約在
    122%,低點則是83%。(P.61)

    巴菲特指標在台灣1990年萬點泡沫、1997年亞洲金融風暴以及20
    00年的網路泡沫時,都出現了相對的高點。當時的巴菲特指標分
    別創下了167%、133%與137%的高點,而2008年發生全球金融海嘯
    時,台灣的巴菲特指標則是來到創歷史新高的179%。在這幾次的
    泡沫事件後所出現的崩跌,相信許多投資人記憶猶新。(P.62)

    若我們拿國際間重要泡沫破滅時的巴菲特指標來看:日本在1989
    年失落的十年開始時的巴菲特指標是149%,美國2000年網路泡沫
    時是155%,台灣1990年資產泡沫時是167%,上海2007年股市泡沫
    時是109%。可以發現,不論是國際股市或台灣過去的歷史經驗,
    巴菲特指標超過150%絕對是股市泡沫的一個嚴重警訊。(P.62)

    從2008年底到2009年,全球央行的灑鈔票救市政策,讓原本需要
    經過三至四年休養生息的全球股市,在一年之內又回到高點,然
    而這也為接下來的紓困泡沫埋下了伏筆。

    2009年一整年,台灣的外匯存底增加了565億美元,這個數字超
    過了2004~2008年外匯存底增加的總額,而M1B在2009年這一年
    增加了兩兆新臺幣,這數字更是超過了2003~2008年增加的額度
    。也因此,經過了2008年的崩跌之後,台灣的巴菲特指標很快又
    從谷底回到了高點。(P.62)

    2010年元月,台灣的巴菲特指標高達162%。(P.64)

    台股在2010年第一季末的平均本益比為40倍,這樣的數據同
    樣高過於許多國際主要股市。(P.64)
  • news
  • 美抗通膨公債 首見負殖利率

    【經濟日報╱編譯綜合外電】 2010.10.27

    美國的抗通膨債券(TIPS)25日首度出現負殖利率,反映市場預
    期聯邦準備理事會(Fed)即將展開新一波的量化寬鬆措施,可
    望推升通貨膨脹率,有助於提振美國經濟。

    美國財政部25日以負0.55%的殖利率標售100億美元五年期TIPS;
    在同一天,企業獲利和房屋銷售雙雙大增,也激勵華爾街股市主
    要指數勁揚。上回TIPS最低的殖利率紀錄是4月26日出現的0.55%


    Guggenheim合夥公司固定收益部主管葛洛馬說:「這表示TIPS出
    現真正的需求,因為投資人認為量化寬鬆將助長未來的通貨膨脹
    ,因而願意付錢為通膨的保護。」聯準會預料將在11月2日到3日
    的決策會議,宣布新一波債券收購計畫。

    葛洛馬說,TIPS會出現負殖利率,是因為市場預期「未來的通膨
    壓力會很大」。據彭博資訊調查59名分析師預測的中間值,2010
    年的通膨率將達1.6%。

    紐約德意志銀行利率策略師亞力士‧李指出:「這意味市場對聯
    準會的量化寬鬆計畫有信心,並預期可創造出通膨。在名目利率
    如此低的情況下,必須有負實質殖利率才能達到高TIPS損益平衡
    率(breakeven rate)。」

    TIPS持有人除了得到固定利率(實質殖利率)的支付外,還可獲
    得債券本金的調整,調整幅度相當於消費者物價指數(CPI)的
    變化。TIPS的固定利率通常低於傳統公債的固定利率,兩者差距
    即損益平衡率。5年期的損益平衡率在標售TIPS後為155個基點,
    意味投資人預期五年後的通膨率為1.55%。

    五年期TIPS殖利率跌破零,是因為預期CPI漲幅會大於傳統五年
    期公債的殖利率。由於投資人爭相買進安全的美國公債,使五年
    期公債殖利率一直徘徊在低檔。

    30年期公債殖利率25日在紐約債市下跌兩個基點,以3.91%收盤
    ;10年期公債殖利率上漲一個基點至2.56%。
  • Robert Kiyosaki
  • The Rise and Fall of American Democracy

    by Robert Kiyosaki

    Posted on Wednesday, October 27, 2010


    Alexander Tytler (1747-1813) was a Scottish-born English lawyer and historian. Reportedly, Tytler was critical of democracies, pointing to the history of democracies such as Athens and its flaws, cycles, and ultimate failures. Although the authenticity of his following quote is often disputed, the words have eerie relevance today:

    A democracy is always temporary in nature; it simply cannot exist as a permanent form of government.

    A democracy will continue to exist up until the time voters discover they can vote themselves generous gifts from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates who promise the most benefits from the public treasury, with the result that every democracy will finally collapse due to loose fiscal policy, which is always followed by dictatorship.

    The average age of the world's greatest civilizations from the beginning of history has been about 200 years. During those 200 years, these nations always progressed through the following sequence:

    • From bondage to spiritual faith;

    • From spiritual faith to great courage;

    • From courage to liberty;

    • From liberty to abundance;

    • From abundance to complacency;

    • From complacency to apathy;

    • From apathy to dependence;

    • From dependence back to bondage.

    Tytler's Cycle and the U.S.

    In looking at American history, we can see Tytler's sequence in action. In 1620, the Pilgrims sailed to America to escape the religious bondage imposed by the Church of England. Their spiritual faith carried them to the new world.

    Because of their deep faith, the Pilgrims left England in spite of the high percentage of deaths incurred by earlier American settlements. For example, when Jamestown, Virginia, was founded in 1607, 70 of the 108 settlers died in the first year. The following winter only 60 of 500 new settlers lived. Between 1619 and 1622, the Virginia Company sent 3,600 more settlers to the colony, and over those three years 3,000 would die.

    In 1776, the Declaration of Independence was signed. From spiritual faith the new Americans were garnering great courage. By crafting the Declaration of Independence, the colonists knew they were essentially declaring war on the most powerful country in the world -- England.

    With the onset of the Revolutionary War, the colonists were moving from courage to liberty, following Tytler's sequence. By demanding their independence and being willing to fight for it, a new democracy was born. This new democracy grew rapidly for nearly 200 years.

    Then, in 1933, the U.S. was thrown into the Great Depression and elected Franklin Delano Roosevelt as president. Facing total economic collapse, Roosevelt took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard. At the same time, Germany, also in financial crisis, elected Adolf Hitler as its leader. World War II soon followed.

    In 1944, with WWII coming to an end, the Bretton Woods Agreement was signed by the world powers and the U.S. dollar, once again backed by gold, became the reserve currency of the world.

    After the war, America passed England, France, and Germany to become the new world power. Having entered the war late, the U.S. emerged as the creditor nation to the world. Our factories weren't bombed and the world owed us money. The U.S. grew rich financing the rebuilding of England, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The American democracy was transitioning from liberty to abundance -- maybe too much abundance.

    In 1971 President Nixon violated the Bretton Woods Agreement by taking the U.S. dollar off the gold standard because America was spending more than it was producing and the U.S. gold reserves were being depleted.

    In 1972 Nixon visited China to open the door for trade. What followed was the biggest economic boom in history -- a boom fueled by the U.S. borrowing money through the sale of bonds to China, one of the world's poorest countries at that time. The sale of these bonds financed a growing U.S. trade deficit. China produced low-cost goods, and we paid for them with money borrowed from the Chinese workers.

    American factory production, which had fueled the American boom after WWII, was "shipped" overseas along with high-paying American jobs. America was shifting from abundance to complacency. Rather than produce, we borrowed and printed money to maintain our standard of living.

    In 1976 America celebrated its 200th anniversary as a democracy. Rather than produce, we kept borrowing to finance social-welfare programs. Over the next three decades or so, America slid from complacency to apathy.

    In 2007 the subprime crisis reared its ugly head. And by 2010, unemployment increased to double-digits, even as the rich got richer. Once-affluent people walked away from homes they could no longer afford. The U.S. moved from apathy to dependence.

    Today we're dependent upon China to finance our debt as well as fill our stores with cheap products. At the same time, millions of Americans are becoming dependent upon the government to take care of them. If Tytler is correct, the American democracy is presently moving from dependence back to bondage.

    Filling the Void

    History reminds us that dictators and despots arise during times of severe economic crisis. Some of the more infamous despots are Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Napoleon. I find it interesting that the U.S. is now dependent upon Chairman Mao's creation, the People's Republic of China, for the things that we buy and the money that we borrow.

    To me, this is spooky, foreboding, and ominous. While the Chinese people, as a rule, are good people, my business dealings with Communist Chinese officials have left me disturbed and concerned about the rise of the Chinese Empire. As you know, China doesn't plan on becoming a democracy. With money, factories, a billion people to feed, and a massive military, could they put the free world into bondage?

    Although I don't like the way the Chinese do business, I continue to do business in China. I have to. They're the next world power. I cautiously believe that trade, business, and understanding offer better options for world peace and prosperity than isolationism.
    Now the Western world must seek to grow stronger financially as China continues to gain power. To do this, our schools need to offer more sophisticated financial education to children of all ages.

    This is not the time to be complacent or apathetic. This is the time to think globally. Putting up trade barriers would be disastrous. Instead, it's time our schools train students to be entrepreneurs who export to the world rather than employees looking for jobs that are being exported to low-wage countries.

    Please be clear. I don't fear the Chinese. I fear our own growing weakness. Only a weak people can be oppressed. Today, America has too many people looking to the government for financial salvation.

    In 1620 the Pilgrims fled the spiritual oppression of the Church of England. Today Americans may need to flee the financial oppression of our own government as our democracy dies. If we follow Tytler's cycle for democracy, our financial dependence will lead us to financial bondage.
  • Robert Kiyosaki
  • What’s Worse Than a Depression?


    by Robert Kiyosaki


    Posted on Wednesday, October 27, 2010


    "Is the crisis over?"

    "Is the economy recovering?"

    These are questions I'm often asked. People who ask such questions are praying for a "V-shaped" recovery, hoping that the worst is over and that we're on our way to economic recovery.

    Some experts say that we're in a "U-shaped" recovery, meaning the recovery will take longer, maybe another two to three years. Others fear a "W-shaped recovery," a double dip, which could result in another crash before full recovery. Some experts are calling for a zombie recovery similar to the Japanese economy's 20-year stagnation.

    There's also a growing chorus of experts who are warning of our greatest fear, a depression either in the form of hyperinflation like the German Weimar Republic experienced in the 1920s, or a deflationary depression like the Great Depression.
    A depression would be devastating, but could there be something worse than a depression?

    The answer is, "Yes." There could be an economic collapse.


    Near Miss

    In 2008 my friend and author of The Dollar Crisis and The Corruption of Capitalism, Richard Duncan, called me and said, "The global credit card system almost shut down. Can you imagine what would've happened to the world economy if the credit card system failed? We came very close."

    Richard is not an alarmist. He's a classically trained economist, a graduate of Vanderbilt University and Babson College, and a former advisor to both the IMF and the World Bank. He has access to information most of us don't. He's a reserved, clear-thinking, soft-spoken person. For over a year now, Richard's words have been ringing in my ears.

    For me, the key word is system. For something to collapse, not all systems have to shut down. In most cases, just one system is enough. For example, the human body is a system of systems. If just one system, such as the cardiovascular system, shuts down, death follows. The same is true for an automobile. If the fuel system shuts down, the car is inoperable even though the other systems may all be in good order.
    Many of us go about our days in blissful ignorance that an economic collapse could happen at any moment should one of our financial systems -- like the credit card system -- collapse. Our global economy is much more fragile than many of us realize.

    Collapse

    The world is made up of systems, systems often competing against one another. For instance, BP's latest gusher in the Gulf brought home the fragile relationship between the world's eco and economic systems. The environmentalists say capitalism is killing our oceans, air, land, and forests. Capitalists argue that they provide food, fuel, and building materials for a growing world.

    Because the world is made up of systems in conflict, it's not only uncommon (but, rather, normal) to see systems collapse.

    History is full of economic collapses from the Roman Empire to Weimar Germany to, most recently, Iceland. Economic collapses most often precede the collapse of empires.

    In families, if the breadwinners lose their jobs, the family economy often collapses.
    We should not be surprised when collapses happen. Rather, we should be surprised they don't happen more often.

    As you may have already guessed, a minor collapse can create a ripple effect that may cause a domino effect of bigger crashes. This is why Greece was such a hot issue. If Greece failed, it might have taken the mighty German and French economies down. This would have caused an economic tsunami and collapsed the world economy.
    Jared Diamond's Collapse is a great book for history buffs of collapses. Diamond traces the causes that led to the fall of civilizations such as the Maya, Easter Island, the Anasazi Indian tribe of Arizona and Utah, the environmental and economic collapse going on in Montana today, and more. The book reads like a murder mystery. It's easy to read, disturbing, frightening -- and hard to put down. Looking into the history of collapses, we see many parallels to today.

    And, it seems to me, we know this intuitively. Our pop culture is becoming obsessed with apocalyptic stories. There are more and more movies about what would happen to our world after a collapse. The latest are 2012, The Road, and The Book of Eli. There is a new TV series titled The Colony that is created on the same theme. Even TV commercials are picking up on the post-apocalyptic world. Bridgestone tires runs a commercial about a rogue gang of dark and dangerous looking thugs stopping a car on a steep mountain road demanding, "Your Bridgestones or your life." The driver throws out a gorgeous, sexy, long-legged young woman, turns around and drives off with the thugs screaming, "Your life, not your wife!"

    Judging History

    So the question becomes, if the world's economic systems are so fragile, and if collapses are common in a world of competing systems, why are we not talking more about the possibility of collapse? Obviously our leaders don't want us talking or thinking about that. And they try hard to frame the discussion so we don't.
    Most people would agree (including many historians) that the best way to anticipate the future is to study the past. But what if our version of history is wrong? What if our history is distorted to sell an agenda? After all, the word "history" is made up of two words: his and story.

    Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the Princeton University scholar of the Great Depression, often says that the depression could have been averted if only the government had printed more money. That's his story, but that's not what history says.
    After the crash of 1929, FDR was elected in 1933. He immediately took the U.S. off the gold standard through the Emergency Banking Act and introduced his New Deal. This allowed him to print more money and rack up huge amounts of national debt. At first it seemed that FDR's plan was working.

    Yet in 1938 there was a "depression within the depression." Economic output collapsed and the unemployment rate rose from 14.3% to 19%, in the face of a year-over-year decline from the peak of 24.9% in 1933.
    History proves Bernanke's claim (that FDR didn't print enough money) to be wrong. This is what Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, wrote in his diary in May 1939: "We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work. And I have just one interest, and now if I am wrong, somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country prosper. I want to see people get a job. I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises. I say after eight years of this administration, we have just as much unemployment as when we started. And enormous debt to boot."

    World War II broke out in 1939 and many people credit that war with saving the economy. While the war did boost the recovery, it was the Bretton Woods Agreement, signed in 1944, that put the world back on the gold standard, which stabilized the global economy.

    Back to the Future

    In 1971 President Richard Nixon took the world off the gold standard. Here we are again on the edge of a new depression. After the last depression, America emerged as the richest creditor nation in the world. Because our homeland wasn't bombed like the European countries, we had factories exporting products to a world rebuilding from the war.

    Today leaders like Ben Bernanke want to rewrite history. They want us to believe that spending and debt are the solution. They want us to buy their version of history and continue to get deeper and deeper into debt. They want us to trust that printing more money will pull us out of our great recession.

    True history speaks a different story. It speaks of collapse when a nation or empire overextends itself. The true fear should not be a depression or a double-dip recession. It should be an economic collapse. You can only tip the system so many times before it falls completely apart.

    Today America is the biggest debtor nation in the world. Our factories have moved overseas. Now we're net importers paying our bills and fighting two wars with counterfeit money as our leaders use the same accounting rules WorldCom and Enron used -- and as you know, those companies no longer exist.
  • 邁克爾 . 赫德遜
  • 美國世界第一

    美國成功的原因是沒有在本國實施新自由主義

    《關於現代化與當代資本主義的訪談》

    2010 邁克爾•赫德遜

    美國過去的成功是因為它並沒有在本國實施新自由主義,而是使
    其他國家實施新自由主義,從而導致經濟慢性自殺。以前,一個國
    家用軍事行動征服另一個國家,而美國卻是用經濟和意識形態來
    征服其他國家。意識形態就是它控制他人和破壞其他國家經濟的
    工具。在過去的一個世紀中,美國的成功在於它通過使其他國家
    實施新自由主義而破壞了它們的經濟。

    世界銀行說冰島是世界上最推崇新自由主義也是最富有的國家,
    但正是新自由主義使冰島這個國家破產的。

    美國告訴別人不要去做什麼事,但它自己正是通過做這些事而迅速發展。美國通過徵收高額關稅來保護自己的工業;美國不是私有化的,美國政府修建高速公路、開鑿巴拿馬運河、開辦義務教育和州立大學、登陸月球等,這些公共開支的資金都來自於對土地收稅。政府修建那些滿足基本需求的公共設施時,所需的花費比私人機構少,它不收利息,不支付利息,不必分紅,不用支付獎金,它也沒有資本收益。但美國卻告訴開發中國家不要這麼做,要私有化,所以就要承受更高的價格,所以就沒法與美國競爭。

    美國稱這些第三世界國家為“發展中國家”,但恰恰正是世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織讓這些國家不再發展。因此,在所有國際組織中,美國提供給其他國家的建議都是:“照我們口頭上說的做,而不是照我們實際上做的做。”

    例如,目前美國絕不會遵守其他任何一個國家的法律法規,它只
    會根據自己本國的利益而行動。美國會說,我們絕不會加入任何
    我們沒有否決權的組織。因此美國不會遵守世界貿易組織所制定
    的規則,但卻說中國應該遵守這些規則,即使美國剛剛對中國出
    口的產品強行徵收了非法關稅。

    美國靠從來不遵守任何國際組織的規定而發家致富,規定是為別人而不是為它制定的。美國像玩遊戲一樣將國際協定玩弄於股掌之中,而欺騙是遊戲的一部分,也是被允許的行為。它告訴其他國家不能去欺騙,要根據制定好的規則行事,但它自己卻一直都在欺騙。國際貨幣基金組織告訴其他國家,如果出現財政赤字,你們就必須開始節儉,實施財政緊縮計畫,提高稅收,減少政府開支。但是目前陷入經濟蕭條的美國卻增加政府開支,擴大赤字,因為它知道中國會為美國的赤字買單。中國很友好,因為美國不必對它本國的人民收稅,它可以對中國收鑄幣稅。這就是中美夥伴關係的含義。這是一種不平等的關係。

    因此,美國保護自己的工業,美國政府發行貨幣也調控市場,它
    卻告訴別人不要去控制市場,因為這會干涉並擾亂市場。但美國
    政府自己卻制定了反壟斷法、價格法,控制著公共事業如天然氣
    和電的價格。美國經濟是一種混合經濟,其中政府提供了所有有
    利於公共事業的資源,從而降低了成本並更具競爭力。

    歷史上最成功的經濟體制其實是混合式經濟,其中私有經濟和政
    府都各司其職。美國實行的是混合式經濟,這正是它取得成功的
    原因所在。但它卻告訴其他國家比如中國,不能讓政府插手經濟
    ,不能實行混合式經濟,只留下私有經濟就可以了。

    美國對自己是一套標準,對別人又是另一套標準。提倡私有化和
    新自由主義是用來讓別人提高成本的,這樣別人就不能和美國競
    爭了。新自由主義沒有任何資本主義的特徵,它只是一種經濟上
    的自殺行為。
  • 美國人真幸福
  • 美國人真幸福
  • Michael Hudson
  • U.S. Quantitative Easing is Fracturing the Global Economy

    Nov 01, 2010

    By: Michael_Hudson


    Moreover, it may well be asked whether we can take it for granted that a return to freedom of exchanges is really a question of time. Even if the reply were in the affirmative, it is safe to assume that after a period of freedom the regime of control will be restored as a result of the next economic crisis. (Paul Einzig, Exchange Control (1934)).[1]



    Great structural changes in world trade and finance occur quickly – by quantum leaps, not by slow marginal accretions. The 1945-2010 era of relatively open trade, capital movements and foreign exchange markets is being destroyed by a predatory financial opportunism that is breaking the world economy into two spheres: a dollar sphere in which central banks in Europe, Japan and many OPEC and Third World countries hold their reserves the form of U.S. Treasury debt of declining foreign-exchange value; and a BRIC-centered sphere, led by China, India, Brazil and Russia, reaching out to include Turkey and Iran, most of Asia, and major raw materials exporters that are running trade surpluses.

    What is reversing trends that seemed irreversible for the past 65 years is the manner in which the United States has dealt with its bad-debt crisis. The Federal Reserve and Treasury are seeking to inflate the economy out of debt with an explosion of bank liquidity and credit – which means yet more debt. This is occurring largely at other countries’ expense, in a way that is flooding the global economy with electronic “keyboard” bank credit while the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit widens and U.S. official debt soars beyond any foreseeable means to pay. The dollar’s exchange rate is plunging, and U.S. money managers themselves are leading a capital flight out of the domestic economy to buy up foreign currencies and bonds, gold and other raw materials, stocks and entire companies with cheap dollar credit.

    This outflow from the dollar is not the kind of capital that takes the form of tangible investment in plant and equipment, buildings, research and development. It is not a creation of assets as much as the creation of debt, and its multiplication by mirroring, credit insurance, default swaps and an array of computerized forward trades. The global financial system has decoupled from trade and investment, taking on a life of its own.

    In fact, financial conquest is seeking today what military conquest did in times past: control of land and basic infrastructure, industry and mining, banking systems and even government finances to extract the economic surplus as interest and tollbooth-type economic rent charges. U.S. officials euphemize this policy as “quantitative easing.” The Federal Reserve is flooding the banking system with so much liquidity that Treasury bills now yield less than 1%, and banks can draw freely on Fed credit. Japanese banks have seen yen borrowing rates fall to 0.25%.

    This policy is based on a the wrong-headed idea that if the Fed provides liquidity, banks will take the opportunity to lend out credit at a markup, “earning their way out of debt” – inflating the economy in the process. And when the Fed talks about “the economy,” it means asset markets – above all for real estate, as some 80% of bank loans in the United States are mortgage loans.

    One-third of U.S. real estate is now reported to be in negative equity, as market prices have fallen behind mortgage debts. This is bad news not only for homeowners but also for their bankers, as the collateral for their mortgage loans does not cover the principal. Homeowners are walking away from their homes, and the real estate market is so thoroughly plagued with a decade of deception and outright criminal fraud that property titles themselves are losing security. And despite FBI findings that financial fraud is found in over three-quarters of the packaged mortgages they have examined, the Obama Justice Department has not sent a single bankster to jail.

    Instead, the financial crooks have been placed in charge– and they are using their power over government to promote their own predatory gains, having disabled U.S. public regulatory agencies and the criminal justice system to create a new kind of centrally planned economy in the hands of banks. As Joseph Stiglitz recently observed:

    In the years prior to the breaking of the bubble, the financial industry was engaged in predatory lending practices, deceptive practices. They were optimizing not in producing mortgages that were good for the American families but in maximizing fees and exploiting and predatory lending. Going and targeting the least educated, the Americans that were most easy to prey on.

    We’ve had this well documented. And there was the tip of the iceberg that even in those years the FBI was identifying fraud. When they see fraud, it’s really fraud. But beneath that surface, there were practices that really should have been outlawed if they weren’t illegal.

    … the banks used their political power to make sure they could get away with this [and] … that they could continue engaging in these kinds of predatory behaviors. … there's no principle. It’s money. It’s campaign contributions, lobbying, revolving door, all of those kinds of things.

    … it’s like theft … A good example of that might be [former Countrywide CEO] Angelo Mozillo, who recently paid tens of millions of dollars in fines, a small fraction of what he actually earned, because he earned hundreds of millions.

    The system is designed to actually encourage that kind of thing, even with the fines. … we fine them, and what is the big lesson? Behave badly, and the government might take 5% or 10% of what you got in your ill-gotten gains, but you’re still sitting home pretty with your several hundred million dollars that you have left over after paying fines that look very large by ordinary standards but look small compared to the amount that you've been able to cash in.

    The fine is just a cost of doing business. It’s like a parking fine. Sometimes you make a decision to park knowing that you might get a fine because going around the corner to the parking lot takes you too much time.

    I think we ought to go do what we did in the S&L [crisis] and actually put many of these guys in prison. Absolutely. These are not just white-collar crimes or little accidents. There were victims. That’s the point. There were victims all over the world. … the financial sector really brought down the global economy and if you include all of that collateral damage, it’s really already in the trillions of dollars.[2]

    This victimization of the international financial system is a consequence of the U.S. Government’s attempt to bail out the banks by re-inflating U.S. real estate, stock and bond markets at least to their former Bubble Economy levels. This is what U.S. economic policy and even its foreign policy is now all about, including de-criminalizing financial fraud. As Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner tried to defend this policy: “Americans were rightfully angry that the same firms that helped create the economic crisis got taxpayer support to keep their doors open. But the program was essential to averting a second Great Depression, stabilizing a collapsing financial system, protecting the savings of Americans [or more to the point, he means, their indebtedness] and restoring the flow of credit that is the oxygen of the economy.”[3]

    Other economists might find a more fitting analogy to be carbon dioxide and debt pollution. “Restoring the flow of credit” is simply a euphemism for keeping the existing, historically high debt levels in place rather than writing them down – and indeed, adding yet more debt (“credit”) to enable home buyers, stock market investors and others to use yet more debt leverage to bid asset prices back up to rescue the banking system from the negative equity into which it has fallen. That is what Mr. Geithner means by “stabilizing a collapsing financial system” – bailing banks out of their bad loans and making all the counterparties of AIG’s fatal financial gambles whole at 100 cents on the dollar.

    The Fed theorizes that if it provides nearly free liquidity in unlimited amounts, banks will lend it out at a markup to “reflate” the economy. The “recovery” that is envisioned is one of new debt creation. This would rescue the biggest and most risk-taking banks from their negative equity, by pulling homeowners out of theirs. Housing prices could begin to soar again.

    But the hoped-for new borrowing is not occurring. Instead of lending more – at least, lending at home – banks have been tightening their loan standards rather than lending more to U.S. homeowners, consumers and businesses since 2007. This has obliged debtors to start paying off the debts they earlier ran up. The U.S. saving rate has risen from zero three years ago to 3% today – mainly in the form of amortization to pay down credit-card debt, mortgage debt and other bank loans.

    Instead of lending domestically, banks are sending the Fed’s tsunami of credit abroad, flooding world currency markets with cheap U.S. “keyboard credit.” The Fed’s plan is like that of the Bank of Japan after its bubble burst in 1990: The hope is that lending to speculators will enable banks to earn their way out of debt. So U.S. banks are engaging in interest-rate arbitrage (the carry trade), currency speculation, commodity speculation (driving up food and mineral prices sharply this year), and buying into companies in Asia and raw materials exporters.

    By forcing up targeted currencies against the dollar, this U.S. outflow into foreign exchange speculation and asset buy-outs is financial aggression. And to add insult to injury, Mr. Geithner is accusing China of “competitive non-appreciation.” This is a euphemistic term of invective for economies seeking to maintain currency stability. It makes about as much sense as to say “aggressive self-defense.” China’s interest, of course, is to avoid taking a loss on its dollar holdings and export contracts denominated in dollars (as valued in its own domestic renminbi).

    Countries on the receiving end of this U.S. financial conquest (“restoring stability” is how U.S. officials characterize it) understandably are seeking to protect themselves. Ultimately, the only way this serious way to do this is to erect a wall of capital controls to block foreign speculators from deranging currency and financial markets.

    Changing the international financial system is by no means easy. How much of alternative do countries have, Martin Wolf recently asked. “To put it crudely,” he wrote:

    the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.[4]

    Mr. Wolf cites New York Federal Reserve chairman William C. Dudley to the effect that Quantitative Easing is primarily an attempt to deal with the mortgage crisis that capped a decade of bad loans and financial gambles. Economic recovery, the banker explained on October 1, 2010, “has been delayed because households have been paying down their debt – a process known as deleveraging.” In his view, the U.S. economy cannot recover without a renewed debt leveraging to re-inflate the housing market.

    By the “U.S. economy” and “recovery,” to be sure, Mr. Dudley means his own constituency the banking system, and specifically the largest banks that gambled the most on the real estate bubble of 2003-08. He acknowledges that the bubble “was fueled by products and practices in the financial sector that led to a rapid and unsustainable buildup of leverage and an underpricing of risk during this period,” and that household debt has risen “faster than income growth … since the 1950s.” But this debt explosion was justified by the “surge in home prices [that] pushed up the ratio of household net worth to disposable personal income to nearly 640 percent.” Instead of saving, most Americans borrowed as much as they could to buy property they expected to rise in price. For really the first time in history an entire population sought to get rich by running to debt (to buy real estate, stocks and bonds), not by staying out of it.

    But now that asset prices have plunged, people are left in debt. The problem is, what to do about it. Disagreeing with critics who “argue that the decline in the household debt-to-income ratio must go much further before the deleveraging process can be complete,” or who even urge “that household debt-to-income ratios must fall back to the level of the 1980s,” Mr. Dudley retorts that the economy must inflate its way out of the debt corner into which it has painted itself. “First, low and declining inflation makes it harder to accomplish needed balance sheet adjustments.” In other words, credit (debt) is needed to bid real estate prices back up. A lower rather than higher inflation rate would mean “slower nominal income growth. Slower nominal income growth, in turn, means that less of the needed adjustment in household debt-to-income ratios will come from rising incomes. This puts more of the adjustment burden on paying down debt.” And it is debt deflation that is plaguing the economy, so the problem is how to re-inflate (asset) prices.

    (1) How much would the Fed have to purchase to have a given impact on the level of long-term interest rates and economic activity, and, (2) what constraints exist in terms of limits to balance-sheet expansion, and what are the costs involved that could impede efforts to meet the dual mandate now or in the future?[5]

    On October 15, 2010, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke explained that he wanted the Fed to encourage inflation – his of program of Quantitative Easing – and acknowledged that this would drive down the dollar against foreign currencies. Flooding the U.S. banking system with liquidity will lower interest rates, increasing the capitalization rate of real estate rents and corporate income. This will re-inflate asset prices – by creating yet more debt in the process of rescue banks from negative equity by pulling homeowners out of their negative equity. But internationally, this policy means that foreign central banks receive less than 1% on the international reserves they hold in Treasury securities – while U.S. investors are making much higher returns by borrowing “cheap dollars” to buy Australian, Asian and European government bonds, corporate securities, and speculating in foreign exchange and commodity markets.

    Mr. Bernanke proposes to solve this problem by injecting another $1 trillion of liquidity over the coming year, on top of the $2 trillion in new Federal Reserve credit already created during 2009-10. The pretense is that bailing Wall Street banks out of their losses is a precondition for reviving employment and consumer spending – as if the giveaway to the financial sector will get the economy moving again.

    The working assumption is that if the Fed provides liquidity, banks will lend it out at a markup. At least this is the dream of bank loan officers. The Fed will help them keep the debt overhead in place, not write it down. But as noted above, the U.S. market is “loaned up.” Borrowing by homeowners, businesses and individuals is shrinking. Unemployment is rising, stores are closing and the economy is succumbing to debt deflation. But most serious of all, the QE II program has a number of consequences that Federal Reserve policy makers have not acknowledged. For one thing, the banks have used the Federal Reserve and Treasury bailouts and liquidity to increase their profits and to continue paying high salaries and bonuses. What their lending is inflating are asset prices, not commodity prices (or output and employment). And asset-price inflation is increasing the power of property over living labor and production, elevating the FIRE sector further over the “real” economy.

    These problems are topped by the international repercussions that Mr. Dudley referred to as the “limits to balance-of-payments expansion.” Cheap electronic U.S. “keyboard credit” is going abroad as banks try to earn their way out of debt by financing arbitrage gambles, glutting currency markets while depreciating the U.S. dollar. So the upshot of the Fed trying save the banks from negative equity is to flood the global economy with a glut of U.S. dollar credit, destabilizing the global financial system.

    Can foreign economies rescue the U.S. banking system?

    The international economy’s role is envisioned as a deus ex machina to rescue the economy. Foreign countries are to serve as markets for a resurgence of U.S. industrial exports (and at least arms sales are taking off to India and Saudi Arabia), and most of all as financial markets for U.S. banks and speculators to make money at the expense of foreign central banks trying to stabilize their currencies.

    The Fed believes that debt levels can rise and become more solvent if U.S. employment increases by producing more exports. The way to achieve this is presumably to depreciate the dollar – the kind of “beggar-my-neighbor” policy that marked the 1930s. Devaluation will be achieved by flooding currency markets with dollars, providing the kind of zigzagging opportunities that are heaven-sent for computerized currency trading, short selling and kindred financial options.

    Such speculation is a zero-sum game. Someone must lose. If Quantitative Easing is to help U.S. banks earn their way out of negative equity, by definition their gains must be at the expense of foreigners. This is what makes QE II is a form of financial aggression.

    This is destructive of the global currency stability that is a precondition for stable long-term trade relationships. Its underlying assumptions also happen to be based on Junk Economics. For starters, it assumes that international prices are based on relative price levels for goods and services. But only about a third of U.S. wages are spent on commodities. Most is spent on payments to the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector and on taxes. Housing and debt service typically absorb 40% and 15% of wage income respectively. FICA Wage withholding for Social Security and Medicare taxes absorb 11%, and income and sales taxes another 15 to 20%. So before take-home pay is available for consumer spending on goods and services, these FIRE-sector charges make the cost of living so high as to render American industrial labor uncompetitive in world markets. No wonder the U.S. economy faces a chronic trade deficit!

    The FIRE sector overhead has become structural, not merely a marginal problem. To restore its competitive industrial position, the United States would have to devalue by much more than the 40% that it did back in 1933. Trying to “inflate its way out of debt” may help bank balance sheets recover, but as long as the economy remains locked in debt deflation it will be unable to produce the traditional form of economic surplus needed for genuine recovery. A debt write-down would be preferable to the policy of keeping the debts on the books and distorting the U.S. economy with inflation – and engaging in financial aggression against foreign economies. The political problem, of course, is that the financial sector has taken control of U.S. economic planning – in its own self-interest, not that of the economy at large. A debt write-down would threaten the financial sector’s creditor power over the economy.

    So it is up to foreign economies to enable U.S. banks to earn their way out of negative equity. For starters, there is the carry trade based on interest-rate arbitrage – to borrow at 1%, lend at a higher interest rate, and pocket the margin (after hedging the currency shift). Most of this financial outflow is going to China and other Asian countries, and to raw materials exporters. Australia, for example, has been raising its interest rates in order to slow its own real estate bubble. Rather than slowing speculation in its large cities by fiscal policy – a land tax – its central bank is operating on the principle that a property is worth whatever a bank will lend against it. Raising interest rates to the present 4.5% reduces the capitalization rate for property rents – and hence shrinks the supply of mortgage credit that has been bidding up Australian property prices.

    This interest-rate policy has two unfortunate side effects for Australia – but a free lunch for foreign speculators. First of all, high interest rates raise the cost of borrowing across the board for doing business and for consumer finances. Second – even more important for the present discussion – high rates attract foreign “hot money” as speculators borrow at low interest in the United States (or Japan, for that matter) and buy high-yielding Australian government bonds.

    The effect is to increase the Australian dollar’s exchange rate, which recently has achieved parity with the U.S. dollar. This upward valuation makes its industrial sector less competitive, and also squeezes profits in its mining sector. So on top of Australia’s rising raw-materials exports, its policy to counter its real estate bubble is attracting foreign financial inflows, providing a free ride for international arbitrageurs. Over and above their interest-rate arbitrage gains is the foreign currency play – rising exchange rates in Australia and many Asian countries as the U.S. dollar glut swamps the ability of central banks to keep their exchange rates stable.

    This foreign-currency play is where most of the speculative action is today as speculators watching these purchases have turned the currencies and bonds of other raw-materials exporters into speculative vehicles. This currency speculation is the most aggressive, predatory and destructive aspect of U.S. financial behavior. Its focus is now shifting to the major nation that has resisted U.S. attempts to force its currency up: China. The potentially largest prize for U.S. and foreign speculators would be an upward revaluation of its renminbi.

    The House Ways and Means Committee recently insisted that China raise its exchange rate by the 20 percent that the Treasury and Federal Reserve have suggested. Suppose that China would obey this demand. This would mean a bonanza for U.S. speculators. A revaluation of this magnitude would enable them to put down 1% equity – say, $1 million to borrow $99 million – and buy Chinese renminbi forward. The revaluation being demanded would produce a 2000% profit of $20 million by turning the $100 million bet (and just $1 million “serious money”) into $120 million. Banks can trade on much larger, nearly infinitely leveraged margins.


    Can U.S. banks create enough electronic “keyboard credit” to buy up the whole world?

    The Fed’s QE II policy poses a logical question: Why can’t U.S. credit buy out the entire world economy – all the real estate, companies and mineral rights yielding over 1%, with banks and their major customers pocketing the difference?

    Under current arrangements the dollars being pumped into the global economy are recycled back into U.S. Treasury IOUs. When foreign sellers turn over their dollar receipts to their banks for domestic currency, these banks turn the payment over to the central bank – which then faces a Hobson’s Choice: either to sell the dollars on the foreign exchange market (pushing up their currency against the dollar), or avoid doing this by buying more U.S. Treasury securities and thus keeping the dollar payment within the U.S. economy. Why can’t this go on ad infinitum?

    What makes these speculative capital inflows so unwelcome abroad is that they do not contribute to tangible capital formation or employment. Their effect is simply to push up foreign currencies against the dollar, threatening to price exporters out of global markets, disrupting domestic employment as well as trade patterns.

    These financial gambles are setting today’s exchange rates, not basic production costs.
    In terms of relative rates of return, foreign central banks earn 1% on their U.S. Treasury bonds, while U.S. investors buy up the world’s assets. In effect, U.S. diplomats are demanding that other nations relinquish their trade surpluses, private savings and general economic surplus to U.S. investors, creditors, bankers, speculators, arbitrageurs and vulture funds in exchange for this 1% return on U.S. dollar reserves of depreciating value – and indeed, in amounts already far beyond the foreseeable ability of the U.S. economy to generate a balance-of-payments surplus to pay this debt to foreign governments.

    The global economy is being turned into a tributary system, achieving what military conquest sought in times past. This turns out to be implicit in QE II. Arbitrageurs and speculators are swamping Asian and Third World currency markets with low-priced U.S. dollar credit to make predatory trading profits at the expense of foreign central banks trying to stabilize their exchange rates by selling their currency for dollar-denominated securities – under conditions where the United States and Canada are blocking reciprocal direct investment (e.g., Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan in Canada and Unocal in the United States.).


    The road to capital controls

    Hardly by surprise, other countries are taking defensive measures against this speculation, and against “free credit” takeovers using inexpensive U.S. electronic “keyboard bank credit.” For the past few decades they have stabilized their exchange rates by recycling dollar inflows and other foreign currency buildups into U.S. Treasury securities. The Bank of Japan, for instance, recently lowered its interest rate to just 0.1% in an attempt to induce its banks to lend back abroad the foreign exchange that is now coming in as its banks are being repaid on their own carry-trade loans. It also offset the repayment of past carry-trade loans extended by its own banks in yen by selling $60 billion of yen and buying U.S. Treasury securities, of which it now owns over $1 trillion.

    Foreign economies are now taking more active steps to shape “the market” in which international speculation occurs. The most modest move is to impose a withholding tax on interest payments to foreign investors. Just before the IMF meetings on October 9-10, 2010, Brazil doubled the tax on foreign investment in its government bond to 4%. Thailand acted along similar lines a week later. It stopped exempting foreign investors from having to pay the 15% interest-withholding tax on their purchases of its government bonds. Finance Minister Korn Chatikavinij warned that more serious measures are likely if “excessive” speculative inflows keep pushing up the baht. “We need to consider the rationality of capital inflows, whether they are for speculative purposes and how much they generate volatility in the baht,” he explained But the currency continues to rise.

    Such tax withholding discourages interest-rate arbitrage via the bond market, but leaves the foreign-currency play intact – and that is where the serious action is today. In the 1997 Asian Crisis, Malaysia blocked foreign purchases of its currency to prevent short-sellers from covering their bets by buying the ringgit at a lower price later, after having emptied out its central bank reserves. The blocks worked, and other countries are now reviewing how to impose such controls.

    Longer-term institutional changes to more radically restructure the global financial system may include dual exchange rates such as were prevalent from the 1930 through the early 1960s, one (low and stable) for trade and at least one other (usually higher and more fluctuating) for capital movements. But the most decisive counter-strategy to U.S. QE II policy is to create a full-fledged BRIC-centered currency bloc that would minimize use of the dollar.

    China has negotiated currency-swap agreements with Russia, India, Turkey and Nigeria. These swap agreements may require exchange-rate guarantees to make central-bank holders “whole” if a counterpart currency depreciates. But at least initially, these agreements are being used for bilateral trade. This saves exporters from having to hedge their payments through forward purchases on global exchange markets.

    A BRIC-centered system would reverse the policy of open and unprotected capital markets put in place after World War II. This trend has been in the making since the BRIC countries met last year in Yekaterinburg, Russia, to discuss such an international payments system based on their own currencies rather than the dollar, sterling or euro. In September, China supported a Russian proposal to start direct trading using the yuan and the ruble rather than pricing their trade or taking payment in U.S. dollars or other foreign currencies. China then negotiated a similar deal with Brazil. And on the eve of the IMF meetings in Washington on Friday, Premier Wen stopped off in Istanbul to reach agreement with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to use their own currencies in a planned tripling Turkish-Chinese trade to $50 billion over the next five years, effectively excluding the dollar.

    China cannot make its currency a world reserve currency, because it is not running a deficit and therefore cannot supply large sums of renminbi to other countries via trade. So it is negotiating currency-swap agreements with other countries, while using its enormous dollar reserves to buy up natural resources in Australia, Africa and South America.

    This has reversed the dynamics that led speculators to gang up and cause the 1997 Asia crisis. At that time the great speculative play was against the “Asian Tigers.” Speculators swamped their markets with sell orders, emptying out the central bank reserves of countries that tried (in vain) to keep their exchange rates stable in the face of enormous U.S. bank credit extended to George Soros and other hedge fund managers and the vulture funds that followed in their wake. The IMF and U.S. banks then stepped in and offered to “rescue” these economies if they agreed to sell off their best companies and resources to U.S. and European buyers.

    This was a major reason why so many countries have tried to free themselves from the IMF and its neoliberal austerity programs, euphemized as “stabilization” plans rather than the economic poison of chronic dependency and instability programs. Left with only Turkey as a customer by 2008, the IMF was a seemingly anachronistic institution whose only hope for survival lay in future crises. So that of 2009-10 proved to be a godsend. At least the IMF found neoliberal Latvia and Greece willing to subject themselves to its precepts. Today its destructive financial austerity doctrine is applied mainly by Europe’s “failed economies.”

    This has changed the equation between industrial-nation creditors and Third World debtors. Many dollar-strapped countries have been subject to repeated raids on their central banks – followed by IMF austerity programs that have shrunk their domestic markets and made them yet more dependent on imports and foreign investments, reduced to selling off their public infrastructure to raise the money to pay their debts. This has raised their cost of living and doing business, shrinking the economy all the more and creating new budget squeezes driving them even further into debt. But China’s long-term trade and investment deals – to be paid in raw materials, denominated in renminbi rather than dollars – is alleviating their debt pressures to the point where currency traders are jumping on the bandwagon, pushing up their exchange rates. The major international economic question today is how such national economies can achieve greater stability by insulating themselves from these predatory financial movements.


    Notes

    1 Paper presented at the Boeckler Foundation meetings in Berlin, October 30, 2010. I am indebted to Eric Janszen of i-tulip for bringing the Einzig quote to my attention.

    2 “Stiglitz Calls for Jail Time for Corporate Crooks,” DailyFinance: http://srph.it/aRwI4I, October 21, 2010.

    3 Tim Geithner, “Five Myths about Tarp,” Washington Post, October 10, 2010.

    4 Martin Wolf, “Why America is going to win the global currency battle,” Financial Times, October 13, 2010.

    5 William C. Dudley, “The Outlook, Policy Choices and Our Mandate,” Remarks at the Society of American Business Editors and Writers Fall Conference, City University of New York, Graduate School of Journalism, New York City, October 1, 2010. http://www.zerohedge.com/article/why-imf-meetings-failed-and-coming-capital-controls.

    6 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz: Foreclosure Moratorium, Government Stimulus Needed to Revive US Economy, Democracy Now, Oct. 21, 2010.


    Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist and now a Distinguished Research Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC),
  • 1973 oil crisis
  • 1973 oil crisis

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Jump to: navigation, search
    Further information: 1973 world oil market chronology
    1973 oil crisis
    Other names Arab Oil Embargo
    Date October 1973 (October 1973) - March 1974 (March 1974)
    The 1973 oil crisis started in October 1973, when the members of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or the OAPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus Egypt, Syria and Tunisia) proclaimed an oil embargo "in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military" during the Yom Kippur war; it lasted until March 1974.[1] With the US actions seen as initiating the oil embargo and the long term possibility of high oil prices, disrupted supply and recession, a strong rift was created within NATO. Additionally, some European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from the US Middle East policy. Arab oil producers had also linked the end of the embargo with successful US efforts to create peace in the Middle East, which complicated the situation. To address these developments, the Nixon Administration began parallel negotiations with both Arab oil producers to end the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange an Israeli pull back from the Sinai and the Golan Heights after the fighting stopped. By January 18, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had negotiated an Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the Sinai. The promise of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria was sufficient to convince Arab oil producers to lift the embargo in March 1974. By May, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights.[1]

    Independently, the OPEC members agreed to use their leverage over the world price setting mechanism for oil to stabilize their real incomes by raising world oil prices. This action followed several years of steep income declines after the recent failure of negotiations with the major Western oil companies earlier in the month.

    For the most part, industrialized economies relied on crude oil, and OPEC was their predominant supplier. Because of the dramatic inflation experienced during this period, a popular economic theory has been that these price increases were to blame, as being suppressive of economic activity. However, the causality stated by this theory is often questioned.[2] The targeted countries responded with a wide variety of new, and mostly permanent, initiatives to contain their further dependency. The 1973 "oil price shock", along with the 1973–1974 stock market crash, have been regarded as the first event since the Great Depression to have a persistent economic effect.[3]


    Graph of oil prices from 1861–2007, showing a sharp increase in 1973, and again during the 1979 energy crisis. The orange line is adjusted for inflation.Contents [hide]
    1 Background
    1.1 Founding of OPEC
    1.2 End of Bretton Woods
    1.3 Yom Kippur War
    2 Arab oil embargo
    2.1 Chronology
    2.2 Immediate economic effects
    3 Price controls and rationing
    4 Conservation and reduction in demand
    5 Search for alternatives
    6 Macroeconomic effects
    7 Effects on international relations
    8 Decline of OPEC
    9 Long-term effects
    9.1 Soviet reaction
    9.2 Growing security concerns
    9.3 Conclusions
    10 Impact on motor industry
    10.1 West Europe
    10.2 U.S.
    11 See also
    12 Notes
    13 Further reading
    14 External links


    [edit] Background
    [edit] Founding of OPEC
    The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which then consisted of twelve countries, including Iran, seven Arab countries, plus Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Ecuador, had been formed at a Baghdad conference on September 14, 1960. OPEC was organized to resist pressure by the "Seven Sisters" (mostly owned by U.S., British, and Dutch nationals) to reduce oil prices and payments to producing countries. At first OPEC had operated as an informal bargaining unit for the sale of oil by resource-rich Third World nations. OPEC confined its activities to gaining a larger share of the profits generated by the Western oil companies and greater control over the members' levels of production. As a result of this and other events in the early 1970s, it began to exert its economic and political strength; the major Western oil conglomerates, as well as the importing nations, suddenly faced a unified bloc of exporters.

    [edit] End of Bretton Woods
    On August 15, 1971, the United States pulled out of the Bretton Woods Accord taking the US off the Gold Exchange Standard (whereby only the value of the US dollar had been pegged to the price of gold and all other currencies were pegged to the US dollar), allowing the dollar to "float". Shortly thereafter, Britain followed, floating the pound sterling. The industrialized nations followed suit with their respective currencies. In anticipation of the fluctuation of currencies as they stabilized against each other, the industrialized nations also increased their reserves (printing money) in amounts far greater than ever before. The result was a depreciation of the value of the US dollar, as well as the other currencies of the world. Because oil was priced in dollars, this meant that oil producers were receiving less real income for the same price. The OPEC cartel issued a joint communique stating that forthwith they would price a barrel of oil against gold.

    This led to the "Oil Shock" of the mid-seventies. In the years after 1971, OPEC was slow to readjust prices to reflect this depreciation. From 1947-1967 the price of oil in U.S. dollars had risen by less than two percent per year. Until the Oil Shock, the price remained fairly stable versus other currencies and commodities, but suddenly became extremely volatile thereafter. OPEC ministers had not developed the institutional mechanisms to update prices rapidly enough to keep up with changing market conditions, so their real incomes lagged for several years. The substantial price increases of 1973-74 largely caught up their incomes to Bretton Woods levels in terms of other commodities such as gold.[4]

    [edit] Yom Kippur War
    On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israel.[5] This new round in the Arab-Israeli conflict triggered a crisis already in the making; the price of oil was going to rise. The West could not continue to increase its energy consumption 5% annually, while also paying low oil prices, and selling inflation-priced goods to the petroleum producers in the developing Third World. This was stressed by the Shah of Iran, whose nation was the world's second-largest exporter of oil and the closest ally of the United States in the Middle East at the time. "Of course [the world price of oil] is going to rise," the Shah told The New York Times in 1973. "Certainly! And how...; You [Western nations] increased the price of wheat you sell us by 300%, and the same for sugar and cement...; You buy our crude oil and sell it back to us, refined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you've paid to us...; It's only fair that, from now on, you should pay more for oil. Let's say ten times more."[6]

    On October 12, 1973, President Richard Nixon authorized Operation Nickel Grass, an overt strategic airlift to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel, after the Soviet Union began sending arms to Syria and Egypt.

    [edit] Arab oil embargo
    On October 16, 1973, OPEC announced a decision to raise the posted price of oil by 70%, to $5.11 a barrel.[7] The following day, oil ministers agreed to the embargo, a cut in production by five percent from September's output, and to continue to cut production over time in five percent increments until their economic and political objectives were met.[8] October 19, US President Richard Nixon requested Congress to appropriate $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel, including $1.5 billion in out-right grants. George Lenczowski notes, “Military supplies did not exhaust Nixon’s eagerness to prevent Israel’s collapse. ... This [$2.2B] decision triggered a collective OPEC response.” [9] Libya announced it would embargo all oil shipments to the United States. Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC states quickly followed suit, joining the embargo on October 20, 1973.[10] At their meeting in Kuwait the OPEC oil-producing countries, proclaimed the oil boycott that provided for curbs on their oil exports to various consumer countries and a total embargo on oil deliveries to the United States as a “principal hostile country”.[11] The embargo was thus variously extended to Western Europe and Japan.

    Though United States was the initial target of the embargo, it was later expanded to the Netherlands.[12] Price increases were also imposed. Since oil demand falls little when the price is raised, the prices had to be risen dramatically to reduce demand to the new lower level of supply. Anticipating this, the market price for oil immediately rose substantially, from $3 a barrel to $12.[12] The world financial system, which was already under pressure from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, was set on a path of recessions and high inflation that persisted until the early 1980s, with oil prices continuing to rise until 1986.


    The price of oil during the embargo. The graph is based on the nominal, not real, price of oil, and so overstates prices at the end. However, the effects of the Arab Oil Embargo are clear—it effectively doubled the real price of crude oil at the refinery level, and caused massive shortages in the U.S.Over the long term, the oil embargo changed the nature of policy in the West towards increased exploration, energy conservation, and more restrictive monetary policy to better fight inflation.

    [edit] Chronology
    January 1973—The 1973–1974 stock market crash begins, as a result of inflation pressure, the Nixon Shock and the collapsing monetary system.
    August 23, 1973—In preparation for the Yom Kippur War, Saudi King Faisal and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat meet in Riyadh and secretly negotiate an accord whereby the Arabs will use the "oil weapon" as part of the upcoming military conflict.[13]
    October 6—Egypt and Syria attack Israeli occupied lands in Sinai and Golan Heights on Yom Kippur, starting the fourth Arab-Israeli War.
    October 8–October 10—OPEC negotiations with major oil companies to revise the 1971 Tehran price agreement fail.
    October 12— The United States initiates Operation Nickel Grass, an overt strategic airlift operation to provide replacement weapons and supplies to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. This followed similar Soviet moves to supply the Arab side.
    October 16—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Qatar unilaterally raise posted prices by 17% to $3.65 per barrel and announce production cuts.[14]
    October 17—OPEC oil ministers agree to use oil as a weapon to influence the West's support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war. They recommend an embargo against non-complying states and mandate a cut in exports.
    October 19—US President Richard Nixon requests Congress to appropriate $2.2billion in emergency aid to Israel. This decision triggered a collective Arab response.[9] Libya proclaims an embargo on oil exports to the United States; Saudi Arabia and other Arab states follow.
    October 23–October 28—The Arab oil embargo is extended to the Netherlands.
    October 26—The Yom Kippur War ends.
    November 5—Arab producers announce a 25% output cut. A further 5% cut is threatened.
    November 23—The Arab embargo is extended to Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
    November 27—U.S. President Richard Nixon signs the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act authorizing price, production, allocation and marketing controls.
    December 9—Arab oil ministers agree to another five percent cut for non-friendly countries for January 1974.
    December 25—Arab oil ministers cancel the five percent output cut for January. Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani promises a ten percent OPEC production rise.
    January 7–January 9, 1974—OPEC decides to freeze prices until April 1.
    January 18—Israel signs a withdrawal agreement to pull back to the east side of the Suez Canal.
    February 11—United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger unveils the Project Independence plan to make U.S. energy independent.
    February 12–February 14—Progress in Arab-Israeli disengagement brings discussion of oil strategy among the heads of state of Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
    March 5—Israel withdraws the last of its troops from the west side of the Suez Canal.
    March 17—Arab oil ministers, with the exception of Libya, announce the end of the embargo against the United States.
    May 31—Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger produces a disengagement agreement on the Syrian front.
    December 1974—The 1973–1974 stock market crash ends.
    [edit] Immediate economic effects

    In this 1974 photo, a man at a service station reads about the gas rationing system in an afternoon newspaper; a sign in the background states that no gas is availableThe effects of the embargo were immediate. OPEC forced the oil companies to increase payments drastically. The price of oil quadrupled by 1974 to nearly US$12 per barrel (75 US$/m3).[15]

    This increase in the price of oil had a dramatic effect on oil exporting nations, for the countries of the Middle East who had long been dominated by the industrial powers were seen to have acquired control of a vital commodity. The traditional flow of capital reversed as the oil exporting nations accumulated vast wealth. Some of the income was dispensed in the form of aid to other underdeveloped nations whose economies had been caught between higher prices of oil and lower prices for their own export commodities and raw materials amid shrinking Western demand for their goods. Much was absorbed in massive arms purchases that exacerbated political tensions, particularly in the Middle East.

    This control of a vital commodity became known as the “oil weapon,” which came in the form of an embargo and cutbacks in oil production from the Arab states to select industrial governments of the world to pressure Israel during the fourth Arab-Israeli War in October 1973. These target industrial governments included the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. In retrospect, the purpose of the embargo, as perceived by these target governments, was to sway their foreign policies concerning Israel towards a more pro-Arab position by threatening to cut off exports of Arab oil, and that in altering their policies the Arab states would respond by again allowing their purchase of more oil.[16] The Arab states selected their target governments to emplace their embargo, mostly affecting the European Common Market countries and Japan with a eventual 25% oil cut in production.[17] However, in all five cases there did not appear to be the dramatic change in policy making as envisioned by the Arab states.[18]

    In the case of the United States, scholars argue that there already existed a negotiated settlement based on equality between both parties prior to 1973. Second, Soviet involvement in the Middle East as a threat to becoming another superpower confrontation was of more concern to the United States than the oil weapon. A third reason, the interest groups and other government agencies that were more concerned with the implications of the oil weapon held little influential power concerning foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of Kissinger’s total dominance over this process.[19] Also within the United States concerning the economic impact at the macro level, direct correlations have been drawn between the rise in oil prices and economic recessions. “Oil price shocks”, referring to disruptions in the production and distribution of oil, that result in the increase of oil prices “have been held responsible for recessions, periods of excessive inflation, reduced productivity, and lower economic growth”[20]

    The effect of the Arab embargo had a negative influence on the U.S economy through causing immediate demands to address the threats to U.S energy security.[21] On an international level, the price increases of petroleum disrupted market systems in changing competitive positions. At the macro level, economic problems consisted of both inflationary and deflationary impacts of domestic economies.[22] The Arab embargo left many U.S companies searching for new ways to develop expensive oil, even in the elements of rugged terrain such as in hostile arctic environments. The problem that many of these companies faced is that finding oil and developing new oil fields are timely operations, and usually produce a time lag of 5 to 10 years between the planning process and significant oil production.[23]

    OPEC-member states in the developing world withheld the prospect of nationalization of the companies' holdings in their countries. Most notably, the Saudis acquired operating control of Aramco, fully nationalizing it in 1980 under the leadership of Ahmed Zaki Yamani. As other OPEC nations followed suit, the cartel's income soared. Saudi Arabia, awash with profits, undertook a series of ambitious five-year development plans, of which the most ambitious, begun in 1980, called for the expenditure of $250 billion. Other cartel members also undertook major economic development programs.

    Meanwhile, the shock produced chaos in the West. In the United States, the retail price of a gallon of gasoline (petrol) rose from a national average of 38.5 cents in May 1973 to 55.1 cents in June 1974. State governments requested citizens not put up Christmas lights, with Oregon banning Christmas as well as commercial lighting altogether.[12] Politicians called for a national gas rationing program.[24] Nixon requested gasoline stations to voluntarily not sell gasoline on Saturday nights or Sundays; 90% of owners complied, which resulted in lines on weekdays.[12]

    The embargo was not uniform across Europe. Of the nine members of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Netherlands faced a complete embargo, the United Kingdom and France received almost uninterrupted supplies (having refused to allow America to use their airfields and embargoed arms and supplies to both the Arabs and the Israelis), whilst the other six faced only partial cutbacks. The UK had traditionally been an ally of Israel, and Harold Wilson's government had supported the Israelis during the Six Day War, but his successor, Ted Heath, had reversed this policy in 1970, calling for Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders. The members of the EEC had been unable to achieve a common policy during the first month of the Yom Kippur War. The Community finally issued a statement on November 6, after the embargo and price rises had begun; widely seen as pro-Arab, this statement supported the Franco-British line on the war, and OPEC duly lifted its embargo from all members of the EEC. The price rises had a much greater impact in Europe than the embargo, particularly in the UK (where they combined with strikes by coal miners and railroad workers to cause an energy crisis over the winter of 1973-74, a major factor in the change of government).[25] The UK, Germany, Switzerland, and Norway banned flying, driving and boating on Sundays.[12] Sweden rationed gasoline and heating oil.[12] The Netherlands imposed prison sentences for those who used more than their given ration of electricity.[12] Ted Heath asked the British to heat only one room in their houses over the winter.[26]

    A few months later, the crisis eased. The embargo was lifted in March 1974 after negotiations at the Washington Oil Summit, but the effects of the energy crisis lingered on throughout the 1970s. The price of energy continued increasing in the following year, amid the weakening competitive position of the dollar in world markets.

    [edit] Price controls and rationing

    Oregon gasoline dealers displayed signs explaining the flag policy in the winter of 1973-74
    Gasoline ration stamps printed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in 1974Government price controls further exacerbated the crisis in the United States,[24] which limited the price of "old oil" (that already discovered) while allowing newly discovered oil to be sold at a higher price, resulting in a withdrawal of old oil from the market and the creation of artificial scarcity. The rule also discouraged alternative energies or more efficient fuels or technologies from being developed.[24] The rule had been intended to promote oil exploration.[27] This scarcity was dealt with by rationing of gasoline (which occurred in many countries), with motorists facing long lines at gas stations beginning in summer 1972 and increasing by summer 1973.[24]

    In 1973, U.S. President Richard Nixon named William E. Simon as the first Administrator of the Federal Energy Office, or the "Energy Czar".[28] Simon allocated states the same amount of domestic oil for 1974 that each consumed in 1972, which worked well for states whose populations were not increasing.[29] In states with increased populations, lines at gasoline stations were common.[29] The American Automobile Association reported that in the last week of February 1974, 20% of American gasoline stations had no fuel at all.[29]

    In the U.S., odd-even rationing was implemented; drivers of vehicles with license plates having an odd number as the last digit (or a vanity license plate) were allowed to purchase gasoline for their cars only on odd-numbered days of the month, while drivers of vehicles with even-numbered license plates were allowed to purchase fuel only on even-numbered days.[30] The rule did not apply on the 31st day of those months containing 31 days, or on February 29 in leap years— the latter never came into play, since the restrictions had been abolished by 1976.

    In some U.S. states, a three-color flag system was used to denote gasoline availability at service stations — a green flag denoted unrationed sale of gasoline, a yellow flag denoted restricted and rationed sales, and a red flag denoted that no gasoline was available but the service station was open for other services.[31] Additionally, coupons for gasoline rationing were ordered in 1974 and 1975 for Federal Energy Administration, but were never actually used for this crisis or the 1979 energy crisis.[32]

    The rationing led to incidents of violence, after truck drivers nationwide chose to strike for two days in December 1973 because they objected to the supplies Simon had rationed for their industry.[29] In Pennsylvania and Ohio, non-striking truckers were shot at by striking truckers, and in Arkansas, trucks of non-strikers were attacked with bombs.[29]

    America had controlled the price of natural gas since the 1950s, and with the inflation of the 1970s, the market price of natural gas was not encouraging the search for new reserves.[33] America's natural gas reserves dwindled from 237 trillion in 1974 to 203 trillion in 1978, and the price controls were not changed despite President Gerald Ford's repeated requests to Congress.[33]

    [edit] Conservation and reduction in demand
    To help reduce consumption, in 1974 a national maximum speed limit of 55 mph (about 88 km/h) was imposed through the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act. Development of the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve began in 1975, and in 1977, the cabinet-level Department of Energy was created, followed by the National Energy Act of 1978.

    Year-round daylight saving time was implemented from January 6, 1974 to February 23, 1975. The move spawned significant criticism because it forced many children to commute to school before sunrise. The pre-existing daylight-saving rules, calling for the clocks to be advanced one hour on the last Sunday in April, were restored in 1976.


    Gas stations abandoned during the crisis were sometimes used for other purposes. This station at Potlatch, Washington was turned into a revival hall.The crisis also prompted a call for individuals and businesses to conserve energy, most notably a campaign by the Advertising Council using the tag line "Don't Be Fuelish." [34] Many newspapers carried full-page advertisements that featured cut-outs which could be attached to light switches, reading "Last Out, Lights Out: Don't Be Fuelish."

    By 1980, there were no longer full-size luxury cars with a 130-inch (3.3 m) wheelbase and gross weights averaging 4,500 pounds (2,041 kg). The automakers began phasing out the traditional front engine/rear wheel drive layout in favor of more efficient front engine/front wheel drive designs.

    Though not regulated by the new legislation, auto racing groups voluntarily began conserving as well. In 1974 the 24 Hours of Daytona was canceled and NASCAR reduced all race distances by 10%. The 12 Hours of Sebring race was cancelled.

    In 1976, the U.S. Congress created the Weatherization Assistance Program to help low-income homeowners and renters deal with rising heating costs by reducing their demand through advanced insulation.

    [edit] Search for alternatives
    The energy crisis led to greater interest in renewable energy and spurred research in solar power and wind power. It also led to greater pressure to exploit North American oil sources, and increased the West's dependence on coal and nuclear power. This included increased interest in mass transit.

    In Australia, heating oil ceased being considered an appropriate winter heating fuel. This often meant that a lot of oil-fired room heaters that were popular from the late-1950s to the early-1970s were considered outdated. Gas-conversion kits that let the heaters burn natural gas or propane were introduced.

    For the handful of industrialized nations that were net energy exporters, the effects of the oil crisis were very different. In Canada the industrial east suffered many of the same problems of the United States. In oil rich Alberta, however, there was a sudden and massive influx of money that quickly made it the richest province in the country. The federal government attempted to correct this imbalance through the creation of the government-owned Petro-Canada and later the National Energy Program. These efforts produced a great deal of anger in the west producing a sentiment of alienation that has remained a central element of Canadian politics to this day. Overall the oil embargo had a sharply negative effect on the Canadian economy. The economic malaise in the United States easily crossed the border and increases in unemployment, and stagflation hit Canada as hard as the United States despite Canadian fuel reserves.

    The Brazilian government implemented a very large project called "Proálcool" (pro-alcohol) that mixed ethanol with gasoline for automotive fuel.

    To supplement Israel's over-taxed power grid, Harry Zvi Tabor, the father of Israel's solar industry, developed the prototype for a solar water heater now used in over 90% of Israeli homes.[35]

    [edit] Macroeconomic effects
    The 1973 oil crisis was a major factor in Japan's economy shifting from oil-intensive industries, and resulted in huge Japanese investments in industries such as electronics. The Japanese auto makers also took advantage of this embargo. After they realized what fuel costs were in the United States, they started producing small, more fuel efficient models, which began selling as an alternative to "gas-guzzling" American vehicles of the time. This triggered a drop in American auto sales that lasted into the 1980s.

    The Western nations' central banks decided to sharply cut interest rates to encourage growth, deciding that inflation was a secondary concern. Although this was the orthodox macroeconomic prescription at the time, the resulting stagflation surprised economists and central bankers, and the policy is now considered by some to have deepened and lengthened the adverse effects of the embargo.

    Long-term effects of the embargo are still felt. Many in the public remain suspicious of oil companies, believing they profiteered, or even colluded with OPEC. In 1974, seven of the fifteen top Fortune 500 companies were oil companies.

    [edit] Effects on international relations
    The Cold War policies of the Nixon administration also suffered a major blow in the aftermath of the oil embargo. They had focused on China and the Soviet Union, but the latent challenge to U.S. hegemony coming from the Third World became evident. U.S. power was under attack even in Latin America.

    The oil embargo was announced roughly one month after a right-wing military coup in Chile led by General Augusto Pinochet Chilean coup of 1973 toppled socialist president Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. The United States' subsequent assistance to this government did little to curb the activities of socialist guerrillas in the region. The response of the Nixon administration was to propose doubling of the amount of military arms sold by the United States. As a consequence, a Latin American bloc was organized and financed in part by Venezuela and its oil revenues, which quadrupled between 1970 and 1975.

    In addition, Western Europe and Japan began switching from pro-Israel to more pro-Arab policies.[36][37][38] This change further strained the Western alliance system, for the United States, which imported only 12% of its oil from the Middle East (compared with 80% for the Europeans and over 90% for Japan), remained staunchly committed to backing Israel. The percentage of U.S. oil which comes from the nations bordering the Persian Gulf has remained steady over the years, with a figure of a little more than 10% in 2008.[39]

    Although historically having no connections to the Middle East, Japan was the most heavily dependent on its oil from this region, making up 71% of its imported oil from the Middle East in 1970. However, on November 7, 1973, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments declared Japan a “nonfriendly” country directed towards changing its policy of noninvolvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, placing a 5 percent production cut in December to Japan.[40] The December production cut to the Japanese government caused somewhat of a panic, where on November 22 Japan issued a statement “asserting that Israel should withdraw from all of the 1967 territories, advocating Palestinian self-determination, and threatening to reconsider its policy toward Israel if Israel refused to accept these preconditions”[40] By December 25, Japan was considered a friendly state.

    With the oil embargo in place, the industrial governments of the world in some way altered their foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and after the use of the Arab oil weapon. These included European countries such as the UK who decided to refuse to allow the United States to use British bases in the UK and in Cyprus to airlift resupplies to Israel along with the rest of the members of the European Community.[41] It also included the Japanese restatement on November 22, to “reconsider” their relations with Israel if Israel did not acknowledge their avocations to return to their pre-1967 territorial state, although this was never acted upon. Canada shifted towards a more pro-Arab position after displeasure was expressed by many Arab governments towards Canada’s Middle Eastern position as one of being mostly neutral. “On the other hand, after the embargo the Canadian government moved quickly indeed toward the Arab position, despite its low dependence on Middle Eastern oil”[40]

    A year after the start of the 1973 oil embargo, the nonaligned bloc in the United Nations passed a resolution demanding the creation of a "new international economic order" in which resources, trade, and markets would be distributed more equitably, with the local populations of nations within the global South receiving a greater share of benefits derived from the exploitation of southern resources, and greater respect for the right to self-directed development in the South be afforded by the North.

    In the post-Cold War era, Israel continues to serve the U.S.A. as a strategically important non-NATO ally in the Middle East. According to the American military journalist and commentator William M. Arkin in his book Code Names, the U.S. has prepositioned munitions, vehicles, and military equipment, and even a 500-bed hospital for use by US Marines, Special Forces, and Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft in a wartime contingency at least six sites in Israel.[42] Late Republican Senator Jesse Helms used to call Israel "America's aircraft carrier in the Middle East," when explaining why the US viewed Israel as such a strategic ally, saying that the military foothold in the region offered by the Jewish State alone justified the military aid that the US grants Israel every year.[43] Israel is not the only country in the Middle East to host US military bases, though. There are American military facilities in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the Persian Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain (headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet), and Qatar.[43]

    [edit] Decline of OPEC
    Further information: 1980s oil glut

    OPEC net oil export revenues for 1971–2007[44]Since 1973, OPEC failed to hold on to its preeminent position, and by 1981, its production was surpassed by that of other countries. Additionally, its own member nations were divided among themselves. Saudi Arabia, trying to gain back market share, increased production and caused downward pressure on prices, making high-cost oil production facilities less profitable or even unprofitable. The world price of oil, which had reached a peak in 1979 during the 1979 energy crisis, at more than US$80 per barrel, decreased during the early 1980s to US$38 per barrel (239 US$/m3). In real prices, oil briefly fell back to pre-1973 levels. Overall, the reduction in price was a windfall for the oil-consuming nations: United States, Japan, Europe, and especially the Third World.

    Part of the decline in prices and economic and geopolitical power of OPEC comes from the move away from oil consumption to alternate energy sources. OPEC had relied on the famously limited price inelasticity of oil demand [45] to maintain high consumption but had underestimated the extent to which other sources of supply would become profitable as the price increased. Electricity generation from nuclear power and natural gas, home heating from natural gas and ethanol blended gasoline all reduced the demand for oil.

    At the same time, the drop in prices represented a serious problem for oil-producing countries in northern Europe and the Persian Gulf region. For a handful of heavily populated, impoverished countries, whose economies were largely dependent on oil — including Mexico, Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya — governments and business leaders failed to prepare for a market reversal, the price drop placed them in wrenching, sometimes desperate situations.

    When reduced demand and over-production produced a glut on the world market in the mid-1980s, oil prices plummeted and the cartel lost its unity. Oil exporters such as Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela, whose economies had expanded in the 1970s, were plunged into near-bankruptcy, and even Saudi Arabian economic power was significantly weakened. The divisions within OPEC made subsequent concerted action more difficult.

    Nevertheless, the 1973 oil shock provided dramatic evidence of the potential power of Third World resource suppliers in dealing with the developed world. The vast reserves of the leading Middle East producers guaranteed the region its strategic importance, but the politics of oil still proves dangerous for all concerned to this day.

    [edit] Long-term effects
    Prior to the embargo, the geo-political competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, in combination with low oil prices that hindered the necessity and feasibility for the West to seek alternative energy sources, presented the Arab States with financial security, moderate economic growth, and disproportionate international bargaining power.[46] Following the embargo, higher oil prices instigated new avenues for energy exploration or expansion including Alaska, the North Sea, the Caspian Sea, and Caucasus.[47]

    [edit] Soviet reaction
    Prior to the ascendence of Mohammed Anwar Al Sadat to president of Egypt in 1970, the Middle East had been an important arena in the global superpower competition, most lucidly displayed in the arms sales and cooperation between the American and Soviet governments with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran allied to The United States, and Egypt, Syria, and Iraq allied with the Soviet Union. Although none of these states entered into any formal alliances comparative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they did benefit greatly from the geo-political competition in the region and vacillations in alignment often resulted in greater gains of assistance. This competitive environment, beneficial to the regional states involved, was mitigated sharply after 1970. Sadat's dismissal of Soviet specialists in Egypt and the dramatic price increases in hydrocarbons hardened relations with all of the Middle East and created new opportunities for the export of Soviet oil. Exploration in the Caspian Basin and Siberia became more cost effective. Former cooperation evolved into a far more adversarial relationship as the Soviet Union increased oil production and export (by 1980 the Soviet Union was the world's largest producer of oil) to take advantage of the supply problems in the West created by OPEC's production reductions.[48][49] This growing economic competition turned into genuine fears of military aggression after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, leaving the Persian Gulf states to look to the United States for the type of security guarantees against Soviet military action in the Persian Gulf that the Israelis had exclusively received only a decade earlier.

    [edit] Growing security concerns
    The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was only part of the growing security destabilization in the Middle East, most obviously seen in the increased sale of American weapons, technology, and outright military presence. Saudi Arabia and Iran became increasingly dependent on bi-lateral American security assurances to combat both external and internal threats, including increased military competition between these states because of the increased oil revenues. Both states were seemingly competing for preeminence in the Persian Gulf and using increased revenues on disproportionately powerful military forces. By 1979, Saudi weapon purchases from the United States was in excess of five times the amount that Israel was purchasing annually.[50] Following the failure of the Shah during January 1979 to maintain control of Iran, the Saudis were forced to deal with the prospect of internal destabilization via Islamic fundamentalism, a reality which would quickly be revealed in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Wahhabi extremists during November and a Shia revolt in al-Hasa during December.[51][52]

    [edit] Conclusions
    This article is written like a personal reflection or essay and may require cleanup. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (September 2010)

    Growing fears about eventual Western energy independence, various security threats, and the absence of a Western rival in the geo-political competition over the Middle-East led the Arab states in a more dependent relationship with the West. This is most explicit in Saudi Arabia's consistent policy of price and production moderation in an effort to reduce the chances of Western alienation and the opportunity costs for alternative energy production.[53] The exchange for Western moderation in Arab-Israeli affairs ultimately led to a reshaping of the Middle-Eastern geo-political landscape that was significantly less advantageous than prior to 1973.

    [edit] Impact on motor industry
    [edit] West Europe
    This section does not cite any references or sources.
    Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (October 2007)

    The motor industry was one of Western Europe's most affected industries in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis.

    After the Second World War most West European countries applied heavy taxes to motor fuel because it was imported, and as a result most cars made in Europe were small and economical. However by the late sixties as wealth increased car sizes were rising despite heavy fuel taxes, although some of the more upmarket brands were building cars that could take lead-free fuel, and there were still a number of "economy" cars in production at this time.

    But the oil crisis gradually saw many West European car buyers move away from larger, less economical cars. The most notable result of this transition in the car market was the rise in popularity of compact hatchbacks.

    The only notable small hatchbacks built in Western Europe at the time of the oil crisis were the Peugeot 104, Renault 5 and Fiat 127. By the end of the decade, the market had massively expanded with the introduction of the Ford Fiesta, Opel Kadett (sold as the Vauxhall Astra in Great Britain), Chrysler Sunbeam and Citroen Visa.

    Buyers looking for larger cars were increasingly drawn to medium sized hatchbacks that were virtually unknown in Europe in 1973, but by the end of the decade were gradually replacing saloons as the mainstay of this sector. Between 1973 and 1980, the following medium sized hatchbacks were launched across Europe: the Chrysler/Simca Horizon, Fiat Ritmo (Strada in the UK), Ford Escort MK3, Renault 14, Volvo 340 / 360, Opel Kadett and Volkswagen Golf. These cars offered new standard of fuel economy, which were much needed in the aftermath of the oil crisis.

    The new cars launched in the wake of the oil crisis were considerably more economical than the traditional saloons they were taking the place of, and even attracted a considerable number of buyers who would have otherwise chosen cars in the next sector. Their success continued into the 1980s and by the later part of the decade, some 15 years after the oil crisis, hatchbacks almost monopolised most European small and medium car markets, and had gained a substantial share of the large family car market.

    [edit] U.S.
    As in Western Europe, U.S. automakers were significantly impacted by the 1973 oil embargo and energy crisis. Before the energy crisis, large, heavy, and powerful cars were the standard in the U.S. By 1971, the standard engine in a Chevrolet Caprice was a 400-cubic inch (6.5 liter) V8. The wheelbase of this car was 121.5 inches (3,090 mm), and Motor Trend's 1972 road test of the similar Chevrolet Impala logged no more than 15 miles per gallon on the highway.

    After the energy crisis, however, gasoline cost more and reduced the demand for large cars.[33] The Toyota Corona, the Toyota Corolla, the Datsun B210, the Datsun 510, the Honda Civic, the Mitsubishi Galant (a captive import from Chrysler sold as the Dodge Colt), the Subaru DL, and later the Honda Accord all had four cylinder engines that were more fuel efficient in comparison to the typical V8 and six cylinder engines found in North American vehicles. From Europe, the Volkswagen Beetle, the Volkswagen Fastback, the Renault 8, the Renault LeCar, and the Fiat Brava were also offered. As buyers began exchanging large cars for the smaller imported ones, Detroit responded with the Ford Pinto, the Ford Maverick, the Chevrolet Vega, the Chevrolet Nova, the Plymouth Valliant, and the Plymouth Volaré.

    Some buyers lamented the small size of the first compacts that came from Japan, and both Toyota and Nissan (known as Datsun during the 1970s) introduced larger cars called the Toyota Corona Mark II, replaced by the Toyota Cressida, the Mazda 616, and Datsun 810 which gave buyers increased passenger space and some luxury amenities, such as air conditioning, power steering, AM-FM radios, and even power windows and central locking without increasing the price of the vehicle. These larger compacts were at the very limit of Japanese government regulations concerning size and engine displacement so that they could still be affordable in the Japanese Domestic Market, yet offer export buyers larger cars that sacrificed fuel economy for passenger accommodation and a higher price. Toyota also sold the Toyota Crown from 1965 to 1974 with very limited amount of sales.

    Compact trucks were also introduced to the USA, with the Toyota Hilux and the Datsun Truck, followed by the Mazda Truck also sold as the Ford Courier, with Isuzu selling their compact truck as the Chevrolet LUV.

    An increase in imported cars into North America forced the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) to introduce smaller and fuel-efficient models for domestic sales.[33] The Dodge Omni / Plymouth Horizon from Chrysler, the Ford Fiesta, and the Chevrolet Chevette all had four-cylinder engines and room for at least four passengers by the late '70s. By 1985, the average American vehicle received 17.4 miles per gallon, compared to 13.5 miles per gallon in 1970.[33] The improvements stayed even though the price of a barrel of oil remained constant at $12 from 1974 to 1979.[33]

    While at the same time these new imports were major inroads in the American market, sales of large sedans for most makes (except Chrysler products) recovered within two model years of the 73’ Oil Crisis. Sales of models such as the Cadillac DeVille, Buick Electra, Oldsmobile 98, Lincoln Continental, Mercury Marquis, and various other luxury oriented sedans became popular again in the mid-70s. The only full-size models to see permanent reductions in sales were the lower price models; such as the Chevrolet Impala, and Ford Galaxie 500. At the same time, slightly smaller, if not entirely more fuel efficient mid-size models such as the Oldsmobile Cutlass, Chevrolet Monte Carlo, Ford Thunderbird and various other models sold well.

    This led to the somewhat odd juxtaposition of small economical imports introducing themselves as major elements of the market, while at the same time heavy, expensive, largely impractical vehicles (with 7 mpg; Lincoln sold 80,321 Mark Vs in 77) selling alongside the new imports in equally impressive numbers. In 1976; Toyota, with an average weight around 2,100 lbs sold 346,920 cars in the United States, while Cadillac with an average weight around 5,000 lbs sold 309,139 cars.

    Federal safety standards, such as NHTSA Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 215 (pertaining to safety bumpers), and compacts like the 1974 Mustang II were a prelude to the DOT "downsize" revision of vehicle categories.[54] By 1977, GM's full-sized cars reflected on the 1973 oil crisis and preceded later DOT downsizing.[55] By 1979, virtually all the big "full size" American cars were "downsized," featuring smaller engines and smaller dimensions outside. Chrysler Corporation ended production of their full-sized luxury sedans at the end of the 1981 model year, moving instead to a full front wheel drive lineup for 1982 (except for the M-body Dodge Diplomat/Plymouth Gran Fury and Chrysler New Yorker Fifth Avenue sedans).

    It has been suggested that if mass production of overdrive transmissions had been introduced, there would not have actually been any vehicle downsizing.[55]
  • 1979 energy crisis
  • 1979 energy crisis

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Jump to: navigation, search
    Further information: 1979 world oil market chronology
    1979 oil crisis

    Graph of Top Oil Producing Counties, showing drop in Iran's Production [1]
    Other names Second oil crisis
    Date 1979 (1979) - 1980 (1980)
    The 1979 (or second) oil crisis in the United States occurred in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Amid massive protests, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled his country in early 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeini soon became the new leader of Iran. Protests severely disrupted the Iranian oil sector, with production being greatly curtailed and exports suspended. When oil exports were later resumed under the new regime, they were inconsistent and at a lower volume, which pushed prices up. Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations, under the presidency of Dr. Mana Alotaiba increased production to offset the decline, and the overall loss in production was about 4 percent.[2] However, a widespread panic resulted, driving the price far higher than would be expected under normal circumstances.

    In 1980, following the Iraqi invasion of Iran, oil production in Iran nearly stopped, and Iraq's oil production was severely cut as well.

    After 1980, oil prices began a six-year decline that culminated with a 46 percent price drop in 1986. This was due to reduced demand and over-production, which caused OPEC to lose its unity. Oil exporters such as Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela expanded production. Ending of price controls allowed the US and Europe to get more oil from Prudhoe Bay and the North Sea.

    Contents [hide]
    1 Iran
    2 Effects
    2.1 Other OPEC members
    2.2 United States
    2.3 Oil patch
    2.4 Automobile fuel economy
    3 See also
    3.1 Further reading
    4 References


    [edit] Iran
    In November 1978, a strike by 37,000 workers at Iran's nationalized oil refineries initially reduced production from 6 million barrels (950,000 m3) per day to about 1.5 million barrels (240,000 m3).[3] Foreign workers (including skilled oil workers) fled the country. On January 16, 1979, Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his wife left Iran at the behest of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (a long time opposition leader himself), who sought to calm down the situation.[4]

    [edit] Effects
    [edit] Other OPEC members

    OPEC net oil export revenues for 1971 - 2007.[5]The rise in oil price benefited other OPEC members, which made record profits.

    [edit] United States

    Line at a gas station in Maryland, USA, June 15, 1979.Richard Nixon had imposed price controls on domestic oil, which had helped cause shortages that led to gasoline lines during the 1973 Oil Crisis. Gasoline controls were repealed, but controls on domestic US oil remained. The Jimmy Carter administration began a phased deregulation of oil prices on April 5, 1979, when the average price of crude oil was US$15.85 per barrel (42 US gallons). Over the next 12 months the price of crude oil rose to $39.50 per barrel (its all time highest real price until March 7, 2008.)[6] Deregulating domestic oil price controls allowed domestic U.S. oil output to rise sharply from the large Prudhoe Bay fields, while oil imports fell sharply. Hence, long lines appeared at gas stations, as they had six years earlier during the 1973 oil crisis.

    controls. The amount of oil sold in the United States in 1979 was only 3.5 percent less than the record set for oil sold the year previously.[7]

    Many politicians proposed gas rationing; one such proponent was Harry Hughes, Governor of Maryland, who proposed odd-even rationing (only people with an odd-numbered license plate could purchase gas on an odd-numbered day), as was used during the 1973 Oil Crisis. Several states actually implemented odd-even gas rationing, including Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Texas. Coupons for gasoline rationing were printed but were never actually used during the 1979 crisis.[8]

    On July 15, 1979, President Jimmy Carter outlined his plans to reduce oil imports and improve energy efficiency in his "Crisis of Confidence" speech (sometimes known as the "malaise" speech).[9] It is often said that during the speech, Carter wore a cardigan (he actually wore a blue suit) [10] and encouraged citizens to do what they could to reduce their use of energy. He had already installed solar power panels on the roof of the White House and a wood-burning stove in the living quarters. However, the panels were removed in 1986, reportedly for roof maintenance, during the administration of his successor, Ronald Reagan, and were never replaced.[11]

    Carter's speech argued the oil crisis was "the moral equivalent of war". Several months later, in January 1980, Carter issued the Carter Doctrine, which declared that any interference with U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on the vital interests of the United States.[12] Additionally, as part of his administration's efforts at deregulation, Carter proposed removing price controls that had been imposed in the administration of Richard Nixon before the 1973 crisis. Carter agreed to remove price controls in phases; they were finally dismantled in 1981 under Reagan.[13] Carter also said he would impose a windfall profit tax on oil companies.[14] While the regulated price of domestic oil was kept to $6 a barrel, the world market price was $30.[14]

    In 1980, the U.S. Government established the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to produce an alternative to imported fossil fuels.

    [edit] Oil patch
    When the price of West Texas intermediate crude oil increased 250 percent between 1978 and 1980, the oil-producing areas of Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Colorado, Wyoming, and Alaska began experiencing an economic boom and population inflows.[15]

    [edit] Automobile fuel economy
    At the same time, Detroit's then-Big Three automakers (Ford, Chrysler, GM) were marketing downsized full-sized automobiles like the Chevrolet Caprice, the Ford LTD Crown Victoria and the Dodge St. Regis which met the CAFE fuel economy mandates passed in 1978. Detroit's response to the growing popularity of imported compacts like the Toyota Cressida and the Volkswagen Rabbit were the Chevrolet Citation, and the Ford Fairmont; Ford replaced the Ford Pinto with the Ford Escort and Chrysler, on the verge of bankruptcy, introduced the Dodge Aries K. GM was having unfavorable market reactions to the Citation, and introduced the Chevrolet Corsica and Chevrolet Beretta in 1987 which did sell better. GM also replaced the Chevrolet Monza, introducing the 1982 Chevrolet Cavalier which was better received. Ford experienced a similar market rejection of the Fairmont, and introduced the front wheel drive Ford Tempo in 1984.

    Detroit was not well prepared for the sudden rise in fuel prices, and imported brands were now more widely available in North America and had developed a loyal customer base. Many imported brands utilized fuel saving technologies such as fuel injection and multi-valve engines over the common use of carburetors. GM's Cadillac division experimented with their V8-6-4 power plant (the ancestor of the modern-day Active Fuel Management and/or variable displacement), which was a market failure.[16] Nonetheless, overall fuel economy declined, which was one factor leading to the subsequent 1980s oil glut.
  • Japanese asset price buuble
  • Japanese asset price bubble

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Jump to: navigation, search
    This article needs additional citations for verification.
    Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (April 2009)

    See also: Japanese post-war economic miracle
    The Japanese asset price bubble (バブル景気, baburu keiki?, lit. "bubble economy") was an economic bubble in Japan from 1986 to 1991, in which real estate and stock prices greatly inflated.[1] The bubble's collapse lasted for more than a decade with stock prices bottoming in 2003, until hitting an even lower low amidst the current global crisis in 2008. The Japanese asset price bubble contributed to what the Japanese refer to as the Lost Decade.

    Contents [hide]
    1 History
    2 See also
    2.1 General
    2.2 Property bubbles
    3 Notes
    4 References
    5 External links and sources


    [edit] History
    In the decades following World War II, Japan implemented stringent tariffs and policies to encourage people to save their income. With more money in banks, loans and credit became easier to obtain, and with Japan running large trade surpluses, the yen appreciated against foreign currencies. This allowed local companies to invest in capital resources much more easily than their competitors overseas, which reduced the price of Japanese-made goods and widened the trade surplus further. And, with the yen appreciating, financial assets became very lucrative.[2]

    With so much money readily available for investment, speculation was inevitable, particularly in the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the real estate market. The Nikkei stock index hit its all-time high on December 29, 1989 when it reached an intra-day high of 38,957.44 before closing at 38,915.87. Additionally, banks granted increasingly risky loans.

    Prices were highest in Tokyo's Ginza district in 1989, with choice properties fetching over 100 million yen (approximately $1 million US dollars) per square meter ($93,000 per square foot). Prices were only marginally less in other large business districts of Tokyo. By 2004, prime "A" property in Tokyo's financial districts had slumped to less than 1 percent of its peak, and Tokyo's residential homes were less than a tenth of their peak, but still managed to be listed as the most expensive in the world until being surpassed in the late 2000s by Moscow and other cities. Tens of trillions of dollars worth were wiped out with the combined collapse of the Tokyo stock and real estate markets. Only in 2007 had property prices begun to rise; however, they began to fall in late 2008 due to the financial crisis.

    With the economy driven by its high rates of reinvestment, this crash hit particularly hard. Investments were increasingly directed out of the country, and manufacturing firms lost some degree of their technological edge. As Japanese products became less competitive overseas, the low consumption rate began to bear on the economy, causing a deflationary spiral. The Japanese Central Bank set interest rates at approximately zero. When that failed to stop deflation some economists, such as Paul Krugman, and some Japanese politicians, advocated inflation targeting.[3]

    The easily obtainable credit that had helped create and engorge the real estate bubble continued to be a problem for several years to come, and as late as 1997, banks were still making loans that had a low probability of being repaid. Loan Officers and Investment staff had a hard time finding anything to invest in that would return a profit. They would sometimes resort to depositing their block of investment cash, as ordinary deposits, in a competing bank, which would bring howls of complaint from that bank's Loan Officers and Investment staff. Correcting the credit problem became even more difficult as the government began to subsidize failing banks and businesses, creating many so-called "zombie businesses". Eventually a carry trade developed in which money was borrowed from Japan, invested for returns elsewhere and then the Japanese were paid back, with a nice profit for the trader.

    The time after the bubble's collapse (崩壊, hōkai?), which occurred gradually rather than catastrophically, is known as the "lost decade or end of the century" (失われた十年, ushinawareta jūnen?) in Japan. On March 10, 2009 the Nikkei 225 stock index reached a 27-year low of 7054.98 [4].
  • 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
  • 1997 Asian Financial Crisis

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Jump to: navigation, search

    Countries most affected by the Asian Crisis.The Asian Financial Crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of Asia beginning in July 1997, and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion.

    The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht caused by the decision of the Thai government to float the baht, cutting its peg to the USD, after exhaustive efforts to support it in the face of a severe financial over extension that was in part real estate driven. At the time, Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the collapse of its currency. As the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping currencies, devalued stock markets and other asset prices, and a precipitous rise in private debt.[1]

    Though there has been general agreement on the existence of a crisis and its consequences, what is less clear are the causes of the crisis, as well as its scope and resolution. Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were also hurt by the slump. The People's Republic of China, India, Taiwan, Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam were less affected, although all suffered from a loss of demand and confidence throughout the region.

    Foreign debt-to-GDP ratios rose from 100% to 167% in the four large ASEAN economies in 1993–96, then shot up beyond 180% during the worst of the crisis. In South Korea, the ratios rose from 13 to 21% and then as high as 40%, while the other northern newly industrialized countries fared much better. Only in Thailand and South Korea did debt service-to-exports ratios rise.[2]

    Although most of the governments of Asia had seemingly sound fiscal policies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to initiate a $40 billion program to stabilize the currencies of South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, economies particularly hard hit by the crisis. The efforts to stem a global economic crisis did little to stabilize the domestic situation in Indonesia, however. After 30 years in power, President Suharto was forced to step down on 21 May 1998 in the wake of widespread rioting that followed sharp price increases caused by a drastic devaluation of the rupiah. The effects of the crisis lingered through 1998. In the Philippines growth dropped to virtually zero in 1998. Only Singapore and Taiwan proved relatively insulated from the shock, but both suffered serious hits in passing, the former more so due to its size and geographical location between Malaysia and Indonesia. By 1999, however, analysts saw signs that the economies of Asia were beginning to recover.[3]

    Contents [hide]
    1 History
    2 IMF Role
    2.1 IMF and high interest rates
    3 Thailand
    4 Indonesia
    5 South Korea
    6 Philippines
    7 Hong Kong
    8 Malaysia
    9 Singapore
    10 China
    11 United States and Japan
    12 Consequences
    12.1 Asia
    12.2 Outside Asia
    13 See also
    14 References
    15 External links


    [edit] History
    Until 1997, Asia attracted almost half of the total capital inflow to developing countries. The economies of Southeast Asia in particular maintained high interest rates attractive to foreign investors looking for a high rate of return. As a result the region's economies received a large inflow of money and experienced a dramatic run-up in asset prices. At the same time, the regional economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea experienced high growth rates, 8–12% GDP, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This achievement was widely acclaimed by financial institutions including the IMF and World Bank, and was known as part of the "Asian economic miracle".

    In 1994, noted economist Paul Krugman published an article attacking the idea of an "Asian economic miracle".[4] He argued that East Asia's economic growth had historically been the result of increasing capital investment. However, total factor productivity had increased only marginally or not at all. Krugman argued that only growth in total factor productivity, and not capital investment, could lead to long-term prosperity. Krugman's views would be seen by many as prescient after the financial crisis had become apparent, though he himself stated that he had not predicted the crisis nor foreseen its depth.[citation needed]

    The causes of the debacle are many and disputed. Thailand's economy developed into a bubble fueled by "hot money". More and more was required as the size of the bubble grew. The same type of situation happened in Malaysia, and Indonesia, which had the added complication of what was called "crony capitalism".[5] The short-term capital flow was expensive and often highly conditioned for quick profit. Development money went in a largely uncontrolled manner to certain people only, not particularly the best suited or most efficient, but those closest to the centers of power.[6]

    At the time of the mid-1990s, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea had large private current account deficits and the maintenance of fixed exchange rates encouraged external borrowing and led to excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk in both the financial and corporate sectors. In the mid-1990s, two factors began to change their economic environment. As the U.S. economy recovered from a recession in the early 1990s, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank under Alan Greenspan began to raise U.S. interest rates to head off inflation. This made the U.S. a more attractive investment destination relative to Southeast Asia, which had been attracting hot money flows through high short-term interest rates, and raised the value of the U.S. dollar. For the Southeast Asian nations which had currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, the higher U.S. dollar caused their own exports to become more expensive and less competitive in the global markets. At the same time, Southeast Asia's export growth slowed dramatically in the spring of 1996, deteriorating their current account position.

    Some economists have advanced the growing exports of China as a contributing factor to ASEAN nations' export growth slowdown, though these economists maintain the main cause of the crises was excessive real estate speculation.[7] China had begun to compete effectively with other Asian exporters particularly in the 1990s after the implementation of a number of export-oriented reforms. Other economists dispute China's impact, noting that both ASEAN and China experienced simultaneous rapid export growth in the early 1990s.[8]

    Many economists believe that the Asian crisis was created not by market psychology or technology, but by policies that distorted incentives within the lender–borrower relationship. The resulting large quantities of credit that became available generated a highly leveraged economic climate, and pushed up asset prices to an unsustainable level.[9] These asset prices eventually began to collapse, causing individuals and companies to default on debt obligations. The resulting panic among lenders led to a large withdrawal of credit from the crisis countries, causing a credit crunch and further bankruptcies. In addition, as foreign investors attempted to withdraw their money, the exchange market was flooded with the currencies of the crisis countries, putting depreciative pressure on their exchange rates. To prevent currency values collapsing, these countries' governments raised domestic interest rates to exceedingly high levels (to help diminish flight of capital by making lending more attractive to investors) and to intervene in the exchange market, buying up any excess domestic currency at the fixed exchange rate with foreign reserves. Neither of these policy responses could be sustained for long. Very high interest rates, which can be extremely damaging to an economy that is healthy, wreaked further havoc on economies in an already fragile state, while the central banks were hemorrhaging foreign reserves, of which they had finite amounts. When it became clear that the tide of capital fleeing these countries was not to be stopped, the authorities ceased defending their fixed exchange rates and allowed their currencies to float. The resulting depreciated value of those currencies meant that foreign currency-denominated liabilities grew substantially in domestic currency terms, causing more bankruptcies and further deepening the crisis.

    Other economists, including Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, have downplayed the role of the real economy in the crisis compared to the financial markets. The rapidity with which the crisis happened has prompted Sachs and others to compare it to a classic bank run prompted by a sudden risk shock. Sachs pointed to strict monetary and contractory fiscal policies implemented by the governments on the advice of the IMF in the wake of the crisis, while Frederic Mishkin points to the role of asymmetric information in the financial markets that led to a "herd mentality" among investors that magnified a small risk in the real economy. The crisis has thus attracted interest from behavioral economists interested in market psychology. Another possible cause of the sudden risk shock may also be attributable to the handover of Hong Kong sovereignty on 1 July 1997. During the 1990s, hot money flew into the Southeast Asia region but investors were often ignorant of the actual fundamentals or risk profiles of the respective economies. The uncertainty regarding the future of Hong Kong led investors to shrink even further away from Asia, exacerbating economic conditions in the area (subsequently leading to the depreciation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997).[10]

    The foreign ministers of the 10 ASEAN countries believed that the well co-ordinated manipulation of their currencies was a deliberate attempt to destabilize the ASEAN economies. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad accused George Soros of ruining Malaysia's economy with "massive currency speculation." (Soros appeared to have had his bets in against the Asian currency devaluations, incurring a loss when the crisis hit.[citation needed]) At the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia, they issued a joint declaration on 25 July 1997 expressing serious concern and called for further intensification of ASEAN's cooperation to safeguard and promote ASEAN's interest in this regard.[11] Coincidentally, on that same day, the central bankers of most of the affected countries were at the EMEAP (Executive Meeting of East Asia Pacific) meeting in Shanghai, and they failed to make the 'New Arrangement to Borrow' operational. A year earlier, the finance ministers of these same countries had attended the 3rd APEC finance ministers meeting in Kyoto, Japan on 17 March 1996, and according to that joint declaration, they had been unable to double the amounts available under the 'General Agreement to Borrow' and the 'Emergency Finance Mechanism'. As such, the crisis could be seen as the failure to adequately build capacity in time to prevent Currency Manipulation. This hypothesis enjoyed little support among economists, however, who argue that no single investor could have had enough impact on the market to successfully manipulate the currencies' values. In addition, the level of organization necessary to coordinate a massive exodus of investors from Southeast Asian currencies in order to manipulate their values rendered this possibility remote.[citation needed]

    [edit] IMF Role
    Such was the scope and the severity of the collapses involved that outside intervention, considered by many as a new kind of colonialism,[12] became urgently needed. Since the countries melting down were among not only the richest in their region, but in the world, and since hundreds of billions of dollars were at stake, any response to the crisis had to be cooperative and international, in this case through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF created a series of bailouts ("rescue packages") for the most affected economies to enable affected nations to avoid default, tying the packages to reforms that were intended to make the restored Asian currency, banking, and financial systems as much like those of the United States and Europe as possible. In other words, the IMF's support was conditional on a series of drastic economic reforms influenced by neoliberal economic principles called a "structural adjustment package" (SAP). The SAPs called on crisis-struck nations to cut back on government spending to reduce deficits, allow insolvent banks and financial institutions to fail, and aggressively raise interest rates. The reasoning was that these steps would restore confidence in the nations' fiscal solvency, penalize insolvent companies, and protect currency values. Above all, it was stipulated that IMF-funded capital had to be administered rationally in the future, with no favored parties receiving funds by preference. In at least one of the affected countries the restrictions on foreign ownership were greatly reduced.[13] There were to be adequate government controls set up to supervise all financial activities, ones that were to be independent, in theory, of private interest. Insolvent institutions had to be closed, and insolvency itself had to be clearly defined. In short, exactly the same kinds of financial institutions found in the United States and Europe had to be created in Asia, as a condition for IMF support. In addition, financial systems had to become "transparent", that is, provide the kind of reliable financial information used in the West to make sound financial decisions.[14]

    However, the greatest criticism of the IMF's role in the crisis was targeted towards its response.[15] As country after country fell into crisis, many local businesses and governments that had taken out loans in US dollars, which suddenly became much more expensive relative to the local currency which formed their earned income, found themselves unable to pay their creditors. The dynamics of the situation were closely similar to that of the Latin American debt crisis. The effects of the SAPs were mixed and their impact controversial. Critics, however, noted the contractionary nature of these policies, arguing that in a recession, the traditional Keynesian response was to increase government spending, prop up major companies, and lower interest rates. The reasoning was that by stimulating the economy and staving off recession, governments could restore confidence while preventing economic loss. They pointed out that the U.S. government had pursued expansionary policies, such as lowering interest rates, increasing government spending, and cutting taxes, when the United States itself entered a recession in 2001, and arguably the same in the fiscal and monetary policies during the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis.

    Although such reforms were, in most cases, long needed Template:Were they?), the countries most involved ended up undergoing an almost complete political and financial restructuring. They suffered permanent currency devaluations, massive numbers of bankruptcies, collapses of whole sectors of once-booming economies, real estate busts, high unemployment, and social unrest. For most of the countries involved, IMF intervention has been roundly criticized. The role of the International Monetary Fund was so controversial during the crisis that many locals called the financial crisis the "IMF crisis".[16] Many commentators in retrospect criticized the IMF for encouraging the developing economies of Asia down the path of "fast track capitalism", meaning liberalization of the financial sector (elimination of restrictions on capital flows); maintenance of high domestic interest rates to attract portfolio investment and bank capital; and pegging of the national currency to the dollar to reassure foreign investors against currency risk.[15]

    [edit] IMF and high interest rates
    The conventional high-interest-rate economic wisdom is normally employed by monetary authorities to attain the chain objectives of tightened money supply, discouraged currency speculation, stabilized exchange rate, curbed currency depreciation, and ultimately contained inflation.

    In the Asian meltdown, highest IMF officials rationalized their prescribed high interest rates as follows:

    From then IMF First Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer (Stanley Fischer, "The IMF and the Asian Crisis," Forum Funds Lecture at UCLA, Los Angeles on March 20, 1998):

    ”When their governments "approached the IMF, the reserves of Thailand and South Korea were perilously low, and the Indonesian Rupiah was excessively depreciated. Thus, the first order of business was... to restore confidence in the currency. To achieve this, countries have to make it more attractive to hold domestic currency, which in turn, requires increasing interest rates temporarily, even if higher interest costs complicate the situation of weak banks and corporations...

    "Why not operate with lower interest rates and a greater devaluation? This is a relevant tradeoff, but there can be no question that the degree of devaluation in the Asian countries is excessive, both from the viewpoint of the individual countries, and from the viewpoint of the international system. Looking first to the individual country, companies with substantial foreign currency debts, as so many companies in these countries have, stood to suffer far more from… currency (depreciation) than from a temporary rise in domestic interest rates…. Thus, on macroeconomics… monetary policy has to be kept tight to restore confidence in the currency..."

    From the then IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus himself ("Doctor Knows Best?" Asiaweek, 17 July 1998, p. 46):

    "To reverse (currency depreciation), countries have to make it more attractive to hold domestic currency, and that means temporarily raising interest rates, even if this (hurts) weak banks and corporations."

    [edit] Thailand
    Further information: Economy of Thailand
    From 1985 to 1996, Thailand's economy grew at an average of over 9% per year, the highest economic growth rate of any country at the time. Inflation was kept reasonably low within a range of 3.4–5.7%.[17] The baht was pegged at 25 to the US dollar.

    On 14 May and 15 May 1997, the Thai baht was hit by massive speculative attacks. On 30 June 1997, Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh said that he would not devalue the baht. This was the spark that ignited the Asian financial crisis as the Thai government failed to defend the baht, which was pegged to the U.S. dollar, against international speculators. Thailand's booming economy came to a halt amid massive layoffs in finance, real estate, and construction that resulted in huge numbers of workers returning to their villages in the countryside and 600,000 foreign workers being sent back to their home countries.[18] The baht devalued swiftly and lost more than half of its value. The baht reached its lowest point of 56 units to the US dollar in January 1998. The Thai stock market dropped 75%. Finance One, the largest Thai finance company until then, collapsed.[19]

    The Thai government was eventually forced to float the Baht, on 2 July 1997. On 11 August 1997, the IMF unveiled a rescue package for Thailand with more than $17 billion, subject to conditions such as passing laws relating to bankruptcy (reorganizing and restructuring) procedures and establishing strong regulation frameworks for banks and other financial institutions. The IMF approved on 20 August 1997, another bailout package of $3.9 billion.

    Thai opposition parties claimed that former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had profited from the devaluation,[20] It has been investigated by the court of justice and despite comments from former Thaksin cabinet member Sanoh that "There were four people who got involved in the Baht depreciation, i.e. Chavalit, Thaksin, Thanong and Pokin," [21] no case has been filed against Thaksin for this or any other parties.

    By 2001, Thailand's economy had recovered. The increasing tax revenues allowed the country to balance its budget and repay its debts to the IMF in 2003, four years ahead of schedule. The Thai baht continued to appreciate to 29 Baht to the Dollar in October 2010.

    [edit] Indonesia
    See also: Fall of Suharto and Economy of Indonesia
    In June 1997, Indonesia seemed far from crisis. Unlike Thailand, Indonesia had low inflation, a trade surplus of more than $900 million, huge foreign exchange reserves of more than $20 billion, and a good banking sector. But a large number of Indonesian corporations had been borrowing in U.S. dollars. During the preceding years, as the rupiah had strengthened respective to the dollar, this practice had worked well for these corporations; their effective levels of debt and financing costs had decreased as the local currency's value rose.

    In July 1997, when Thailand floated the baht, Indonesia's monetary authorities widened the rupiah trading band from 8% to 12%. The rupiah suddenly came under severe attack in August. On 14 August 1997, the managed floating exchange regime was replaced by a free-floating exchange rate arrangement. The rupiah dropped further. The IMF came forward with a rescue package of $23 billion, but the rupiah was sinking further amid fears over corporate debts, massive selling of rupiah, and strong demand for dollars. The rupiah and the Jakarta Stock Exchange touched a historic low in September. Moody's eventually downgraded Indonesia's long-term debt to 'junk bond'.[22]

    Although the rupiah crisis began in July and August 1997, it intensified in November when the effects of that summer devaluation showed up on corporate balance sheets. Companies that had borrowed in dollars had to face the higher costs imposed upon them by the rupiah's decline, and many reacted by buying dollars through selling rupiah, undermining the value of the latter further. In February 1998, President Suharto sacked Bank Indonesia Governor J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, but this proved insufficient. Suharto resigned under public pressure in May 1998 and Vice President B. J. Habibie was elevated in his place. Before the crisis, the exchange rate between the rupiah and the dollar was roughly 2,600 rupiah to 1 USD.[23] The rate plunged to over 11,000 rupiah to 1 USD in January 1998, with spot rates over 14,000 during January 23–26 and trading again over 14,000 for about six weeks during June-July 1998. On 31 December 1998, the rate was almost exactly 8,000 to 1 USD.[24] Indonesia lost 13.5% of its GDP that year.

    [edit] South Korea
    Further information: Economy of South Korea


    Economy of South Korea
    History
    Miracle on the Han River
    1997 financial crisis

    Companies
    List of companies
    Chaebol
    Samsung (Chaebol)
    Hyundai (Chaebol)
    LG (Chaebol)
    SK (Chaebol)

    Industry
    Currency
    Communications
    Tourism
    Transportation
    Real estate
    Financial services
    Nuclear power

    Rankings
    Regions by GDP per capita
    International rankings

    Related topics
    Science and technology
    Cities

    This box: view • talk • edit
    Macroeconomic fundamentals in South Korea were good but the banking sector was burdened with non-performing loans as its large corporations were funding aggressive expansions. During that time, there was a haste to build great conglomerates to compete on the world stage. Many businesses ultimately failed to ensure returns and profitability. The South Korean conglomerates, more or less completely controlled by the government, simply absorbed more and more capital investment. Eventually, excess debt led to major failures and takeovers. For example, in July 1997, South Korea's third-largest car maker, Kia Motors, asked for emergency loans. In the wake of the Asian market downturn, Moody's lowered the credit rating of South Korea from A1 to A3, on 28 November 1997, and downgraded again to B2 on 11 December. That contributed to a further decline in South Korean shares since stock markets were already bearish in November. The Seoul stock exchange fell by 4% on 7 November 1997. On 8 November, it plunged by 7%, its biggest one-day drop to that date. And on 24 November, stocks fell a further 7.2% on fears that the IMF would demand tough reforms. In 1998, Hyundai Motors took over Kia Motors. Samsung Motors' $5 billion dollar venture was dissolved due to the crisis, and eventually Daewoo Motors was sold to the American company General Motors (GM).

    The South Korean won, meanwhile, weakened to more than 1,700 per dollar from around 800. Despite an initial sharp economic slowdown and numerous corporate bankruptcies, South Korea has managed to triple its per capita GDP in dollar terms since 1997. Indeed, it resumed its role as the world's fastest-growing economy—since 1960, per capita GDP has grown from $80 in nominal terms to more than $21,000 as of 2007. However, like the chaebol, South Korea's government did not escape unscathed. Its national debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubled (app. 13% to 30%) as a result of the crisis.

    In South Korea, the crisis is also commonly referred to as the IMF crisis.

    [edit] Philippines
    Further information: Economy of the Philippines
    The Philippine central bank raised interest rates by 1.75 percentage points in May 1997 and again by 2 points on 19 June. Thailand triggered the crisis on 2 July and on 3 July, the Philippine Central Bank was forced to intervene heavily to defend the peso, raising the overnight rate from 15% to 32% right upon the onset of the Asian crisis in mid-July 1997. The peso fell significantly, from 26 pesos per dollar at the start of the crisis, to 38 pesos as of mid-1999, and to 54 pesos as of first half August 2001.

    The Philippine economy recovered from a contraction of 0.6% in GDP during the worst part of the crisis to GDP growth of some 3% by 2001, despite scandals of the administration of Joseph Estrada in 2001, most notably the "jueteng" scandal, causing the PSE Composite Index, the main index of the Philippine Stock Exchange, to fall to some 1000 points from a high of some 3000 points in 1997. The peso fell even further, trading at levels of about 55 pesos to the US dollar. Later that year, Estrada was on the verge of impeachment but his allies in the senate voted against the proceedings to continue further. This led to popular protests culminating in the "EDSA II Revolution", which finally forced his resignation and elevated Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency. Arroyo managed to lessen the crisis in the country, which led to the recovery of the Philippine peso to about 50 pesos by the year's end and traded at around 41 pesos to a dollar by end 2007. The stock market also reached an all time high in 2007 and the economy is growing by at least more than 7 percent, its highest in nearly 2 decades.

    [edit] Hong Kong
    Further information: Economy of Hong Kong
    Although the two events were unrelated, the collapse of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997, came only 24 hours after the United Kingdom handed over sovereignty of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. In October 1997, the Hong Kong dollar, which had been pegged at 7.8 to the U.S. dollar since 1983, came under speculative pressure because Hong Kong's inflation rate had been significantly higher than the U.S.'s for years. Monetary authorities spent more than US$1 billion to defend the local currency. Since Hong Kong had more than US$80 billion in foreign reserves, which is equivalent to 700% of its M1 money supply and 45% of its M3 money supply,[citation needed] the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (effectively the city's central bank) managed to maintain the peg.

    Stock markets became more and more volatile; between 20 October and 23 October the Hang Seng Index dropped 23%. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority then promised to protect the currency. On 15 August 1998, it raised overnight interest rates from 8% to 23%, and at one point to 500%.[citation needed] The HKMA had recognized that speculators were taking advantage of the city's unique currency-board system, in which overnight rates automatically increase in proportion to large net sales of the local currency. The rate hike, however, increased downward pressure on the stock market, allowing speculators to profit by short selling shares. The HKMA started buying component shares of the Hang Seng Index in mid-August.

    The HKMA and Donald Tsang, then the Financial Secretary, declared war on speculators. The Government ended up buying approximately HK$120 billion (US$15 billion) worth of shares in various companies,[25] and became the largest shareholder of some of those companies (e.g. the government owned 10% of HSBC) at the end of August, when hostilities ended with the closing of the August Hang Seng Index futures contract. In 1999, the Government started selling those shares by launching the Tracker Fund of Hong Kong, making a profit of about HK$30 billion (US$4 billion).

    [edit] Malaysia
    Further information: Economy of Malaysia
    Before the crisis, Malaysia had a large current account deficit of 5% of its GDP. At the time, Malaysia was a popular investment destination, and this was reflected in KLSE activity which was regularly the most active stock exchange in the world (with turnover exceeding even markets with far higher capitalization like the NYSE). Expectations at the time were that the growth rate would continue, propelling Malaysia to developed status by 2020, a government policy articulated in Wawasan 2020. At the start of 1997, the KLSE Composite index was above 1,200, the ringgit was trading above 2.50 to the dollar, and the overnight rate was below 7%.

    In July 1997, within days of the Thai baht devaluation, the Malaysian ringgit was "attacked" by speculators. The overnight rate jumped from under 8% to over 40%. This led to rating downgrades and a general sell off on the stock and currency markets. By end of 1997, ratings had fallen many notches from investment grade to junk[disambiguation needed], the KLSE had lost more than 50% from above 1,200 to under 600, and the ringgit had lost 50% of its value, falling from above 2.50 to under 4.10 to the dollar. The then premier, Mahathir Mohammad imposed strict capital controls and introduced a 3.80 peg against the US dollar

    In 1998, the output of the real economy declined plunging the country into its first recession for many years. The construction sector contracted 23.5%, manufacturing shrunk 9% and the agriculture sector 5.9%. Overall, the country's gross domestic product plunged 6.2% in 1998. During that year, the ringgit plunged below 4.7 and the KLSE fell below 270 points. In September that year, various defensive measures were announced to overcome the crisis. The principal measure taken were to move the ringgit from a free float to a fixed exchange rate regime. Bank Negara fixed the ringgit at 3.8 to the dollar. Capital controls were imposed while aid offered from the IMF was refused. Various task force agencies were formed. The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee dealt with corporate loans. Danaharta discounted and bought bad loans from banks to facilitate orderly asset realization. Danamodal recapitalized banks.

    Growth then settled at a slower but more sustainable pace. The massive current account deficit became a fairly substantial surplus. Banks were better capitalized and NPLs were realised in an orderly way. Small banks were bought out by strong ones. A large number of PLCs were unable to regulate their financial affairs and were delisted. Compared to the 1997 current account, by 2005, Malaysia was estimated to have a US$14.06 billion surplus.[26] Asset values however, have not returned to their pre-crisis highs. In 2005 the last of the crisis measures were removed as the ringgit was taken off the fixed exchange system. But unlike the pre-crisis days, it did not appear to be a free float, but a managed float, like the Singapore dollar.

    [edit] Singapore
    Further information: Economy of Singapore
    As the financial crisis spread the economy of Singapore dipped into a short recession. The short duration and milder effect on its economy was credited to the active management by the government. For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore allowed for a gradual 20% depreciation of the Singapore dollar to cushion and guide the economy to a soft landing. The timing of government programs such as the Interim Upgrading Program and other construction related projects were brought forward. Instead of allowing the labor markets to work, the National Wage Council pre-emptively agreed to Central Provident Fund cuts to lower labor costs, with limited impact on disposable income and local demand. Unlike in Hong Kong, no attempt was made to directly intervene in the capital markets and the Straits Times Index was allowed to drop 60%. In less than a year, the Singaporean economy fully recovered and continued on its growth trajectory.[27]

    [edit] China
    Further information: Economy of the People's Republic of China
    The Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), had been pegged to the US dollar at a ratio of 8.3 RMB to the dollar, in 1994. Having largely kept itself above the fray throughout 1997–1998 there was heavy speculation in the Western press that China would soon be forced to devalue its currency to protect the competitiveness of its exports vis-a-vis those of the ASEAN nations, whose exports became cheaper relative to China's. However, the RMB's non-convertibility protected its value from currency speculators, and the decision was made to maintain the peg of the currency, thereby improving the country's standing within Asia. The currency peg was partly scrapped in July 2005 rising 2.3% against the dollar, reflecting pressure from the United States.

    Unlike investments of many of the Southeast Asian nations, almost all of China's foreign investment took the form of factories on the ground rather than securities, which insulated the country from rapid capital flight. While China was unaffected by the crisis compared to Southeast Asia and South Korea, GDP growth slowed sharply in 1998 and 1999, calling attention to structural problems within its economy. In particular, the Asian financial crisis convinced the Chinese government of the need to resolve the issues of its enormous financial weaknesses, such as having too many non-performing loans within its banking system, and relying heavily on trade with the United States.

    [edit] United States and Japan
    Further information: Economy of the United States and Economy of Japan
    The "Asian flu" had also put pressure on the United States and Japan. Their markets did not collapse, but they were severely hit. On 27 October 1997, the Dow Jones industrial plunged 554 points or 7.2%, amid ongoing worries about the Asian economies. The New York Stock Exchange briefly suspended trading. The crisis led to a drop in consumer and spending confidence (see 27 October 1997 mini-crash). Indirect effects included the dot-com bubble, and years later the housing bubble and the Subprime mortgage crisis. Japan was affected because its economy is prominent in the region. Asian countries usually run a trade deficit with Japan because the latter's economy was more than twice the size of the rest of Asia together; about 40% of Japan's exports go to Asia. The Japanese yen fell to 147 as mass selling began, but Japan was the world's largest holder of currency reserves at the time, so it was easily defended, and quickly bounced back. GDP real growth rate slowed dramatically in 1997, from 5% to 1.6% and even sank into recession in 1998, due to intense competition from cheapened rivals. The Asian financial crisis also led to more bankruptcies in Japan. In addition, with South Korea's devalued currency, and China's steady gains, many companies complained outright that they could not compete.[28]

    Another longer-term result was the changing relationship between the U.S. and Japan, with the U.S. no longer openly supporting the highly artificial trade environment and exchange rates that governed economic relations between the two countries for almost five decades after World War II.[29]

    [edit] Consequences
    [edit] Asia
    The crisis had significant macro-level effects, including sharp reductions in values of currencies, stock markets, and other asset prices of several Asian countries.[30] The nominal US dollar GDP of ASEAN fell by US$9.2 billion in 1997 and $218.2 billion (31.7%) in 1998. In South Korea, the $170.9 billion fall in 1998 was equal to 33.1% of the 1997 GDP.[31] Many businesses collapsed, and as a consequence, millions of people fell below the poverty line in 1997–1998. Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis.

    Currency Exchange rate
    (per US$1)[32] Change
    June 1997 July 1998
    Thai baht 24.5 41 – 40.2%
    Indonesian rupiah 2,380 14,150 – 83.2%
    Philippine peso 26.3 42 – 37.4%
    Malaysian ringgit 2.5 4.1 – 39.0%
    South Korean won 850 1,290 – 34.1%
    Country GNP (US$1 billion)[32] Change
    June 1997 July 1998
    Thailand 170 102 – 40.0%
    Indonesia 205 34 – 83.4%
    Philippines 75 47 – 37.3%
    Malaysia 90 55 – 38.9%
    South Korea 430 283 – 34.2%


    The above tabulation shows that despite the prompt raising of interest rates to 32% in the Philippines upon the onset of crisis in mid-July 1997, and to 65% in Indonesia upon the intensification of crisis in 1998, their local currencies depreciated just the same and did not perform better than those of South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, which countries had their high interest rates set at generally lower than 20% during the Asian crisis. This created grave doubts on the credibility of IMF and the validity of its high-interest-rate prescription to economic crisis.

    The economic crisis also led to a political upheaval, most notably culminating in the resignations of President Suharto in Indonesia and Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in Thailand. There was a general rise in anti-Western sentiment, with George Soros and the IMF in particular singled out as targets of criticisms. Heavy U.S. investment in Thailand ended, replaced by mostly European investment, though Japanese investment was sustained.[citation needed] Islamic and other separatist movements intensified in Southeast Asia as central authorities weakened.[33]

    More long-term consequences included reversal of the relative gains made in the boom years just preceding the crisis. Nominal US dollar GDP per capital fell 42.3% in Indonesia in 1997, 21.2% in Thailand, 19% in Malaysia, 18.5% in South Korea and 12.5% in the Philippines.[31] The CIA World Factbook reported that the per capita income (measured by purchasing power parity) in Thailand declined from $8,800 to $8,300 between 1997 and 2005; in Indonesia it declined from $4,600 to $3,700; in Malaysia it declined from $11,100 to $10,400. Over the same period, world per capita income rose from $6,500 to $9,300.[34] Indeed, the CIA's analysis asserted that the economy of Indonesia was still smaller in 2005 than it had been in 1997, suggesting an impact on that country similar to that of the Great Depression. Within East Asia, the bulk of investment and a significant amount of economic weight shifted from Japan and ASEAN to China and India.[35]

    The crisis has been intensively analyzed by economists for its breadth, speed, and dynamism; it affected dozens of countries, had a direct impact on the livelihood of millions, happened within the course of a mere few months, and at each stage of the crisis leading economists, in particular the international institutions, seemed a step behind. Perhaps more interesting to economists was the speed with which it ended, leaving most of the developed economies unharmed. These curiosities have prompted an explosion of literature about financial economics and a litany of explanations why the crisis occurred. A number of critiques have been leveled against the conduct of the IMF in the crisis, including one by former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz. Politically there were some benefits. In several countries, particularly South Korea and Indonesia, there was renewed push for improved corporate governance. Rampaging inflation weakened the authority of the Suharto regime and led to its toppling in 1998, as well as accelerating East Timor's independence.[36]

    [edit] Outside Asia
    After the Asian crisis, international investors were reluctant to lend to developing countries, leading to economic slowdowns in developing countries in many parts of the world. The powerful negative shock also sharply reduced the price of oil, which reached a low of $8 per barrel towards the end of 1998, causing a financial pinch in OPEC nations and other oil exporters. This reduction in oil revenue contributed to the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which in turn caused Long-Term Capital Management in the United States to collapse after losing $4.6 billion in 4 months. A wider collapse in the financial markets was avoided when Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a $3.625 billion bail-out. Major emerging economies Brazil and Argentina also fell into crisis in the late 1990s (see Argentine debt crisis).[37]

    The crisis in general was part of a global backlash against the Washington Consensus and institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which simultaneously became unpopular in developed countries following the rise of the anti-globalization movement in 1999. Four major rounds of world trade talks since the crisis, in Seattle, Doha, Cancún, and Hong Kong, have failed to produce a significant agreement as developing countries have become more assertive, and nations are increasingly turning toward regional or bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) as an alternative to global institutions. Many nations learned from this, and quickly built up foreign exchange reserves as a hedge against attacks, including Japan, China, South Korea. Pan Asian currency swaps were introduced in the event of another crisis. However, interestingly enough, such nations as Brazil, Russia, and India as well as most of East Asia began copying the Japanese model of weakening their currencies, restructuring their economies so as to create a current account surplus to build large foreign currency reserves. This has led to an ever increasing funding for US treasury bonds, allowing or aiding housing (in 2001–2005) and stock asset bubbles (in 1996–2000) to develop in the United States.
  • LKK
  • 緊急救難背包
    2010/08/22

    遭遇突如其來的天災(地震、水災、颱風等)人禍(戰爭)時,得以自力救濟,不需仰賴與等候外界的援助,而存活至少72小時。




    因為這些災難發生的時候,我們不一定在家,所以又因我們所處的位置、地點,而得準備不同份的緊急救難背包(避難維生背包、逃生背包)。最理想的方法,是家裡、工作場所、以及車上各放置一個。背包所含的內容物,通常如下:飲水、乾糧、頭燈/手電筒、急救醫藥品、電池、收音機、瑞士小刀、N95型口罩、火柴、緊急救生太空毯(求生紙)、哨子、輕便雨衣等。




    由於種種主客觀因素,真正能夠做到如此萬全準備的家庭,畢竟不在多數。

    於是筆者特地規劃出一個簡單、便於實行,周全卻不複雜的系統,以幫助一般民眾克服「嫌麻煩」的心理,在平時做好準備,必要時求生存。




    這個系統,包含一個主要的緊急救難背包,以及一個口袋型的緊急求生小包。

    其中緊急救難背包,包括在黃金72小時 - 甚至更久,所可以提供並援助災難者生存的物資。平時應該放於所處建築物裡的逃生出入口,睡覺時則置於床邊,必要時,隨手一抓,即可逃跑。採用背包,因為逃生、行動時可以帶著走、跑、跳,甚至匍匐前進,機動性強。至於口袋型的緊急求生小包,平時應該存置於口袋、手提包中,隨身攜帶,走到哪,帶到哪。




    背包不要選擇太大,東西不要裝太多,記得這是緊急救難背包,你得背著它「走天下」,倘若太大、太重背不動、無法帶著跑,則有等於無。





    緊急救難背包裡的食物、飲水、與醫藥品,要定期更新,以免過期。
    稍後提到的的MRE〔Meal, Ready-to-Eat〕,是美國軍隊專用的食品,常溫下可以保持數年,所以不需憂慮。只要記得在過期以前,把食物拿出來享用,以免浪費即可。







    存放位置




    緊急救難背包的存放位置,非常重要。如果丟在地下室、角落、不顯眼的地方,當災難發生時,無法即刻取得,就失去它的意義,遑論發揮效果。所以,準備好緊急救難背包以後,還得與存放位置相配合,最重要的,讓家中每一位成員知道緊急救難背包的放置地點,才能形成一個完整的自助求生救難系統。







    以下就主包與小包的存放地點,加以說明:




    緊急救難背包 -

    在家時,白天應置於門口,晚上則帶到臥室床邊。

    出門時,記得隨手攜帶,放在車裡。

    上班時,放在辦公桌旁,或是緊急逃生出入口。




    口袋型緊急求生小包 -

    體積小,便於攜帶,故可放於男性長褲、外套的口袋,或是女用手提包內。不論置於何處,重點在「隨身攜帶」。 養成走到哪裡,就把口袋型緊急求生小包帶到哪裡的好習慣。




    【註】




    背包內容物




    口袋型緊急求生小包 - 由美國求生專家道格‧芮特所設計,4X5照片般大,111公克重:

    Spark-Lite 打火石

    四個 Spark-Lite牌 Tinder-Quik 火種

    Fox-40 塑膠哨

    Rescue Flash閃光信號鏡

    20mm 指北針

    Duct Tape 萬用膠帶 /3M超強大力膠布

    鋼絲

    尼龍繩

    六十九號黑色尼龍線

    釣魚勾

    堅固耐用型縫衣針

    安全別針

    堅固耐用型鋁箔紙

    二號鉛筆和防水便條紙

    二十二號小刀

    說明書

    內容物清單

    放大鏡

    透明膠質防水存放袋

    以上口袋型緊急求生小包,廠商已經事先組好,民眾僅需購買成品即可。




    緊急救難背包 - 包括野外求生必需品(不含地圖與指北針):

    太陽眼鏡 & 防曬油

    防水防風衣物 /輕便型雨衣

    頭燈 /手電筒

    Lightsticks 安全螢光棒

    醫療用品 /急救包(包括醫師處方藥)

    火種、打火石

    防水火柴

    口袋型小刀 /瑞士刀

    備份乾糧、零食(包含三天份食物)

    閃光信號鏡

    哨子

    飲用水、水壺(若有濾水器或者淨水藥片則更佳)

    緊急避難遮蓋物 /緊急救難毯(求生紙)

    電池供電收音機

    備份電池

    繩索

    Duct Tape 萬用膠帶 /3M超強大力膠布

    N95型口罩

    塑膠袋

    親友緊急聯絡通訊資料

    家人的照片、重要文件、證件副本以及保險資料

    些許現金

    女性衛生用品

    以上內容需自備、整理、打包。







    緊急救難背包內容物清單 (包括野外求生九大必需品)




    太陽眼鏡 & 防曬油



    備份、防水防風衣物/輕便型雨衣



    頭燈/手電筒



    Lightsticks

    安全螢光棒



    醫療用品/急救包


    (包括醫師處方藥)



    Firestarter

    火種、打火石



    防水火柴



    口袋型小刀/瑞士刀



    備份乾糧、零食



    Signal Mirror

    閃光信號鏡



    哨子



    飲用水、水壺

    (若有濾水器或淨水藥片更佳)



    Emergency Shelter/Blanket

    緊急避難遮蓋物/緊急救難毯(求生紙)



    電池供電收音機



    備份電池



    繩索



    Duct Tape 萬用膠帶/3M超強大力膠布



    N95 型口罩



    塑膠袋



    親友緊急聯絡通訊資料



    家人照片、重要文件證件副本

    及保險資料



    現金



    女性衛生用品
















    內容物說明




    飲用水、水壺
    求生不可缺少的元素。
    準備每個人一天二~五公升或是一加侖的飲用水。放數瓶罐裝在背包裡。




    筆者自身範例:山貓壺(Nalgene bottle)容量一公升之水壺,堅固、耐用、耐熱、耐寒、不會產生異味。平常裝水於其中,每三個月換一次。另備有濾水器與淨水藥片以防不時之需。




    備份乾糧、零食
    每人至少三天分的食糧。不會腐爛、敗壞,可長久保存,不需電力、爐火烹煮的乾糧為佳。若準備罐頭製品,易開罐較為理想,否則務必記得放入開罐器。餅乾、巧克力、糖果、高熱量食物如花生、堅果、混合豆類都是不錯的選擇。避免含鹽量高的食物。維他命C。即溶咖啡/茶、和即溶巧克力都可以無限期保存。




    筆者自身範例:MRE - Meal, Ready-to-Eat,美國軍隊的個人即食口糧。容易拆封食用與加熱(不加熱也可直接食用),針對軍人健康及體力而設計。全餐包括主食、前餐、點心、餅乾、起司/花生醬、即溶咖啡、調味料、衛生紙、湯匙、加熱袋等,足夠供給一人一天份營養以及熱量所需。特殊技術包裝,華氏80度/攝氏27度,置於櫥櫃中,一般保守的估計,可存三年,若貯存於陰冷處,有效期限可以更長(按照美國官方的數據,華氏80度/攝氏27度下,可以保存超過76個月;華氏60度/攝氏16度下,可以保存超過130個月)。




    辨識MRE貯存期限:由包裝上前四碼來分別,第一碼代表年份,二~四碼代表包裝的天數。例如,0123,就是在西元2000年的第123天裝封;又7025,表示在1997年的第25天裝封,依此類推。




    頭燈 /手電筒
    頭燈比手電筒方便,一般手電筒,因為得由手拿持操作,妨礙了雙手自由與靈活度。




    筆者自身範例:除了頭燈,另備有Photon 牌的Micro-Light II光子科技第二代LED迷你鑰匙圈燈(白),可掛在鑰匙圈上,隨身攜帶。高亮度,耐用,防水,LED燈泡省電高效,壽命達100,000小時,比一般手電筒長10~15倍,在連續使用的情況下,電池可超過十二小時以上,而且在零下度F也能運作。為美國警方、國家太空總署飛行員、情報機構、以及一般民眾廣氾運用。是目前市場上,體積最小、同等級燈中最亮的,1英里/1.61公里外仍舊可以看見。




    Lightsticks 安全螢光棒
    Cyalume 安全螢光棒,不需電池、電力操作,自行發光,可在水中使用,一根棒的光度可維持8-12小時。使用方法簡單;折彎光棒,搖一搖,即可使用。




    應用化學作用的原理,讓液體自行發光,成分無毒,不含非易燃物。但有可能在布料、家具上留下污點。請將燈棒存放在陰涼處,不要在太陽光下直射。




    口袋型小刀 /瑞士刀
    求生不可缺少的必需品。瑞士刀要選附有開罐器的,否則得記得另行準備開罐器。




    醫療用品 /急救包
    可購買成品或是自己組裝。


    包括各種大小的無菌黏性繃帶、剪刀、三英吋大小的無菌紗布、安全別針、彈性繃帶、膠布、酒精、優碘、抗生素、止痛藥、綜合感冒藥、胃藥、止瀉藥、蚊蟲叮咬藥、消炎藥、醫生處方藥、棉花棒、三角巾、生理食鹽水、眼藥水、溫度計、熱帶、消毒濕巾(以節省用水)等。




    筆者自身範例:以「冒險醫療箱」牌(Adventure Medical Kits)的急救包為底,另行添加其餘藥資物品。




    哨子
    緊急救難必需品。




    筆者自身範例:Storm哨,目前世界上最大聲之哨子,為美國政府、官方各單位,以及紅十字會所廣泛使用。不但聲響,更可以在各種天氣狀況以及水中使用。




    閃光信號鏡
    必要時可以打信號求救。




    筆者自身範例:ACR電子信號鏡 - 包括一只信號鏡、一個圓體漂浮物、及一個高音哨。容易使用,而且即使掉入水中也不會沈下。




    電池供電收音機
    小型的、電池供電的收音機,以隨時掌握最新的消息與安全指示。

    一般公司行號的贈品即可。




    備份電池
    頭燈、手電筒、收音機等所需的備用電池。




    防水防風衣物

    /輕便型雨衣
    擋風防雨保溫禦寒用。

    沒有防水防風外套,7-11賣的輕便型雨衣也可。




    緊急避難遮蓋物 /緊急救難毯、太空毯(求生紙)


    緊急情況下,可保溫、防水、禦寒,讓身體持溫,而不至在惡劣的天氣中急速失溫。




    筆者親自範例:太空毯(space blanket)及「冒險醫療箱」牌(Adventure Medical Kits)的緊急避難露宿袋(Thermo-Lite Emergency Bivvy Sack)。




    另外同牌的1-2人用緊急求生毯也是不錯的選擇。使用以及求生方法印在毯上,亮橘明顯的顏色有利搜索救難人員的尋找 。可重複使用。




    火種、打火石
    若有打火石,則不需火柴也可起火。




    防水火柴
    防水防風火柴,在最惡劣的天氣下也可使用。




    太陽眼鏡 & 防曬油
    防曬是很重要的一項防護措施,記得在背包裡放一小瓶防曬乳液或是防曬油。有多餘的一副太陽眼鏡,也順便塞進去。




    繩索



    Duct Tape 萬用膠帶 /3M超強大力膠布
    有個別名「馬蓋先膠帶」,超黏、防水、易撕、耐高溫,緊急情況下,可用來固定、黏貼、修補各種東西。




    N95型口罩
    地震後可避免吸入過多碎瓦塵土。




    塑膠袋






    親友緊急聯絡通訊資料
    市內、外縣市親友的聯絡通訊資料,包括姓名、地址、日夜間電話。




    家人的照片
    必要時以供尋找、辯認。




    重要文件、證件副本

    以及保險資料
    包括身份證、駕照、健保卡、護照、戶口名簿、出生結婚死亡證明書、預防接種記錄、銀行帳號、保險證書、合約、契約等資料,用防水的袋子保存裝起來。




    些許現金
    以備不時之需。




    女性衛生用品



















    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    其他可自行斟酌、加減的物品(可有可無,主要是保心安、讓自己覺得舒服):

    ﹡衛生紙

    ﹡眼鏡

    ﹡鞋子

    ﹡嬰兒奶粉與尿布(有寶寶的家庭千萬不要忘記)

    ﹡家庭用漂白水以及點眼藥器(必要時可作消毒或淨水用,使用比例 - 5公升水:16滴漂白劑)

    ﹡工業型以及醫院用手套

    ﹡牙刷、牙膏

    ﹡備份衣物

    ﹡旅行用肥皂、洗髮精

    ﹡護唇膏

    ﹡善存、維他命C

    ﹡濕巾

    ﹡爐頭、燃料油

    ﹡地圖、指北針











    註:若依然覺得此系統太繁複、不夠方便,此間最折衷的辦法,是除了居家的緊急救難背包,同時在工作場所、與汽車裡各自備有一個簡易小包,這兩個簡易小包只需含基本物資。若有工作場所包與汽車包,則緊急救難背包就能留在家裡,不必帶來帶去。而儘管兩者不若緊急救難背包齊全,有準備至少勝過完全毫無準備。簡言之,如果平日不想帶著緊急救難背包穿梭於家裡、車上、與辦公室之間,那在工作場所以及私人轎車內各自準備一個簡易包,是折衷的作法。簡易包的製作相當簡單,不需花費太多精神與心力,所以不要嫌麻煩,利用五分鐘的時間,準備兩個簡易包,防患未然,何樂而不為。以下資料參考三藩市(San Francisco)消防局針對綜合災難所作「鄰里應急反應訓練」的中文版文宣:



    工作場所包 - 一個簡便的包,讓你能夠回到家裡或團聚地點(便宜背包、贈品旅行袋均可)

    舒適、好走的鞋子
    手電筒
    便攜式無線電
    少量水和食品
    些許現金
    親友緊急聯絡通訊資料



    汽車包 - 與工作場所包相似,簡便、容易攜帶的包(便宜背包、贈品旅行袋均可)

    舒適、好走的鞋子
    手電筒
    少量水和食品
    小型醫藥包
    些許現金
    地圖、親友緊急聯絡通訊資料
    換洗衣服
    閃光燈


    另外,若有孩童,不妨考慮作個簡易孩童包,選擇一個小背包,裡面裝有:

    爸爸媽媽的通訊資料、市外聯絡人的地址與電話
    孩童名字與聯絡人身份
    喜歡的書或玩具
    喜歡的餅乾或飲料
    換洗衣物
    備用藥品(若是醫生處方藥,記得附上便條說明)

  • LKK
  • 簡易濾水器

    自己就能做的「簡易濾水器」,不僅效果佳,並且經濟實惠,值得一試:

    一、利用塑膠飲料容器,如保特瓶、牛奶瓶、果汁瓶等,用剪刀將底部截掉,兩側各鑽一個孔,穿一條繩子(約30公分長)並在兩側各打一個結。

    二、把25公分× 60公分大小的紗布兩張對摺,縫成袋子狀。

    三、把粒狀椰殼活性碳約250公克(化學原料行可買到),裝入紗布袋裡,袋口以棉線紮緊。

    四、開小水量的水在水龍頭下面充分揉洗,直到洗出的水,顏色由黑色變成透明無色為止,再將它裝入容器內。

    五、蓋子上放二、三層紗布,再把打洞的蓋子扭緊。

    六、把瓶底朝上的簡易濾水器,直接掛在水龍頭上,注入自來水,瓶口流出的即為水質乾淨的水了。

    每隔半個月,紗袋中的活性碳要用鍋子在水中煮5分鐘,以防雜菌繁殖,同時也可恢復活性碳的吸附能力,如此活性碳可重覆使用達2年之久,成本低,既經濟又實惠。

      使用簡易濾水器可濾掉水中的霉味及殘留的餘氯,將濾過的水拿來泡茶、沖咖啡,味道特別甘美,沒有苦澀味。

      假日登山或露營時,若能隨身攜帶一個簡易濾水器,那麼在山之涯、水之偶,也仍然可飲用到乾淨又安全的水。
  • BEN
  • 奴役的極致

    最極致的操控是 讓人們 以為他們是自由的

    而事實上已經從最根本的基礎被奴役了


    真像總是太殘酷
    以至於即使 無所掩飾的呈現 眾人也視而不見
  • rich beauty
  • richdad coaching

    有人知道richdad coaching--財務教練嗎?好比他的收費及服務等等,thanks!1
  • 暴力石油派
  • 回答77樓

    資源都被壟斷了 意識型態是壟斷者塑造的 分配利潤的公式是壟斷者決定的 農業社會的互助安全網路又被壟斷者提倡的市場化所取代 
    個人如果沒有祖產 就只能出賣勞力

    這就是有錢人的大計劃
  • news
  • 美國真偉大

    美在瓜地馬拉進行性病人體試驗 美政府道歉
    (2010/10/02)

    國際中心/綜合報導

    美國國務卿希拉蕊克和衛生與公眾服務部長西貝利厄斯(Katherine Sebelius)1日就60多年前美國政府為研究目的,故意讓數百名瓜地馬拉人感染性病表示道歉。

    《新華網》報導,希拉蕊和西貝利厄斯在一份聯合聲明中說,當時在瓜地馬拉進行的這些性病試驗「顯然是不道德的」,她們對這種不負責任的研究能夠在公共衛生的掩護下得以進行感到憤怒。聲明說,「我們對於發生這種事深表遺憾,我們向所有受這種令人厭惡研究行為影響的個人道歉。」

    美國政府於1946年到1948年之間在瓜地馬拉進行這項醫學試驗中,美國醫療人員在受害者不知情或者未經受害者允許的情況下,故意讓數百名當地人感染上淋病和梅毒。據披露的相關文件顯示,受害者中甚至包括醫院內的精神病患者。此外,作為該項研究的一部分,許多感染者還被鼓勵將性病傳染給其他人。感染性病的受害者中大約有三分之一的人一直未得到足夠的治療。
      
    許多美國公眾對此感到震驚。有美國網民在美國的MSNBC新聞網站上評論說,「當時我們不是剛剛絞死了一幫對集中營囚犯進行醫學試驗的納粹分子嗎?美國同時卻在進行性病的人體試驗!沒搞錯吧?」

    這一事件不可避免地讓人想到在美國讓不少黑人聞之色變的「塔斯基吉梅毒實驗」,自1932年起,美國公共衛生部門在阿拉巴馬州以免費治療梅毒為由,將數百名非洲裔黑人男子作為試驗品,秘密研究梅毒對人體的危害。實際上,當事人未得到任何治療。這一研究項目直到1972年被媒體曝光才終止,期間,當事人被隱瞞長達40年,大批受害人及其親屬付出了健康乃至生命的代價。
  • micro-shareholder
  • 美國在瓜地馬拉做的這個梅毒計畫,其中一部份還包括聘請了一批已染了梅毒的妓女去和監獄的囚犯做,而且如果囚犯的免疫力好,沒有得病,他們還會把囚犯的那個那個弄出傷口,以求務必讓他們感染,為的就是研究梅毒的傳染模式。雖然是學術研究,但是這種方式很奇怪。

    還有另一個例子,就是美國要試驗盤尼西林治療梅毒的療效,就找了一些社經地位較差的梅毒患者來試用盤尼西林。在那個時代,抗生素非常昂貴(就是我我們把抗生素稱為美國仙丹差不多的年代),所以後來這個計畫的預算燒得差不多時,就喊停了,也沒有一個適當的退場機制。

    關於瓜地馬拉的故事,提供紐約時報的新聞連結:
    http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/health/research/02infect.html

    當年,就是因為美國做了不少有關梅毒的臨床研究,而且為了要能搞懂有關梅毒的一切,向病人隱瞞了許多事,包括使用安慰劑(讀科學的人會瞭解,做實驗需要對照組,讀醫學相關和統計的人會知道,做臨床試驗,不能讓病人知道他們是用到真藥還是安慰劑,避免bias,但是那個時代病人連自己被當做實驗的對象都不曉得)。今天我們上醫學院,有關梅毒的知識都是美國那些人和無辜病人的貢獻犧牲。而且當被記者訪問時,其中有一位當年的記畫主持人還是覺得他沒有任何不對的地方。

    當年就是美國自己搞了一些以科學研究為名,實則枉顧人的基本人權的實驗(相較之下,納粹和日本明著來還比較光明正大,而且德國自己還蓋了紀念館公布史實,不會像日本那樣一直遮遮掩掩,甚至修改歷史教科書,我還比較欽佩德國一點),被一些比較有良心的學者(有些也是美國人)揭發之後,就開始制訂一些法規,來規範臨床研究必須有科學基礎,並且要保護參加試驗的人的權益。現在在美國,做臨床試驗的醫師要像六十年前那樣搞,是要坐牢的,真是不可同日而語。現在做臨床試驗,醫師要先讓醫院審查計畫設計是否適當,贊助計畫的廠商或是研究機構要把計畫先讓衛生主管機關審查(新藥、新醫療器材或是新醫療技術)或是備案(已上市的藥品做的研究),在請病人參加試驗之前,會和病人解釋試驗內容,而且是自願的,簽署同意書之後才能參加試驗。病人如果對自己的權益有任何的疑慮,除了詢問主持試驗的醫師之外,也可以詢問醫院的人體試驗委員會(有的醫院叫研究倫理委員會),這些醫院的網站都會有人體試驗委員會的連結,可以上去看看。

    這篇迴響有點離題,請格主在一週之後刪除,在這裡提供這個訊息,不是要為現在的美國平反(因為現在他們在打基因轉植作物戰和特製農藥戰),而是想要多提供一點其他面象的訊息。
  • 暴力石油派
  • 81樓是內行人 (最後一句的括弧)
  • 暴力石油派
  • 阿拉伯半島六國佔全球石油輸出額40%,如果加上英加墨三國,比例大概超過50%。從2007年次貸風暴爆發以來,這些輸出額佔全球50%的國家一直繼續保持用美元交易石油。

    唱x黃金而完全不談石油的人,可能是xyz,或者是zyx。
    唱x黃金而完全不談航空母艦、轟炸機、原子彈的人,可能是xyz,或者是zyx。

    Fed 2010 Q3報告說 : 美國民間儲蓄率也在不斷上升,美國金融機構手握大量的現金。

    當左手一切準備就緒,右手就要出動了。

    扮豬吃老虎的演技一流,可以得獎。
  • GEAB
  • 2011年春季世界經濟與金融系統趨向嚴重崩潰

    作者:GEAB

    如LEAP/E2020去年2月份在第42期中所預測的那樣,2010年第二季度的確伴隨有突兀的危機惡化特徵,其標誌是西方領導人所維護的幻覺復甦的結束[1] ,以及數以萬億為銀行與沒有持續效果經濟“刺激”計劃所吞沒的鈔票。 接下來的月份裡,將揭示一個簡單卻特別痛苦的現實:西方經濟,特別是美國經濟[2],絕對不會真正走出蕭條[3]。 自2009年夏季以來記錄的令人驚訝的統計數字,不過是大規模流動性注入系統所帶來的短期效果,總體實際已經破產,就像美國消費者那樣[4]。

    美國從一開始就居於全球系統危機的核心,接下來的月度裡,便會證明這一點。 再次說明,在將經濟與全球金融帶到黑暗中心的過程中[5],因為美國無法走出“超大蕭條”[6],故而,結果就是政治劇變,也就是11月的美國選舉,所謂增長將再次變得消極,世界必鬚麵對全球經濟與金融系統“非常嚴重的崩潰”,它建於60年前,美國經濟絕不會持久衰落的絕對必要條件上。 現在,2011年上半年將表明,美國經濟會進行前所未有的緊縮藥劑服用,會讓整個星球陷入一個新的金融、貨幣、經濟與社會混亂狀態[7]。

    接下來幾個季度,對世界經濟與金融系統來說特別危險。 美聯儲主席伯南克,最近在懷俄明州傑克遜洞(Jackson Hole)的世界央行家會議上,圓滑地盡可能地傳遞了這個消息。 懷俄明州:即便復甦美國經濟的政策失敗了,世界其它地方還會繼續資助美國赤字的損失,希望在某一時刻打賭兩訖,避免全球系統的崩潰,或者,美國就會貨幣化債務,把這個星球上其它地方所持有的全部所元與美國債券,都打回滑稽的鈔票。 和任何走投無路的大國勢力一樣,美國現在也被迫基於壓力進行威脅,以此獲取他們想要的結果。 只是一年前,世界其它地方的領導人與金融官員,還都自願重新讓美國船浮起來。

    然而,如今事態已經產生了戲劇性的變化,因為來自華盛頓的所謂高貴承諾(美聯儲的,就像奧巴馬政府一樣),純粹是一種虛偽的自大,以為自己理解了危機的本性,還處於能夠控制它的幻想之中。 但是,美國增長一季復一季地蒸發掉[8],在2010年末時又回到消極狀態。 失業問題不能停止增長,在官方展現的穩定性與退出之間,六個月內,仍會有超過200多萬美國人失去工作崗位(我們相信真實的失業統計數字現在至少已經是20%)[ 9];美國房地產市場仍然保持歷史低位蕭條,在2010年第四季度將再次下跌;最後,但並不是不重要的,這種情況下,人們可以想像,美國消費者不會像從前那樣,因為他們會繼續破產,可能結果更糟[10],美國人當中,五個就有一個沒有工作。 這些統計因素後面隱藏著三個現實情況,未來幾個季度,將會劇烈改變美國與世界政治、經濟與社會圖景,當他們開始吸引公眾注意時。


    自2010年11月始廣泛的憤怒將弄殘華盛頓

    首先,有著非常令人沮喪的普遍的現實問題,通向黑暗中心的真實旅程,數以千萬美國人(現在有將近600多萬人依賴糧票)不會再有工作,不會再有房子,不會再有儲蓄,他們以後將如何生存[11]。 年輕人[12],退休者,非洲裔美國人,工人,服務業僱員[13]……他們組成了這個憤怒的公民群體,在11月份的時候,會猛烈發言,將華盛頓推入不幸的政治僵局。 茶黨的支持者[14],還有最新的分離主義者[15]運動……都希望打碎華盛頓機器(還有華爾街),他們沒有什麼可行建議來解決這個國家的無數問題[16]。 2010年11月的選舉,將是“痛苦美國”的第一次機會,來表達危機情況和後果,而且,如經過共和黨甚至極端主義分子勝出,這些投票人有助於進一步損毀奧巴馬政府與國會(可能會向共和黨一方搖擺),只會讓這個國家更為僵局,當所有信號都變紅時。 這種廣泛的憤怒情緒,從12月開始,還會與奧巴馬建立的赤字委員會的報告相衝突,將會自動將赤字議題置於公共討論的中心,從2011年開始[17]。

    比如,我們已經看到反對華爾街的此類特別而又廣泛的憤怒,在那些被股票市場遺棄的美國人當中泛起[18]。 每一個月,都會增加很多小投資者,離開華爾街與金融市場[19]。 如今,已經使得70%交易落在主要的機構手中,其它的就是“高頻交易商”了。 如果用傳統的影響記住的話,股票交易所就是當今所謂現代資本主義的寺廟,那麼,我們便將見證一種現象,相當多的人,會像以前共產主義跌落之前對政府的不滿一樣,對現政府的官方陳述感到不平。



    美聯儲知道自己的無力

    最後,還有一個特別悲劇的金融與貨幣效應,因為玩家知道他們不是那麼令人羨慕的境地:美聯儲現在知道自己的無力。 暫不說奇怪的效果(零利率、量化寬鬆,對房地產抵押市場的支持,對銀行的大規模支持,讓資產負債表擴大了三倍……),這是從2008年9月份開始執行的,美國經濟不會重啟。 美聯儲的領導人,剛發現,他們其實也不過是系統的一個部分,即便處於關鍵位置,故而,他們對問題的處理也做不了什麼,既然這樣的話,問題依舊影響系統的性質,美國金融系統,自1945年以來作為有償債能力的全球金融系統的核心。 不過,美國消費者已經破產了[20],近三十年來的消費者,已經成為金融核心的中央經濟玩家(70%的美國增長依賴於居住房產開支)。 就是這些破產的美國屋主[21],將打碎美聯儲的努力。

    習慣於虛擬主義的,可能會操控事件進程與動態,美國央行家相信,他們會“誤導”房產主,再次給他們一個財富的幻像,繼而推動他們去消費,而其後則是整個美國的經濟與金融機器。 直到2010年,他們都不相信危機的系統性質,或者他們不了解是什麼導致這些問題,央行工具都不管用了,以前可是很強大的啊。 只有最近幾週,他們才揭示了兩個證據:他們的政策失效了,他們既沒了武器也沒了彈藥。

    因為傑克遜洞央行會議討論的沮喪背景,對未來行動缺乏共識,未來幾月內,由此仍是無窮盡的關於風險性質的爭論(比如通脹還是通縮,系統的內部工具,用來量度這些趨勢的經濟後果,甚至都不再相關[22]),還有以債務撬動增長的支持者,與赤字縮減贊成方的劇烈衝突……而伯南克的談話,完全隱含著對世界各地央行同僚的威脅,以模棱兩可的術語,他傳達了這樣的訊息:我們將盡一切努力避免經濟與金融崩潰,你們也要繼續資助著一切,否則我們將放縱通脹,順而貶值美元,而美國債券也會變得不那麼值錢[23]。 當一個央行家如此表述,簡直就像現金勒索者,那麼房間裡就有危險了[24]。

    世界主要央行的反應,將在接下來兩個季度內揭示。 歐洲央行清晰表示,他們認為通過增加美國赤字方式的刺激新政策,對美國來說就是自殺。 還有中國,也是說什麼都不會做,把時間花在出售美國資產購買日本資產(通過日元/美元匯率的歷史水平就可以反映出來)。 至於日本,也和華盛頓與背景同時看齊……而這些,將會抵消其所有金融與貨幣政策。 未來幾個季度,美聯儲,會和聯邦政府一樣,會發現美國不再有什麼收益或者共享權力,說服夥伴的能力將急劇下降,特別當後者質疑相關科選政策時[25]。

    這三個現實結果,美國以及全球意識會愈加感到它們的存在,因此,我們認為,在2011年春季,美國將進入一個空前的緊縮時期,既然這個國家是全球經濟與金融系統的核心。 聯邦政治阻塞,接下來對華盛頓和華爾街感到厭倦的背景中,會過度依賴整體美國的資金,而美聯儲的不舉,更會引起國際社會的交流,更不情願資助美國赤字,這會讓該國更加緊縮。 緊縮已起,迎頭影響至少20%的人口,其直接效應是,會讓失業的兩個美國人當中,至少有一個擔心加入無家可歸的行列,還有其他長期失業者。

    對於數千萬美國人來說,緊縮已經擺在那裡,名字叫持續性貧窮。 從現在到2011年春季期間,美國官方姿態,財政預算政策,還有國際社會對美國不再是“富饒之地”(而是貧瘠之地)的認識,都會有所改變。 除了國內政治選擇外,它還面臨新的限制:美國沒錢進行新刺激政策[26]。 和日本幾十年崩潰不同的是,許多決策制定者將為休克療法所誘惑……相同的休克療法,美國通過國際貨幣基金組織給拉美、亞洲與東歐國家推薦過。

    通常這對評級機構來說是個好理由,很快就會看到,世界大部分國家眼中的都會認為一錢不值的東西,隨著重新評級的調低,將會威脅美國,如果美國不盡快盡可能實行全面的緊縮計劃的話。 無論如何,根據上述的內部與外部條件,我們認為,到2011年春季的時候,美國將會如約與緊縮政策相遇,如果它政治上麻木的話,世界其它地方將會實施的約定。

    直到那時,美聯儲才可能實施一系列“非傳統”措施(技術術語上叫“絕望努力”),試圖阻止它的到來,這是因為,在這個階段,一定會涉及到一件事,美國進入大規模緊縮計劃的影響:市場將伴隨金融與貨幣混亂,也許是數十年的相反方向,也就是說,美國將荒蕪一片;還有自1930年以來從沒有過的空前的內部經濟與社會震動[27]。
  • news
  • 傳索羅斯瞄準台灣 擬狙擊台幣台股 央行嚴陣以待
    2010/11/12
    鉅亨網

    市場人士透露,本周甫於香港設立辦事處的國際炒手索羅斯,旗下對沖基金正瞄準台灣,準備大炒台幣匯率、台股。不過,中央銀行對索羅斯的最新動向未正面回應,僅強調會密切注意各外資動向。

    香港《文匯報》引述台灣《聯合報》報導,外商銀行主管指出,國際炒手索羅斯挾著龐大的對沖基金,近年不斷狙擊亞洲貨幣,也與亞洲各地央行有多場交手戰役。例如,包括泰、馬、星、印、韓等各場「貨幣攻擊大戰」,幾乎是大獲全勝,荷包滿滿!

    不過, 1997 年金融風暴,索羅斯在港、台兩地大炒匯率,香港金融管理單位及台灣央行總裁彭淮南激烈迎戰,最終讓索羅斯敗仗退去。

    匯銀人士認為,台灣央行對於登記來台投資的外資背景一定充分掌握,索羅斯基金規模龐大、「標的很清楚」,台灣央行一定早已掌握行蹤。但憑著央行緊盯各外資匯入台灣後的資金去處,央行應不會讓國際炒家輕易得逞。

    值得注意的是,美國二度量化寬鬆激起新一波國際熱錢狂潮,台灣中央銀行、金管會已聯手打熱錢,金管會 9 日祭出限縮外資買公債後,外匯市場人士說,被央行總裁彭淮南點名「藏在公債」的 2500 億元新台幣熱錢, 10 日部分炒匯外資已先獲利了結,反手匯出台灣,匯出近 2 億美元 (折合新台幣近 60億元) 。

    台灣匯銀人士解釋,「禿鷹集團」看準台幣抵擋不了熱錢攻勢,潛在沉重升值壓力,瘋狂湧入的結果,致台幣在短短 4 個月內暴漲 1.678 元新台幣,升幅高達 5.48% ,「看來,這波進來就躲進債券市場的炒匯熱錢,幾乎大獲全勝,他們在海撈一票後,本周三開始獲利了結,反手匯出!」

    然而,就在炒匯「禿鷹」飽餐一頓準備離去之際,台灣外銀主管透露,近日正式在香港設立辦事處的國際炒家索羅斯旗下對沖基金卻悄悄登台,本周起台北匯市已經聞到華爾街「鱷魚」的味道。
  • 暴力石油派
  • 水 > 糧食 > 石油 > 金銀 > 美元 > 其它法幣

    不管積蓄多少美元或黃金,一旦水荒糧荒,再多美元再多黃金都換不到足夠的飲水糧食。
    水源地和良田已開發成道路、廠房、樓房、高爾夫球場,水荒糧荒已經是現在進行式。
  • 暴力石油派
  • x國即將上映現代金融版的 長平之戰 
    請拭目以待

    2008九月-2011也是三年
    英法德俄中日 也是六國
    真巧

    ...............................................................................................................................
    長平之戰是中國戰國時代的一場大規模大野戰。前後耗時三年,這場戰役,以秦軍戰勝,趙軍戰敗而告終。
    秦軍前後坑殺趙軍40萬人,被後人認為是戰國形勢的轉折點。

    自此戰後,其他的六國均不再有對抗秦軍的實力。
    ==========================================


    第二階段
    西元前260年夏,趙括接管長平前線四十餘萬趙軍。秦國得知消息後秘密派遣武安君白起抵達長平接替王齕指揮秦軍。趙括到達前線後,立即改變原有的軍事部署和防守戰略並撤換大批中下級軍官,收縮兵力準備主動出擊,企圖一戰殲滅秦軍,收復上黨。白起針對趙軍的動態,以丹河東岸的長平為依託,沿丹河東岸的天然髙崗構築起長達18公里的主陣地,右翼一直延伸到小東倉河北岸,以抵禦趙軍主力的進攻。另安排25000人在決戰開始後切斷趙軍退路;另5000騎兵遮絕留守趙軍與出擊趙軍主力之間的聯繫。

    趙括在對秦軍所知甚少的情況下,指揮主力出擊屯紮在故關前的秦軍部隊。秦軍按照白起的將令,接戰不久後便詐敗,沿直通長平的大道逃跑,把追擊的趙軍主力引誘到預設戰場。
    趙括不知中計,指揮全軍猛攻秦軍陣地,給予秦軍重大殺傷,但秦軍頑強抵抗,趙軍無法攻破。此時趙軍主力已經遠離故關12公里。預伏在小東倉河北岸的兩萬五千名秦軍突然出擊佔領韓王山,切斷了趙軍的退路。五千騎兵也兵臨故關前,使留守故關的趙軍不敢支援。
    趙軍被完全分為兩段。
    趙軍出擊主力失去後勤保障,留守部隊空守糧草輜重不敢增援。秦軍抓住有利態勢,從兩翼攻擊趙軍。趙軍分兵作戰,不能取勝,被秦軍壓縮在了秦軍防禦壁壘所在的將軍嶺與韓王山所夾挾的一片低凹的山谷。

    第三階段
    面對險惡戰局,趙括命令部隊原地築壘防禦等待援兵。秦軍乘勢合圍趙軍於谷地。趙軍被圍的消息報到邯鄲。趙孝成王意欲合縱抗秦,遣使求救於臨近的楚、魏等國。但由於之前趙國使者入咸陽和談得秦昭襄王厚遇,諸侯國不願救趙。趙孝成王只得派出本國的部隊趕往長平前線救援。秦國方面,得知趙軍主力已被合圍,昭襄王親自趕到河內郡,給所有的郡民賜爵一級,命郡內十五歲以上男丁悉數出征支援長平前線,阻擊趙國援軍,被圍的趙軍無法得到援助。9月,在被困46天後,趙括在突圍時被秦軍射殺。趙軍傷病餓羸無法再戰,只得全體投降。秦軍俘虜趙軍近40萬人,己方傷亡過半

    坑殺
    秦軍對近40萬俘虜心有餘悸。白起假意許諾說準備把降兵中身體強健的帶回秦國,而年老體弱傷殘幼小的會放歸趙國。趙人不疑。白起又以酒肉安撫降卒,後令秦兵以白布裹頭,吩咐說「凡首無白布者,即系趙人,當盡殺之。」趙國降卒不曾準備,又無器械,束手就戮。40萬趙軍,一夜俱盡。
    史載當時「血流淙淙有聲,楊谷之水皆變為丹,至今號為丹水」。
    唯有240名年紀幼小的趙兵被秦軍放歸趙國以散布恐慌,震懾山東﹙太行山以東﹚六國。
    坑殺趙卒的消息傳入趙國,整個國家中「子哭其父,父哭其子,兄哭其弟,弟哭其兄,祖哭其孫,妻哭其夫,沿街滿市,號痛之聲不絕」。

    結果
    趙國經此一戰元氣大傷,再也無力單獨和秦國全方位對抗。就此確立了戰略優勢。

    趙括也因一戰斷送己方40萬將士性命和趙國前途而成為千古笑柄,其事迹成為成語「紙上談兵」。
  • Goldman Sachs
  • 高盛2008年6月說原油200, 結果... ...

    高盛:小心!美元還會再貶10% 台幣需升值23%
    2010/11/12
    鉅亨網

    美元跌跌不休,已經貶夠了嗎?高盛 (Goldman Sachs) 經濟學家卻說還早得很!根據他們本周發布報告預估,若欲將美國貿易赤字拉低至符合自然的內部平衡水準,美元價值應該還需降低 10%。

    美元雖然在美國聯準會 (Fed) 主席伯南克執意推動新一波量化寬鬆措施 (QE2) 之下,早已沉重走貶。不過高盛經濟學家 Dominic Wilson 提醒,投資人千萬別低估美元還可能繼續寫下的貶幅。

    Wilson 主張,如果要大幅縮減全球貿易不平衡,「美元還需自目前水準大大貶值」。不過他補充,按照理想狀況,美元接下來貶值對象,將不會是傳統預期的歐元及日元,而是新興的開發中亞洲國家貨幣。

    事實上自美國經濟復甦今年 6 月呈現動力減緩以來,歐元及日元兌美元匯價便持續一飛沖天,分別觸及 1.42 美元及 15 年來最高點近 80 日元。

    Wilson 還明確點出,為了達成國際間貿易廣泛平衡,數個國家的貨幣需要貶值及升值的幅度。他先指出,全球價值最被高估的 4 種貨幣,除了美元以外,其他都是以大宗商品出口為主的國家貨幣,且高估程度也超越美元,分別是澳元、加元及紐元。

    相對地,全球最被低估的貨幣則都來自新興亞洲國家,分別為人民幣、星元、台幣及馬幣。若欲促進貿易平衡,Wilson 認為人民幣經通膨調整後還需升值 19%,星元需升值 23%,台幣需升值 23%,馬幣需升值 13%。

    高盛預期,目前匯市的基本趨勢,亦即美元走貶而日本已外亞洲貨幣走強,從現在起還會有一段長路要走。符合他們疾呼美元還會大範圍走軟的看法。

    當然,高盛預測若要成真,現正於首爾召開 20 國集團 (G20) 峰會的全球領袖,必須先達成基準協議,同意改變關鍵的經濟政策。
  • news
  • 很輕鬆,只要照著Wall Street某些A+的巨無霸在媒體的報告去作,就... ...

    方向 ? 自己想 !
  • news
  • 花旗:中央銀行將要開始拋售美元,在未來數週
    2010/11/08

    伊麗莎白女王二號 有可能作為一個提醒央行儲備經理說,他們仍然有太多的美元,他們需要多樣化了。

    這是論點,從花旗的史蒂芬英格蘭:

    隨著聯邦公開市場委員會的方式進行,基本上達到預期,投資者正在尋找下一步怎麼走。 我們認為,外匯儲備管理者將有助於下一階段的美元疲軟的伊麗莎白女王二號證實了他們最擔心的關注美聯儲的意圖和他們的質量儲備 的投資組合。 他們的憂慮加劇,全球外匯儲備一直增長非常迅速,一個標題的基礎上約11%,比去年同期,現在已經接近USD9trn(圖1)。 雖然中國外匯儲備增長得到了大量的關注,其他國家的儲備增長同樣迅速。

    我們認為這種增長是被迫的,而且其含義是,中央 銀行 有一個非常大的過剩的美元儲備。 我們認為這是外匯儲備增長可能急劇回升,在過去一個月,並會導致新的拋售美元。 美聯儲的伊麗莎白2號公告,而不是一個衝擊,只是提醒服務區管理人員,他們將有更多的美元,其投資組合,如果他們不積極行動。

    歷史記錄表明,在這種情況下,他們很可能在未來幾週內美元賣方。 不用說,所有的分析,本說明是根據公開的數據。 此外,我們發現,我們的結果是基於更強大的聚合時公佈的數據,而不是任何個人的中央銀行,因此我們的分析是指沒有任何一個中央銀行。



    賣多少,我們可能看到什麼?

    隨著近萬億美元的全球儲備USD9,百分之十的轉變,美元儲備的份額,需要銷售USD900bn。即使只有USD6trn積極管理,USD600bn轉變需要去這個美元股份,即使假定這是發生在一個環境中,儲備沒有增長,是巨大的。 儲備經理人開始出售的大小,影響美元的價值將是巨大的,並且有一個公平的機會,他們會提出的價格比他們可以出售他們的美元股票。 因此,總體上他們一直猶豫不決的 賣家。 伊麗莎白女王二號可能使賣壓更激烈了。 隨著前景,美聯儲將積極有效地印鈔票,美國的預算赤字融資,儲備經理現在要問自己是否他們的情況會更好在道路上比現在低。 如果沒有,尤其當他們看到風險,甚至進一步擴大量化寬鬆政策下的道路,激勵是將宜早不宜遲,即使它是痛苦的術語價格逐漸遠離他們。



    QE2 is likely to serve as a reminder to central bank reserve managers that they still have way too many dollars, and that they need to diversify away.

    That's the argument from Citi's Steven Englander:

    With FOMC out of the way and largely meeting expectations, investors are looking for what comes next. We think that reserve managers will contribute to the next stage of USD weakness as QE2 confirms their worst fears about the Fed’s intentions and the quality of their reserves portfolios. To exacerbate their concerns, Global reserves have been growing very rapidly, on a headline basis about 11% over the last year and now are close to USD9trn (Figure 1). While Chinese reserves growth gets a large amount of attention, other countries reserves are growing similarly rapidly.

    We believe this growth is involuntary and the implication is that central banks have a very large overhang of USD reserves. We think it is likely that reserves growth has picked up sharply over the last month and will lead to renewed dollar selling. The Fed’s QE2 announcement, while not a shock, just serves to remind reserve managers that they will have even more dollars in their portfolio if they do not move aggressively.

    The historical record suggests that under these circumstances they are very likely to be dollar sellers in coming weeks. Needless to say, all the analysis in this note is based on publically available data. Moreover, we find that our results are more robust when based on aggregates rather than data published by any individual central banks, so none our analysis refers to any one central bank.



    How much selling might we see?

    With almost USD9 trillion in global reserves, a ten percent shift in the USD reserves share would require selling USD900bn. Even if only USD6trn is actively managed, the USD600bn shift needed to get to this USD share, even assuming that is occurred in an environment in which reserves were not growing, is enormous. Were reserve managers to begin to sell in size, the impact on the value of the USD would be enormous, and there is a fair chance that they would move prices faster than they could sell their USD stock. So, on the whole they have been hesitant sellers. QE2 may make the selling pressure more intense now. With the prospect that the Fed will be aggressively printing money and effectively financing the US budget deficit, reserve managers now have to ask themselves whether their situation will be better down the road than it is now. If not, and especially if they see risk of even further expansion of QE down the road, the incentive is to move sooner rather than later even if it is painful in terms of prices moving away from them.
  • news
  • 高盛:黃金一年內可能上漲至1650美元
    2010/11/08
    鉅亨網

    高盛公司分析師周五在提供給客戶的報告中說,未來十二個月,黃金將上漲至每盎司1650美元,且可能突破該水準。

    分析師說,本周的漲勢使得黃金價格更符合美國的實質低利率環境。

    黃金價格接近高盛公司的三個月目標價每盎司1400美元。由於美國的貨幣政策仍然寬鬆,且美國實質利率仍然偏低,黃金價格仍將上漲,目標在高盛公司12個月目標價1650美元。

    最近交易中,紐約12月黃金上漲13.30美元至每盎司1396.60美元。
  • nervlee
  • 這些貪懶無道的財經公司,股票也好,黃金也好, 房地產也好,好像價格都是隨便喊喊 ,假使哪天100圓的股票下跌7% ,也就是93圓 ,就會喊此檔股票會下探70元,什麼原因,郵發言人去移花接木就可以 ; 哪天股票漲7% ,就會發表上看130元, 完全是耍猴子的伎倆 , 高盛也是造成金融海嘯的頭號要犯,怎麼還存在?
  • .
  • 國王的操盤手養成所
  • 訪客
  • 請問有人能幫小弟解釋一下台灣匯率阻升的機制嗎?
    我看商周他是說央行會購買外存底來阻生~這是為什麼呢?為什麼買外匯存底等於是印鈔票呢?還有為什麼美國一直要中國升值呢?
  • 有錢人的陰謀-教育篇 (山寨版)
  • 上學與不上學的區别





    張二狗是我的同学。一直以来,我们都是被人拿来作为对比的两个极端,我曾经是他的梦魇,现在他却是我的梦魇。
    现将我和他的人生历程列出来,再一次深刻感受风水轮流转这一永恒真理。



    1、小学入学第一天

    我对老师说会背301首唐诗做100以内加减法,口齿清晰条理清楚,老师对我眉开眼笑;

    张二狗对老师的提问一问摇头三不知,神情呆滞语无伦次,老师对他暗暗皱眉。



    2、小学二年级

    我考试次次第一,终于在一次满分后肩膀上多了三条杠杠;

    张二狗和人打架有赢有输,终于在一次大败后脸上多了三条疤疤。



    3、小学三年级

    期末考试我再次拿到语文数学两门功课双一百,老爸被老师请到家长会上介绍家庭教育经验;

    期末考试张二狗再次拿到语文数学两门功课总分三十,老爸被老师请进办公室聆听家庭教育经验。



    4、小学四年级

    领导前来视察我校,我作为少先队代表上台发言,被大家称为主席台上的模范学生。

    校长宣布从严治校,张二狗作为闯祸精代表上台检讨,被大家说是站壁角的形象大使。



    5、小学五年级

    我的作文《一个难忘的晚上》在某次大赛中获奖,老师陪我到省城领奖并游玩了一天。

    张二狗在一个难忘的晚上爬墙进入某个工厂搬运废铜,门卫陪他到派出所领奖并休养了一天。



    6、升初中了

    听说初中的几个班主任为抢我到自己班上而争得面红耳赤。

    听说初中的几个班主任为把张二狗踢到别人班上闹得不可开交。



    7、初一时

    初一时,我爸在酒店设宴庆功,为我在中学生奥数中获奖请别人一起高兴。

    初一时,张二狗爸在酒店设宴赔罪,为张二狗闯的祸请别人不要追究



    8、初二时

    初二时,我光荣地加入了学校里的团组织;

    初二时,张二狗光荣地加入了学校里的痞子帮。



    9、初三时

    班上的班花给我写情书,情书还没到我手里就被班主任发现没收,班主任警告班花:不得妨碍我考重点高中;

    张二狗给班上的胖妞如花递纸条,如花转身把纸条扔进垃圾桶,还告诫张二狗:不要妨碍她混初中文凭。



    10、初中毕业了

    我理所当然地进入了重点高中;

    张二狗顺理成章地进入社会深造。



    11、毕业那天

    我们初中的门卫李大爷指着我教育大孙子:一定要像我这样好好学习天天向上,将来才能做个受尊敬的人;

    我们初中的门卫李大爷指着张二狗教育大孙子:千万不要像他这样惹是生非门门红灯,将来一定是个受鄙视的人。



    12、高中三年

    我做过班长团支书学生会主席,获得了一个又一个荣誉、拿到了一笔又一笔的奖学金;

    社会三年,张二狗做过混混推销员包工头,积累了一条又一条的人脉,攒下了一笔又一笔资金。



    13、黑色七月

    那个黑色七月,我如愿考上省城的大学;

    那个火热七月,张二狗如愿在省城注册公司。



    14、大学与商海

    大学里我在学海遨游创业中,

    张二狗在商海搏击。



    15、毕业那年与创业四年

    毕业那年,优秀毕业生我进入人才市场找工作,处处碰壁后不得不把薪金要求降低。

    创业四年,民营企业家张二狗进入人才市场找员工,广受追捧后不得不把学历门槛提高到硕士起点,很轻松招揽一群高学历高层次的人才,感受了一夜之间从丑小鸭到白天鹅的荣耀



    16、

    我的破永久自行车跑遍全省城,孤身一人凄凄凉凉四处寻找租住的房子;

    张二狗的保时捷跑遍全省城,市长区长作陪四处寻找建二狗大厦和工业园区的地块。



    17、

    我手头紧张,也想学张二狗白手起家自主创业,从小商品市场批发了一大堆东东搞兼职做起了推销,几星期内亏了一大笔,暗自感慨:做生意原来这么难

    张二狗闲来无事,也想进大学校门学习深造增加内涵,请教授吃饭泡校里的美眉就是没认真上课,几年内拿到了MBA学位,暗自感慨:读书原来这么简单



    18、

    七夕节,别人介绍的朋友嫌弃我没房没车没出息,和我分道扬镳

    七夕节,大学里的朋友因为张二狗家大业大前程大,和他交往



    20、

    家门口,我哀求俗气的土包子房东缓交房费时唯唯诺诺支支吾吾,净给大学生丢脸

    电视上,张二狗对着漂亮的财经频道女主持人大谈企业文化



    21、

    房价飞涨,我忽然发现在省城有一套房子只能是一个梦想,老爹老妈来省城看过我的租住房,回家后伤心不已

    房价飞涨,张二狗把一套又一套的房子赠给各类美女,一小美女的老爹老妈来省城看过二狗赠的复式景观房,回家后得意不已



    22、

    春节我回家,没人理睬,我当年就读的初中,听说里面在办校庆,想去看看却被拒之门外,门卫李大爷指着我教育小孙子:不要学习这个人,读了这么多年书还是一穷二白,连自己都养不活。

    春节张二狗回家,县长接驾,还参加当年就读的初中特意举办的校庆,张董在校庆上砸下巨额赞助,门卫李大爷指着张董教育小孙子:你要像主席台上的这个人学习,白手起家富甲一方,连亲戚都沾光。



    23、

    十几年前,老师感叹,要是所有学生都像我一样该有多好.

    十几年后,老师感叹,要是所有学生都像张二狗一样该有多好

    这就是教育
  • LKK
  • 歐亞大動脈中伊鐵路明年開工
    2010/11/23


      駝鈴悠悠,載有香料、象牙、珠寶等物品的阿拉伯商隊來來往往……連接中原與波斯灣的古絲綢之路見證了東西方貿易的繁盛。 如今,一條由鋼鐵築成的“現代絲綢之路”呼之欲出,有望重現幾千年前的盛景。 伊朗外長穆塔基11月15日宣布,修建聯通中國與中東的鐵路線方案已得到相關國家的同意。 如果可行性研究進展順利,這條全長2300公里的歐亞大動脈將於明年初動工。

      歐亞大動脈明年開工

      據伊朗媒體報導,伊朗外長穆塔基11月15日宣布,伊朗、阿富汗、塔吉克斯坦等國已同意與中國合作,共同修建一條連接中國與中亞和中東的鐵路線。 穆塔基說,這條來自中國的鐵路,從新疆出發,途經塔吉克斯坦、吉爾吉斯斯坦、阿富汗抵達伊朗,在伊朗分為南、西兩條線,南線直達波斯灣,西線通往土耳其和歐洲。 他稱這將是“交通領域的一場革命”。

    ........................................................................................................

    一百年前 德國曾經想建築從柏林到巴格達的鐵路 繞過英美控制的海洋 結果是兩次世界大戰 德國最強的時候 海軍水面軍艦還是大多被封鎖在北海

    一百年後 又有新路線 結果如何 
    看看伊拉克 阿富汗 就知道



  • 房寧
  • 戰爭與美國經濟
         

    美國誕生於戰爭,這個地處兩洋之間的偉大國家成長、繁榮進程中的每一步
    幾乎都有戰爭相隨。

    戰爭帶給美國的多是福音,世界上恐怕沒有哪一個民族有如此
    經歷。20世紀以前,美國進行的一系列戰爭,如:征伐印地安人
    的戰爭、對英戰爭、美墨戰爭、美西戰爭,以及多次的海外殖民
    戰爭,為美國開疆拓土,使美國自立於世界民族之林。而20世紀
    以來的歷次戰爭,則一步一步將美國塑造成當今世界的超級霸主


    假如沒有第一次世界大戰,美國也許還是西方列強中普通一員,
    美國脫穎而出得益於第一次世界大戰。1914-1918年的第一次世
    界大戰使歐洲遭受重創,英、法等老牌帝國輝煌不再。戰後的第
    一年,1919年與戰前的1913年相比,西方世界的工業生產下降了
    12.3%,世界貿易更下降了23%。

    惟獨美國,這個遠離戰場的戰勝國,經濟不僅沒有受損,反而大
    幅躍升。戰爭期間在國內外軍事訂貨大增的刺激下,美國的製造
    業增長32%,鋼鐵和汽車產量翻了一番。1914-1918年間,美國
    國民生產總值從386億美元增加到840億美元。

    透過第一次世界大戰,美國經濟最大的獲益是在金融方面。戰爭
    前後,美國從債務國轉化為債權國。1914年美國欠歐洲的私人凈
    債務近40億美元,而1918年戰爭結束時,歐洲反欠美國私人凈債
    務30億美元。戰前英鎊是世界核心貨幣,但戰後英鎊的購買力僅
    及戰前的1/3,美元乘機成為了國際匯兌的主要支付手段。紐約
    也成為了世界金融交易中心和國際資本的供應中心。戰後的一個
    時期內美國發行的國際債券幾乎是英國的兩倍。

    如果說“一戰”使美國脫穎而出的話,那麼“二戰”則把美國造就成了獨
    一無二的經濟巨無霸。如果以“二戰”前的1937年工業生產指數為100.,
    戰後的1946年,美國工業指數為150.,而其他工業化國家都大幅衰退,英
    國為88,意大利為72,法國為69,德國為31,日本衹有24。美國在西方工
    業生產總額中所占的比例,從戰前的42%上升到53.4%。在對外貿易總額中
    ,美國也從13%提高到22%。

    “二戰”後,美國藉歐洲蕭條之機,主動實施向歐洲進行資本擴
    張的“歐洲復興方案”,即“馬歇爾計劃”,推進了美國經濟的
    國際化進程。

    在戰爭結束前一年(1944年),美國還及時倡導建立了“布雷頓森林體系”,成立了世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織,主導世界金融體系,進一步鞏固和強化了美元在世界經濟中核心貨幣的地位。

    產業資本擴張和主導世界金融體系,確立了美國經濟在當代世界經濟體系中的無可爭議的中心地位。

    在二戰後的全盛期,美國的國民生產總值在世界生產總值所占份額一度達
    到40%以上,美國也成為繼英國之後的“世界工廠”,美國出口在世界貿
    易出口額中的比例一度超過25%。然而自70年代中期以來,美國經濟在世
    界經濟中的地位以及美國自身經濟結構都發生了很大的變化。80年代以後
    ,美國經濟在世界經濟中的比重已經低於25%,出口份額也已降到11%左
    右。美國經濟結構變動的基本趨勢是實物經濟下降和符號經濟上升。

    按人口、家庭和土地面積計算平均值,美國國內生產的物質產品和基礎設
    施,從60年代末以來下降了一半,美國靠自身的物質生產已無法維持生存
    。目前美國的實物經濟產值已降到國內生產總值的1/3以下,而非實物經
    濟則占到了2/3以上,其中僅金融服務業就占國內生產總值的近19%,而
    以往的支柱產業如建築業和汽車製造業,在國內生產總值中的比重下降到
    了1%─3%之間。

    全球化是世界經濟潮流,80年代以來的經濟全球化突出地表現為
    金融全球化。美國在傳統經濟領域如製造業中已失去了以往的優
    勢,但由於美國自80年代以後主宰了金融全球化的進程,從而在
    金融全球化中大有獲益,才保住了世界經濟翹楚的地位。美國的
    金融優勢的主要表現是美元強勢地位和興旺的美國資本市場。90
    年代以來,美元作為世界經濟中的核心貨幣的地位有了進一步的
    鞏固和加強。

    目前全世界約有美元資金23兆,占世界金融資產總量的60%,占
    各國外匯儲備的70%。2001年頭五個月發行國際債券中,美元債
    券就占到了47.34%,為3792.980億美元。

    全球石油貿易基本是以美元結算的。

    從90年代初以來興盛不衰的資本市場給美國經濟帶來了巨大的收益。

    過去十年中,道瓊股票指數一度出現了超過十倍的增長,全世界
    大量的貨幣資本流入美國股市、債市。1999年科索沃戰爭結束後
    的一年多的時間裡,就有超過七千億的外國資本凈流入美國。9.
    11以前,外資共持有9080億美元的美國公司債券,較美國散戶持
    有的7650億美元還多1450億美元;政府債券的41%約13,000億美
    元為外資持有,比美聯儲持有的五千億美元多近兩倍。

    在直接投資方面,資本回流和資本集中美國的現象有增無減。19
    97年外資直接投資美國為一千多億美元,1999年高達2825億美元
    ,2000年也維持很高的水平,為2300多億。至2000年底,美國的
    累計“投資赤字”達1.47兆美元。源源不斷的外資進入,造成所
    謂的“財富效應”,即節節上升的股市提高了美國人的收入預期
    ,刺激了消費,從而推動美國經濟走上了為期十年的增長之路。

    在金融全球化的進程中美國受益非淺,而資本向美國的集中是需
    要有前提的,這個前提就是對美國及美國經濟的信心。信心問題
    也是當代金融資本運動的核心問題。

    美國要給世界人民建立的信心就是要讓人相信:
    假若有一天世界所有的貨幣都變得一文不值的話,美元也是最後一個崩潰的;假若有一天世界末日來臨的話,太陽也是從美國落下去的。衹要全世界的人們有這樣的信念,美元就會堅挺,財富就會繼續流向美國。
    怎樣使世界樹立起這樣的信念呢?還是戰爭幫助了美國。

    80年代末期,美國經濟低迷。1987年10月19日的股市崩潰更是嚴
    重地打擊了美國人的信心。90年代初,美國經濟更是出現了負增
    長。

    1990年伊拉克入侵科威特,為美國重返世界石油資源要地──中
    東,創造了機會。1991年01月,美國為首發動了波斯灣戰爭,並
    迅速取得了勝利。04月17日,作為美國經濟晴雨表的道瓊股票指
    數首次以超過三千點收盤。波斯灣戰爭後的1992年美國增長率高
    達3%,不僅結束了經濟低迷的狀態,成為戰後最長時期的經濟增
    長的開端。

    1999年的科索沃戰爭也是觀察戰爭與美國經濟關係的一個窗口。
    1997年的東南亞金融危機促進了美國資本市場的擴張,在一年多
    的時間裡道瓊股票指數上升了兩千多點。1998年07月17日,道瓊
    指數收於9337.970點,創造新高。

    此後由於俄羅斯暫緩償還債務和金融市場出現信貸緊縮等問題,
    美國股市大幅震盪,在一個半月內急跌了近20%,08月31日,跌
    至7539.07點。1999年初繼續震盪,01月11日至22日道瓊指數在
    兩周內下跌了5.4%。而此時美國為首的北約正在醞釀發動科索沃
    戰爭。科索沃轟炸開始的時候,03月29日,道瓊指數躍上了一萬
    點大關。5月8日轟炸中國大使館的當天,道瓊以超過1.10萬點收
    盤,創造了歷史記錄。

    如果僅以股票市場的情況看,科索沃戰爭前後的三個多月,一百
    多天的時間內,道瓊股指的漲幅竟與自1896年創建以來至1991年
    的近百年的漲幅相當。戰爭與美國經濟的關係,由此可見一斑。

    戰爭給美國經濟帶來紅利是和勝利聯繫在一起的。“勝利─增長
    ”和“失敗─衰退”是戰爭與美國經濟關係的基本模式。盡管美
    國自建國以來在絕大多數戰爭中都是獲利的,但也曾嘗試過失敗
    與衰退的苦澀。越南戰爭是美國人的滑鐵盧,他們也從不否認遭
    受了歷史上最慘痛的失敗。隨著越南戰事的爆發和失利,美國經
    濟指標曾劃出了一道由上升轉為下降的曲線。

    1964年08月美國大規模轟炸越南北方,全面開始了越南戰爭。戰
    爭初期,軍費開支急增,到1966年增加幅度為10%以上。與此同
    時,1965~1966兩年,美國經濟增長率達到6%以上。但隨著美國
    在越南的軍事行動陷入困境,軍費負擔不斷加重,美國經濟又調
    頭向下,1967年經濟增長率降到2%,1970年美國經濟增長則完全
    陷於停頓。

    21世紀的第一年並沒有給美國經濟帶來好運氣,今年以來美國資
    本市場呈現了下滑局面,道瓊指數從高峰下跌近20%。就在這時
    ,阿富汗戰爭不期而至。十年前的一場海灣戰爭引領美國走上十
    年的增長之路,十年後的阿富汗戰爭還能使歷史重演嗎?

    有人認為:這次恐怖襲擊事件和戰爭會像以往那樣,將對美國經
    濟產生刺激作用,有利於經濟復甦和增長。如果完全以過去的經
    驗考量當前美國經濟前景,這種判斷是有道理的。但進入新世紀
    的美國經濟畢竟面臨著新的形勢,遇到了一些新的問題,對美國
    經濟的預期,不能不考慮到這些新的形勢和新問題。阿富汗戰爭
    的結局目前尚無法預測,如果僅就現實狀況而言,美國經濟面臨
    諸多困難,要走出困境決非易事。

    從傳統的經驗看,恐怖襲擊後的重建工作和戰爭消耗都會拉動需
    求並促進政府增加開支,從而對經濟產生刺激作用。但人們不應
    忽視當代世界經濟,特別是發達國家經濟,在全球化因素的影響
    下發生的深刻變動。

    戰後以來,西方國家從實行凱恩斯主義經濟政策到嘗試和實行各
    種各樣的經濟調控政策,已有數十年。西方國家經濟的複雜性已
    非昔日可比。在全球化條件下,某一個國家,特別是西方發達國
    家的經濟已不再是封閉體系,而是具有很大的開放性,這樣就導
    致了反饋性能的下降。

    可以看到的現象是:現在任何一項宏觀經濟調控措施的實行,且
    不論效果,其反饋已經不再具有確定性,人們已經很難像以往那
    樣預計一項政策實施的結果。美聯儲連續八次的降息完全沒有產
    生預計的效果,充分反映了現代經濟活動的不確定性。

    具體觀察美國經濟形勢,不難發現美國經濟在宏觀調控方面存在
    著諸多矛盾,現在使用任何一種調控手段其限制條件都是十分苛
    刻的。實際上美國政府及經濟宏觀調控部門,可以採取的措施很
    少,能做的事情不多。金融政策和財政政策是當代宏觀經濟調控
    兩大基本手段,但從現在的情況看,這兩個基本手段在美國都難
    於施展。

    首先,降息作為此次抵抗經濟衰退的主要手段已近極限,進一步
    降息的空間已經極其有限且風險很大。不少經濟觀察家都認為當
    前美國經濟與80、90年代之交日本泡沫經濟行將崩潰前的狀況相
    當類似。

    90年代初日本經濟與美國當前狀況相類似的情況下,採取過降低
    利率的辦法刺激經濟,結果適得其反,作用不大還造成了更為嚴
    重的問題,即加重了銀行的負擔。減息直至實行零利率政策的結
    果是日本銀行系統壞帳的積累,在1997-98年出現了金融危機,
    日本經濟一蹶不振。

    美國連續大度降息,正是按照當年日本經濟收縮時期的邏輯行事
    ,勢必會對美國的銀行系統造成壓力。在經濟高度泡沫化,嚴重
    依賴外來資本支撐股市的情況下,一旦困擾日本及東南亞國家的
    銀行系統壞帳問題在美國大面積出現,其後果不堪設想。

    其次,政府實行的財政政策的餘地也很小。布希政府上台後的宏
    觀經濟政策的基本走向是減稅,而且已經開始實施。減稅使政府
    的財政盈餘減少,限制政府開支的增加。在9.11之後,布希政府
    宣布的增加開支計劃已經用光了克林頓政府積攢的財政盈餘。對
    於全球化背景下的美國經濟來說,強勢美元至關重要,低通漲則
    是維護美元匯率的重要條件,保持低通漲是美聯儲基本政策目標
    。而這一政策目標就必然限制赤字財政,從而約束了政府採取積
    極財政政策的能力。

    現在布希政府與20年前雷根政府的境遇有類似之處。80年代初,
    雷根總統入主白宮後,一方面擴大政府開支,大幅度增加國防預
    算;另一方面又大幅降低稅率,結果使預算赤字急劇上升。1982
    年政府財政赤字首次突破一千億美元,1986年更達到創記錄的22
    12億美元,進而造成了雷根時代嚴重的經濟問題。那時的美國經
    濟開放程度,泡沫化程度和對外資的依賴程度都不能與今天相比
    ,所以布希政府在運用財政政策時必然十分小心謹慎。

    在經濟的戰場上已是兩手空空的布希政府,在軍事的戰場上還是大有手段的。看來如今美國經濟的前景也衹有在戰場上見分曉了。用巡曳飛彈和航空母艦打一場金融保衛戰,可算是經濟史和戰爭史上的奇觀。
  • 艾利克斯
  • 迎接大泡沫年代

    2010-11-29

    艾利克斯﹙《民國100年大泡沫》作者﹚



    這是前一陣子去演講的題目,書裡面沒有寫,因為當初想把書的
    重心放在台灣市場,畢竟沒多少書會以台灣為核心來作分析,這
    其實也是台灣讀者可憐的地方。最主要的內容是從國際經濟發展
    來看「民國100年大泡沫」接下來將會怎麼樣發展,簡單的說就
    是把1985年的廣場協議搬到現在,然後把日本換成中國而已。

    其實在民國100年大泡沫裡面也寫到了,1985年的日本是美國急
    欲撂倒的經濟體,廣場協議後泡沫破滅讓日本一蹶不振,而當時
    的台灣因為是美國第二大貿易逆差來源,因此在美國《1974年貿
    易法》中的《301法案》逼迫之下大幅升值,當然1990年的萬點泡沫
    也就這樣破了,我們來看看,現在各主要國家在作些什麼?


    美國:撂倒中國才是QE2、QE3、QE4….的核心目標

    如果說QE1是為了挽救美國的金融體系,那麼QE2就是為了挽救美
    國的全球霸主地位。
    中國近年來積極表明要擴大內需、開發大西部、縮小貧富差距、調結構勝於保增長以及拓展人民幣結算交易機制,而這一點一點都是漸漸脫離對於出口美國的依賴以及美元的枷鎖。這當然不會是美國想要見到的發展。因為,當中國不再
    仰賴出口大幅購買美債來壓抑匯率之時,美國這樣龐大的政府負債是無法繼續運轉下去的。

    中國至少也知道過去(1985-1990)日本是怎麼死的,所以為什麼人民幣抵死不從?頂多升個3%~5%左右,再多就不可能了。

    很可惜,金融遊戲還是美國比較在行,QE2把原物料炒到天上去
    ,中國你不想升值,我就讓你升息,反正一樣會死。而這點正是
    我在書中所提到的,弱勢美元加上反聖嬰現象會讓新興市場的物
    價將會快速上漲,各國央行將無法維持優雅的升息步調。



    香港: 血腥味引來了大鱷

    索羅斯剛取得香港投資牌照,可操作資金估計為100億美元。由
    於香港採連繫匯率制度,釘住美元,當美元持續弱勢,為了維繫
    匯率,香港必須印發等值港幣,資金流入股市與房市引發資產泡
    沫。而索羅斯過去狙擊的標的都是連繫匯率經濟體,一如1992年
    的英國、1997年的泰國以及2011年的亞洲國家。這些國家的下場
    要不就讓貨幣升值讓所羅斯大賺一筆,不然就是讓資產漲到高點
    後被反手放空,無論哪一種,索羅斯贏面都比較大。

    很多人提到1998年香港跟台灣不是都沒事嗎?為什麼要擔心這次


    首先,索羅斯這次跟亞洲金風暴做的是不同邊的,亞洲金融風暴
    是放空亞洲貨幣,但這一次則是作多亞洲貨幣。放空的話,各國
    央行可以用外匯存底買回本國貨幣做對沖,避免貨幣大幅貶值,
    但是,如果他做多各國的貨幣呢?外匯存底在阻升方面是一點用
    也不會有…

    當然各國可以無限制印鈔票來壓抑升值趨勢,反正一直以來也是
    這麼做的,但是,現在這些區域的通貨膨脹與資產價格已經淹到
    脖子了,還有可能繼續供應大量貨幣到市場上嗎?2012年有可能無視民怨讓資產價格與通膨持續的上漲嗎?而索羅斯會這麼的大動作告訴大家他要到香港,很明顯的就是邀請禿鷹、鱷魚、鬣狗等好朋友一起來幹這一票。


    台灣:無法置身其外的一場風暴

    台灣當然無法從這場風暴中抽身,畢竟已經被柏南克寫在死亡筆
    記本裡了。因為,比較聽話的韓國似乎就沒有被嚴重的抨擊。

    很多人會拿1998年的亞洲金融風暴說台灣跟香港在那場戰爭是勝
    利的,但事實是如此嗎?如果就匯率上的戰爭,確實是戰勝了沒
    有錯,因為沒有在匯率上向索羅斯屈服。但是股市跟房市卻是已
    經出現了明顯的重挫,香港在亞洲金融風暴期間股市下跌近60%
    ,房地產下跌近70%,而台灣號稱在亞洲金融風暴期間受傷最輕
    ,但股市也跌了近50%,都會區房地產下跌20%~40%不等,對於
    小老百姓來說,那場戰爭其實並沒有勝利的感覺。

    明(2011)年,應該是亞洲市場最後的煙火,當然也會是多頭很開心的一
    年,而後年應該就換空軍開心了。
    之所以出版《民國100年大泡沫》這本書,原希望在這樣的系統性風暴出現前,台灣能有機會與時間去做調整。但現在看起來,真正的養套殺程序已經開始了,時間似乎不會站在台灣這邊。而台灣政府對於房價的控制也未若港
    府來的認真與重視,房地產價格還不斷的上漲中,更有趣的是,
    刺激政策還在不斷出籠...

    之前媒體報導央行要求匯銀禁談匯率,當然央行事後出面澄清了
    ,很多人說央行現在正與熱錢交戰,台灣內部自己人不應該扯後
    腿。我同意台灣確實不能只是內鬥內行,外鬥外行,打仗之前可
    以關起門來分析檢討,一旦開戰,砲口就應該一致對外了。
    對於台灣的匯率政策,我該說的東西其實在《民國100年大泡沫》這本書
    裡面跟這段期間的文章都說過了,同樣的問題就不一再重覆的嘮
    叨,接下來我會把研究重心放在「產業」跟「國際經濟」的發展,匯率戰
    爭問題就留給政府去處理吧,畢竟如果這仗沒打贏,短時間內也
    不用談什麼制度的改革,光善後可能就要花上好幾年了。

    引用總幹事講過的故事,官渡之戰已經開打,現在就不是當田豐
    的時刻了,唯一能做的就是禱告吧,天佑台灣!
  • LKK
  • 上次1990年交的學費,這次機會來了要拿回來.
    20年一次的中型循環,不要站錯邊.
  • 訪客
  • 98樓真的是原書的作者嗎

    您這篇的意思為美元將再度強勢?

1 2