炸彈引線越牽越長,一旦引爆就停不了!              NEW9.gif
不知道大家看到這些炸彈再爆有甚麼感覺呢?
驚慌?恐懼?干我何事?或等待+蓄勢待發?

上過財富救生筏的學員也許已經著手準備,
但依然有太多不知道發生甚麼事的人
仍過著看似穩定的日子!

過著看似穩定的日子並沒有不好,
這是每個人的選擇,

就看每個人希望當炸彈全面引爆後,
自己是過著甚麼樣的生活?!

 

美國商辦… 下一個炸彈

【聯合晚報╱編譯范振光/綜合報導】 2010.02.23 02:25 pm
 
商業房地產取代住宅市場,成為美國銀行業的隱憂,

已有更多銀行重整不良債權,避免逾放損失擴大、

爭取更多時間恢復元氣,但可能只是把炸彈引爆時間延後。

次級房貸問題和它引發的金融危機,讓美國金融機構損失慘重,

高失業率導致商辦空置率居高不下,商業房地產不良債權問題揮之不去

根據美國國會監督委員會最新估計,美國金融業者可能因

商業房地產逾放損失2000億到3000億美元


FBR資本市場公司分析師米勒表示,房地產市場似乎穩定下來,

然而重整債權的效果不得而知,意味問題存在時間可能比投資人

預期的還長。Collins Stewart公司分析師海格曼則表示,

主管機關擔心今年和接下來期滿的一波波商業房地產貸款,

希望金融業者更積極重整這些債權。

如果金融業成功協商貸款期限展延,逾放比可下降

而不必提撥逾放準備。投資人或許會認為這只是拖時間,

但美國經濟情況改善,金融機構可有更多時間收回放款。




債好大 科威特投資公司要倒一半

【聯合報╱編譯陳澄和/報導】2010.02.23 03:19 am

 倫敦金融時報報導,銀行界高層警告,很多科威特金融公司在經濟衰退前

從事高度的財務槓桿操作,沉重的償債負擔如今將讓多數科威特投資公司

消聲匿跡。

科威特經濟由政府掌控,政府不需要借錢,因此銀行主要借錢給消費者、

房地產建商和投資公司。由於信貸成本低廉、現金流通量大,且國內投資

機會有限,科威特先後成立數十家投資公司,押注國際與區域房地產、

私募基金和股票市場。在顛峰時期,科威特投資公司擁有的資產超過

500億美元。

但多數大手筆併購交易都是透過短期貸款融通,而金融危機就像

海嘯一般席捲當地的投資公司。

雖然許多銀行家都說,投資公司的災難大致控制在科威特境內,

並未擴散出去,但仍可能導致賤賣海外資產,並對曝險的

科威特銀行部門造成打擊。

科威特兩家最大的投資公司去年都在國際貸款上拖欠償債,

雖然沒有公司倒閉,分析師說,幾乎每一家公司都有可觀虧損,

只能捉襟見肘地設法償債。

Alshall投資公司董事長沙都恩說,科威特有100家投資公司,

「到2011年還能繼續營運的,頂多只有一半。」

銀行家說,很多投資公司實際已沒有償付能力,但當地銀行

不願逼他們宣告破產,寧可讓他們苟延殘喘,

一再展延償付期限,以避免變成呆帳。

此外,匯豐、瑞士信貸與瑞士銀行等國際銀行,也在協助一些

投資公司進行整頓,由於多數股東都不願把公司賣給敵對的

商業家族或公司,所以也不會去考慮整併。

科威特上市投資公司的市值已暴減約270億美元,相當於顛峰時期七成。

Kipco旗下資產管理事業Kamco的研究主管加塞德尼說:

「他們仍在等市場復甦,但恐怕是等不及了。」

 

歐債粉飾太平 靠華爾街換匯

【經濟日報╱編譯陳家齊/綜合外電】2010.02.23 03:19 am
 
除希臘以外,據傳還有其他歐陸國家也利用複雜的金融交易,

隱藏債務及赤字規模。(美聯社)

希臘債務問題掀起了一波風浪,然而,更多的歐洲債務可能

藏在與華爾街的交易中,歐洲赤字的規模可能比官方數據更為嚴重。

由於歐元區訂有嚴格的限制,財政赤字不得超過國內生產毛額(GDP)

的3%,總政府負債不得超過GDP的60%,許多歐元成員國早就在

採用各種「積極性」的會計操作,以符合及格標準。

例如,葡萄牙把里斯本的地鐵補貼費用列為「股權」,不是負債;

希臘堅持大部分國防支出屬於「機密」,所以不列入負債。

不過,最近問題聚焦在各國與華爾街銀行進行的

「換匯交易」(currency swap)。這種交易原本指的是

各國政府用外幣舉債,然後利用衍生性金融商品對匯率

波動避險。但是,這些操作也同樣可以拿來偷偷舉債,掩蓋赤字。

華爾街日報報導說,高盛公司與希臘在1998到2001年間

進行了至多12次換匯交易。彭博資訊報導,高盛在2001年

的一次換匯交易就幫希臘偷偷舉債 10億美元;目前希臘

外債總額約為3,000億美元。紐約時報引述消息人士指出,

高盛在2001年這筆換匯交易就賺到約3億美元手續費。

而且,在希臘危機爆發前夕的去年11月,高盛還在對

雅典兜售另一筆以債養債的交易。

以2001年高盛的那次交易為例,當時擔任希臘公共債務管理局

局長的薩德列斯(Christoforos Sardelis)說,高盛當時承攬

總額約100億美元的債券發行,以美元與日圓計價,向國際市場

兜售;但當得款換回歐元時,採用的「優惠匯率」等於讓希臘額外

獲得一筆約10億美元現金。

紐時報導說,為了獲得這種隱匿性貸款,希臘把國家抵押掉,

就像美國人拿房子去貸款套現,好付其他欠債。

希臘未來數年的樂透發行收入以及機場收入,都已經握在銀行手裡。

類似的換匯交易不只在希臘一國,也不只高盛一家銀行承作。

摩根大通、德意志銀行、瑞士信貸也都有類似交易;

義大利有類似安排,很可能其他歐元國家也有同樣作法。

這種換匯交易的成本並不透明,還隱藏了負債狀況,

歐陸政壇正憤怒地要求調查銀行扮演的角色。

德國總理梅克爾說,希臘「長年偽造統計數據」,

而如果有銀行幫希臘作假,就是一件「貪污醜聞」。

 

索羅斯:救了希臘 歐元也跌不止

【聯合報╱編譯陳澄和/報導】2010.02.23 09:49 am

希臘工會組織呼籲在24日發動全國大罷工的海報,22日張貼在首都雅典

國會大廈前的柱子上。在金融市場關注希臘如何擺脫債務危機之際,

希臘工會又抗議裁員發動罷工,如同雪上加霜。(法新社)

投資富豪索羅斯21日在金融時報撰文指出,歐元有先天的結構缺陷,

希臘危機後還會有更大考驗。衍生性金融商品交易商也說,

即使歐盟紓困希臘,已挫到九個月低谷的歐元跌勢也不會就此打住,

分析師甚至預測,歐元可能跌到和美元平價的水準。

外匯分析師紛紛調低歐元的匯率預測,瑞士銀行的喬弗瑞.余

預測歐元可能測試1歐元兌1.30美元水準,紐澤西Gary Schilling

經濟研究公司的席林說,歐元可能跌到和美元平價的水準。

歐元匯價上周以1歐元兌1.3613美元收盤,今年來對美元跌幅4.9%。

自2002年以來,歐元就不曾低於1美元的水準。

索羅斯指出,當金融體系瀕臨崩潰時,央行可以提供流動資金,

但償付能力的問題卻只有財政部才能解決。

他指出,歐洲各國政府當年創立歐盟時,只想要貨幣同盟,

卻不願把課稅的權力交給共同的政體,這種先天的缺陷也讓

目前的希臘債務危機幾近無解。他引述歐元創始者之一易辛的話說:

「沒有建立政治聯盟,就先推行貨幣同盟,等於把車子放在馬前面要它去拉。」

文中表示,歐盟若未採取必要措施拯救希臘脫困,歐元勢必瓦解。

但沒有政治上的協力合作,救援措施卻很難奏效,即使短期內有用,

同樣暗潮洶湧的西班牙、義大利、葡萄牙與愛爾蘭等會員國,

預算赤字一個比一個嚴重,合計起來卻遠不是歐元區所能支應。

衍生性金融商品交易商則指出,相對於美元貸款,

目前在遠期外匯市場借貸歐元的短期利率已是九月來最便宜,

顯示投資人押注歐洲央行會繼續維持利率在空前低谷,

寧可犧牲歐元強勢,以免歐元債務國消減赤字措施衝擊到經濟成長。

倫敦巴克萊公司的全球外匯策略長吳大衛說:

「投資人開始思考當前危機的下一步,似乎大家都找到新理由必須拋售歐元。」

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  • The Wall Street Journal
  • London firm was created to route cash

    By Carrick Mollenkamp
    The Wall Street Journal
    Monday, February 22, 2010



    Greece's fiscal woes, the exposure of the European financial system to them, and the role played by Wall Street in hiding the problems all converge in a fifth-floor office near London's Liverpool Street station where a company called Titlos PLC was created in early 2009.

    Just 22 days after Titlos was born, the National Bank of Greece SA and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. arranged for the company to sell E5.1 billion, or about $6.96 billion, in notes, according to U.K. and U.S. documents.

    But Titlos wasn't a real company and the notes weren't designed for ordinary investors. Titlos doesn't make anything and its only directors are two British executives who work for a firm that specializes in the formation of corporations and the sale of pooled assets.

    Instead, Titlos, descendent of a 2001 deal to help Greece hide debt, was set up to take advantage of a European Central Bank effort to inject cash into a banking market hobbled by the financial crisis. Titlos' notes were designed to be pledged for that program, according to filings by Titlos and the National Bank of Greece, and the buyer was the bank itself.

    The history of Titlos also illustrates how bank and government dealings, often deeply intertwined, can complicate efforts to unclog a global banking system.

    Gustavo Piga, a professor at the University of Rome Tor Vergata, says the opaque derivative trades that Greece and other countries engaged in "tarnishes the reputation of government" as it tries to police financial markets.

    "There is this huge mortal embrace between the government and the banks," Mr. Piga says. "It creates huge conflicts of interest in the actions of government."

    Behind Titlos and the notes sale are Goldman and the National Bank of Greece, a 169-year-old institution whose operations span Eastern Europe into Turkey, Serbia, and Romania. The bank isn't the country's central bank, though the government owns a 12% stake through its pension system.

    Goldman, the National Bank of Greece, and the Greek government have long had close ties. Last week Greece named Petros Christodoulou, who worked at both Goldman and the National Bank of Greece, as the government's new debt chief.

    Titlos's origin dates to 2001 and a complex transaction that at its crux called for Goldman to loan Greece E2.4 billion. The structure permitted Greece to lower the debt it had.

    Over the next decade, the structure would prove to be malleable -- and legal. In total, from 1998 to 2000, Goldman structured 12 currency-swap agreements with Greece, leading up to the 2001 transaction.

    Greece's finance minister last week said the original transaction met with the legal standards of the European Union's statistics watchdog. Moody's Ratings Service rated the 2009 deal.

    "This was a unique deal," says Christoforos Sardelis, the head of Greece's debt-management agency from 1999 to 2004. "It was made public, and there was no violation of any rules."

    To hedge its credit risk, Goldman carried out a transaction with a small Dublin firm. The investment bank also agreed to a new deal with Greece that was structured as a way to hedge interest-rate risk. That deal compensated Goldman for losses it was experiencing from the currency swap, according to a person familiar with the transaction.

    Goldman then exited from the interest-rate-swap deal in 2005 when the National Bank of Greece replaced Goldman as Greece's trading partner, according to people familiar with that transaction.

    In late 2008, with the financial crisis peaking and banks struggling to borrow from one another or sell pooled assets, Goldman and the National Bank of Greece identified a way to turn that interest-rate transaction into an asset that could be pledged at the European Central Bank for money as part of a program the ECB had set up to exchange bank collateral for billions of euros in loans.

    The program ended up offering a way for banks to easily make money because they could use the ECB's cheap money to obtain or hold higher-yielding assets in what is known as a carry trade. The moves then freed up liquidity for banks, including those in Greece that have been big users of the ECB program.

    "There were a very large number of securitizations done during the financial crisis, of toxic waste, that were designed precisely for the purpose of creating collateral for ECB repo loans," said Darrell Duffie, a Stanford University finance professor and derivatives expert. "The ECB knew this was happening and decided that they wanted to play along in order to get liquidity out there."

    An ECB spokeswoman declined to comment.

    U.K. documents show that Titlos, which filed its incorporation records on Feb. 4, 2009, is housed in a London financial district office occupied by Wilmington Trust SP Services (London) Ltd., a firm that caters to corporation formations and securitizations. Both Titlos directors work for U.S. bank Wilmington Trust. One director, who describes his occupation as a "director of special purpose companies for financing transactions," also serves as a director of nearly 200 other enterprises, the U.K. documents show.

    To finalize the deal, the National Bank of Greece transferred, or novated, its role as counterparty to Greece to Titlos, which now meant that cash flow from Greece would be running through Titlos and that Titlos would sell notes that then could be pledged to the ECB.

    On Feb. 26, just 22 days after Titlos filed corporation records with the U.K., Titlos sold E5.1 billion in notes maturing in 2039. The notes, rated "A1" by Moody's Investors Service, then were repurchased by the National Bank of Greece through a private placement, according to a National Bank of Greece securities filing.

    According to that report, "the notes will be used as security for obtaining liquidity from the ECB." It isn't known if the notes currently reside at the ECB. Those collateral pledges have been subject to a haircut, or charge, levied by the ECB.

    One question today is whether a party to the transactions remains at risk of a large collateral payment following a ratings-agency downgrade. That concern stems from what happened in 2008 when U.S. insurance giant American International Group Inc. nearly failed because its own counterparties, including Goldman, demanded payments AIG couldn't cover.

    A Titlos prospectus indicates that Greece isn't on the hook for a collateral payment to Titlos if Greece is downgraded. The National Bank of Greece, which remained in the transaction to provide hedges for Titlos, is responsible for collateral payments if the bank is downgraded to certain levels, according to Moody's.

    The notes remain tightly intertwined, though, with Greece. In December, Moody's downgraded the notes to "A2," midway between the ratings agency's highest triple-A rating and its first junk-bond grade, from A1 after the ratings agency had downgraded Greece to A2 from A1.

  • 書呆子
  • 歐元是〔把馬車放在馬的前方〕的傑作,歐元馬車還只有一個輪子( 歐元只有貨幣政策的工具,沒有財政政策的工具). 


    出來跑總是要還的.